Of Tort Reform and Millionaire
Muggers: Should An Obscure Equitable
Doctrine Be Revived To
Dent the Litigation Crisis?

ROBERT A. PRENTICE*

"No polluted hand shall touch the pure fountains of justice."
-Chief Justice Wilmot. 1
"No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon
an immoral or an illegal act."
-Lord Mansfield. 2
"Bernard McCummings, a New York City mugger, became a millionaire last
week when the U.S. Supreme Court lot stand a ruling that a police officer
used excessive force by shooting him in the back as he fled a crime scene
in 1984. McCummings, paralyzed from the chest down from the shooting,
had been awarded $4.3 million in damages by a New York Court."3

* Smith Centennial Professor of Business Law, Graduate School of Business,
University of Texas at Austin.
I. 14 Collins v. Blantern, [1767] 2 Wilson 341, 350, 95 Eng. Rep. 847, 852
(K.B.).
2. Holman v. Johnson, [1775] I Cowp. 342, 343, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121
(K.B.). This dictum is often cited as the origin of the ex turpi causa doctrine. Plaintiff
sued to recover the purchase price of tea pursuant to a sale made in Scotland. The court
held that because the contract was perfectly legal in Scotland, defendant could not raise
as a defense the fact that the seller may have known that defendant buyer intended to
smuggle the tea into England.
3. Paul Clegg, A Mugger Millionaire, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 5, 1993, at A25.

53

In a world of anecdote-driven tort reform movements, few
stories other than the infamous cup of very hot McDonald 'S
coffee have more power to outrage than that of Bernard
McCummings, the "millionaire mugger" who was awarded $4.3
million by a jury after he was shot by a police officer allegedly
using excessive force. A seldom-invoked equitable doctrine-----ex
turpi causa non oritur actio ("no cause of action can arise out of
an immoral act") has been invoked more liberally in other
western common-law nations than in the United States and could
be revived by U.S. courts and legislatures to bar recovery in
cases like that of McCummings and, potentially, in a much
broader range of cases as well. However , this Article demonstrates that when the initial outrage of newspaper editorial
writers is replaced by reasoned analysis, it becomes clear that
the ex turpi causa doctrine should, other than in very exceptional
circumstances, not bar recovery by even the most unsympathetic
tort plaintiffs.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Many believe that the United States faces a litigation crisis of
unparalleled dimensions. The crisis supposedly consists of the filing of
far too many lawsuits, particularly tort actions. Fonner Vice-President
Quayle, for example, noted in his capacity as chairman of the
President's Council on Competitiveness that eighteen million new civil
cases were filed in the United States in 1989 alone. 4 The ill effects
caused by such filings supposedly include loss of jobs, burdens to the
U.S. economy, suppression of product innovation, and general injury to
U.S. competitiveness in the global economy.5
Suggestions for remedying the crisis have come from many quarters
and have taken several shapes and forms.. Most states have passed tort
reform legislation and at the time of this writing the Republicans'
"Contract with America" is proposing more federal changes, yet no
proponent of the "litigation crisis" theory would suggest that these
reforms constitute anything more than a starting point for necessary

Dan

4. Talbot "Sandy" D' Alemberte, Restarting Engine of Law Reform, AB.A. J.,
Oct. 1991, at 8.
5. See generally WALTER K. OLSON, THE LmGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT
HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991); PETER W. HUBER, THE
LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988).
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change. 6
Americans have often looked abroad for helpful reform ideas,
especially because other nations are generally perceived as having less
litigation than the United States. 7 Most prominently, many suggest that
America borrow the "English rule" regarding attorneys' fees, so that a
losing plaintiff will have to pay the attorneys' fees of a prevailing
defendant. Such a rule, which prevails in most of the rest of the western
world, supposedly will discourage the filing of frivolous lawsuits.8
This Article also looks abroad to other western common-law
jurisdictions that, suffering their own increases in tort litigation, use the
ex turpi causa non oritur actio doctrine (which means, essentially, that
no lawsuit may be brought by a person who has committed an illegal or
immoral act) much more often than U.S. courts. The doctrine is used to
dismiss tort litigation brought by a particularly troublesome type of
plaintiff-a person, such as Bernard McCummings (the "millionaire
mugger" referred to above), who is himself (or herself) guilty of
wrongdoing in a legal or moral sense.9 Indeed, the ex turpi causa

6. The author has elsewhere expressed the opinion that over-litigiousness is not
one of America's more pressing problems. Robert A. Prentice & Mark E. Roszkowski,

"Tort Reform" and the Liability "Revolution": Defending Strict Liability in Tort for
Defective Products, 27 GoNz. L. REV. 251, 254-71 (1992) (suggesting that claims of a
"liability crisis" are overblown). Nonetheless, the author, too, would be pleased if fewer
frivolous lawsuits were filed. Although aware that our current rules for tort litigation
are not perfect, the author has defended strict products liability, one of the most
controversial areas of tort law. Id. at 272-300. However, the author has also suggested
helpful modifications to the current tort law system. See Robert A. Prentice, Reforming
Punitive Damages: The Judicial Bargaining Concept, 7 REV. Lmo. 113 (1988)
(expressing doubt as to existence of a punitive damages "crisis," but suggesting that
judges use ''judicial remittitur" of punitive damage awards in appropriate circumstances
to induce defendants to remove dangerous products from the market).
7. On the other hand, there is evidence that despite the widespread perception to
the contrary, U.S. citizens are no more litigious than citizens of other western
industrialized nations. Bob Gibbins, Propositions.Built on Myth, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 7,
1991, at 17, 17-18.
8. See Edward A. Snyder, An English Reform for American Law, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 9, 1991, at AS (strongly supporting U.S. adoption of the English rule); Herbert M.
Kritzer, The English Rule, AB.A. J., Nov. 1992, at 54 (questioning the efficacy of the
English rule).
9. Proponents of tort reform are almost as fond of citing examples of tort
recoveries by criminals or drunk drivers as they are of citing excesses by "greedy"
plaintiffs' attorneys. E.g., Capping the Courts, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1985, at 30
(editorial) (citing such examples). Of course, many of these tales are simply legal
versions of "the urban legend." See generally Fred Strasser, Have 'Anecdotes,' Not
Facts, Fueled Tort Crisis?, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 24, 1986, at 15.
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defense has enjoyed a positive revival in recent years in AngloAustralian jurisdictions. 10 Yet, the words ex turpi causa almost never
appear in modem American court opinions. 11 Furthermore, the doctrine
has received virtually no attention in American legal literature, 12 and
the only American decision which could be deemed a "landmark" in the
area was decided in 1845. 13
This Article seeks (a) to explain the essence of the ex turpi causa
doctrine, 14 (b) to examine how it is applied in various forms in selected
western common law jurisdictions (Australia, England, Canada, New
Zealand, and the United States), 15 ( c) to evaluate the various specific
approaches to application of the ex turpi causa defense which have
evolved in these nations, 16 and (d) to give an overall appraisal of the

The Bernard McCummings case, however, is not apocryphaL See McCummings v.
New York City Transit Auth., 613 N.E.2d 559 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 548
(1993). It also led to howls of protest. See, e.g., Eric Breindl, Who Says Crime Doesn't
Pay?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 1993, at Al7; Mugging the System, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Dec. 3, 1993, at Al 7; The Mugger and His Millions, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1993, at B2;
Richard Cohen, A Mugging of Taxpayers, PLAIN DEALER {CLEVELAND), Dec. 5, 1993,
at 3D; Steve Lopez, A Mugger Shouldn't Profit from Beating, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Dec. 4, 1993, at 29A; Tom Knott, Thuggery Just Isn't What It Used To Be, WASH.
TIMES, Dec. 2, 1993, at C2; Marcia Chambers, Sua Sponte, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 20, 1993,
at 13 (listing the case as an example of the "foibles of the legal community" in 1993).
10. See, e.g., LEWIS N. KLAR. TORT LAW 326 {1991) {citing ex turpi causa's
"apparent rebirth in Canadian tort law"); R.F.V. HEUSTON & R.A. BUCKLEY, SALMOND
AND HEUSTON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 327 {19th ed. 1987) {ex turpi causa defense has
enjoyed an "apparent rebirth in Canadian tort law"); ALLEN M. LINDEN, CANADIAN
TORT LAW 439 (1977) ("There has been a rebirth of an old, harsh doctrine of the
common law-ex turpi causa non oritur actio, or what might be called the illegality
defence."); C. R. Symmons, Ex Turpi Causa in English Tort Law, 44 Moo. L. REV. 585,
588 (1981) (ex turpi causa seems "in receat years to have attained greater prominence
in tort cases").
11. A quick LEXIS search will confirm the accuracy of this statement. When the
phrase does appear, it is almost always in a footnote or a passing reference, with no
attempt to explain or justify the doctrine.
12. The last full-scale discussion of the matter was apparently in Harold S. Davis;
The Plaintiff's Illegal Act as a Defense in Actions of Tort, 18 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1905).
The issue has received passing attention in a few more recent articles (E.g., Paula C.
Murray & Brenda J.. Winslett, The Constitutional Right to Privacy and Emerging Tort
Liability for Deceit in Interpersonal Relationships, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 779, 817-22;
Robert A. Prentice & Paula C. Murray, Liability for Transmission of Herpes: Using
Traditional Tort Principles to Encourage Honesty in Sexual Relationships, 11 J..
CONTEMP. L. 67, 93-101 (1984); Louis A. Alexander, Liability in Tort for the Sexual
Transmission of Disease: Genital Herpes and the Law, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 101, 13537 (1984); Marc Gary, Comment, Tort Liability of Participants in Consensual Crimes,
65 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1629-34 (1977).
13. Bosworth v. Swansey, 51 Mass. (10 Met.) 363 (1845).
14. See infra notes 20-75 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 76-177 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 178-255 and accompanying text.
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doctrine to determine whether it should be revitalized by the courts 17
(or adopted by the legislatures) in the United States18 as a means of
solving the so-called tort litigation crisis.
Whether application of the ex turpi causa defense in tort cases is an
appropriate doctrinal transplantation (from contract law) raises many
interesting questions that are basic to the very theoretical underpinnings
of tort jurisprudence. 19

II.

EX TuRPI CAUSA NON ORJTUR ACTI0: BACKGROUND AND
ORIGINS

A.

A Legal Maxim Defined

As noted earlier, ex turpi causa non oritur actio means: ''No cause of
action can arise out of an immoral (or illegal) inducement (or consideration). "20

B.

Roots in Contract Law
1. Introduction

The ex turpi causa doctrine originated in contract law;21 indeed, ex
turpi contractu non oritur actio22 is the most familiar application of the
doctrine. It is a fundamental concept of contract law that illegal
bargains will not be enforced by the courts.23
17. Ex turpi causa non oritur actio is a court-developed legal maxim developed
for contract cases and occasionally applied in tort cases. Courts invented the doctrine.
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 330 (1982). They have slowly discarded it in tort
cases in the United States. Theoretically, they have the power to revive it.
18. See infra notes 256-364 and accompanying text.
19. The ex turpi causa defense raises many intricate and fascinating philosophical
and legal questions, but suffers from the problem raised by Justice Manning when he
complained that "a nice point of law has been brought to the surface of an unedifying
contest between unmeritorious suitors." Godbolt v. Fittock, 1963 N.S.W. St. R. 617,624
(Austl.) (paraphrasing Psaltis v. Schultz, 76 C.L.R. 547, 557 (1948) (Austl.) (Dixon, J.)).
20. BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 447 (3d ed. 1969).
21. Godbolt, 1963 N.S.W. St. R. at 627 (Manning, J.) (The ex turpi causa doctrine
"had its origin no later than the eighteenth century and was directed primarily to
contracts.").
22. Literally, "[f]rom an immoral (or illegal) contract no action can arise."
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 20, at 447.
23. 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON, CONTRACTS§ 1630 (2d ed. 1937).
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The famous English "Highwayman's case," Everet v. Williams, 24
illustrates this limitation on the principle of freedom of contract. In
Everet, one partner sued another, alleging that the defendant had kept
more than his share of the partnership's proceeds. The complaint was
rather vague in describing the nature of the business, alleging that the
parties "proceeded jointly in [dealing for commodities] with good
success on Hounslow Heath, where they dealt with a gentleman for a
gold watch;" that in Finchley plaintiff and defendant "dealt with several
gentlemen for divers watches, rings, swords, canes, hats, cloaks, horses,
bridles, saddles, and other things;" that a gentleman from Blackheath
had items defendant thought "might be had for little or no money in case
they could prevail on the said gentleman to part with the said things."25
It is told that when it dawned on the court that the partners were
highwaymen, the solicitors for both parties were jailed, and the parties
themselves were executed, vividly making the point that courts will not
enforce illegal bargains.

2.

Scope of the Doctrine

The Restatement of the Law of Contracts specifies that a contract is
"illegal . . . if either its formation or performance is criminal, tortious,
or otherwise opposed to public policy."26 Thus, this is a broad concept,
especially so because it gives courts discretion to go beyond criminal
acts in order to refuse to give effect to bargains deemed inconsistent
with that "unruly horse"27 of public policy. Public policy has been
used to invalidate contracts on grounds of immorality, unconscionability,
economic policy, unprofessional conduct, injury to public institutions,

24. The case is partially reproduced and discussed in The Highwayman's Case
(Everet v. Williams), 9 LAW. Q. REV. 197 (Sir Frederick Pollock ed., 1893).
25. Id.
26. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 512 (1932). This statement of
the law has been refined in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 178 (1981).
27. Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229, 252, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (1824)
(Burrough, J.). This unruly horse also evolved over time as standards of morality and
business ethics changed. As noted in Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224 (1892):
It is impossible to define with accuracy what is meant by that public policy for
an interference and violation of which a contract may be declared invalid. It
may be understood in general that contracts which are detrimental to the
interests of the public as understood at the time fall within the ban. The
standard of such policy is not absolutely invariable or fixed, since contracts
which at one stage of our civilization may seem to conflict with public
interests, at a more advanced stage are treated as legal and binding.
Id. at 233-34.
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and many other grounds. 28 Courts have, on public policy grounds,
refused to enforce numerous types of agreements,29 including: contracts
inducing the commission of a tort,30 contracts in restraint of trade (such
as overly broad covenants-not-to-compete31), gambling or lottery
contracts,32 contracts adversely affecting the administration of justice
(such as champerty and maintenance contracts33), contracts tending to
corrupt or to cause a neglect of duty (such as contingent fees for
lobbyists34 or unfair exculpatory clauses35), and contracts impeding the
marriage relationship. 36

3. Rationale of the Doctrine
Although the common law gives great weight to the freedom of men
and women to privately order their own affairs, the illegality defense
embodies the legal system's recognition that in some instances the
freedom to contract is outweighed by broader societal interests.37
Assume that A hires B to murder C. Although it is clear that the courts

28. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 22-1
(2d ed. 1977).
29. See generally 14 WALTER H. E. JAEGER & SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 1628 (3d ed. 1972); LAURENCE P. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 430-62 (2d ed. 1965); GROVER C. GRISMORE & JOHN E.
MURRAY, JR., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 488-503 (rev. ed. 1965).
30. E.g., Sayres v. Decker Auto. Co., 145 N.E. 744 (N.Y. 1924) (holding an
agreement to defraud an insurance company unenforceable)
31. E.g., Bryceland v. Northey, 772 P.2d 36 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (finding a
covenant too broad temporally to be enforceable).
32. E.g., McFadden v. Bain, 91 P.2d 292 (Or. 1939) (deciding that where a prize
wall awarded on the basis of mere chance, illicit lottery was involved).
33. E.g., Fordson Coal Co. v. Garrard, 125 S.W.2d 977, 981 (Ky. 1939) (deciding
that champerty and maintenance contracts are those contracts that have "the tendency or
purpose to stir up and foment litigation, multiply contentions, or unsettle the peace and
quiet of a community, or set one neighbor against another" and were therefore void).
34. E.g., Gesellschaft v. Brown, 78 F.2d 410, 412 (D.C. Cir. 1935), cert. denied,
296 U.S. 663 (1935) (finding a contingent fee for passage of a bill was void as "a direct
and strong incentive to the exertion of not merely personal, but sinister, influence upon
the legislature").
35. E.g., DeVito v. New York University College of Dentistry, 544 N.Y.S.2d 109
(Sup. Ct. 1989) (holding a release of liability for willful or gross negligence was
unenforceable).
36. E.g., McCoy v. Flynn, 151 N.W. 465 (Iowa 1915) (deciding that a promise to
pay a woman $5,000 if she remained unmarried for three years was unenforceable).
37. See Peat Marwick v. Haass, 775 S.W.2d 698, 710 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (''The
right of competent parties to make their own bargain is not unlimited.").
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should not enforce the agreement at the behest of either party, many
cases are not so clear and therefore involve a delicate weighing of public
policy factors.
Factors favoring enforcement may include the justified expectations of
the parties, any forfeiture that might result from a refusal to enforce, and
excusable ignorance of the law by one of the parties.38 Factors
weighing against enforcement include the importance of the public
policy involved, the seriousness and deliberateness of the parties'
misconduct, and the directness of connection between that misconduct
and the agreement.39 Thus, as a. general rule, a plaintiff who has
performed a promise and who would face a burdensome forfeiture if the
contract were not performed may recover if the illicit act is merely
ma/um prohibitum.40 However, this general rule is filled with exceptions, and the distinction between acts that are ma/um prohibitum
("wrong because prohibited") and those that are ma/um in se ("wrong in
themselves") has been harshly criticized.41
Among the oft-spoken reasons for the American courts' refusal to
enforce illegal or immoral contracts are: (a) to deter illegal or other
undesirable conduct,42 (b) to avoid sullying the machinery of justice,43
and (c) to regulate contractual morality. 44 Similar reasons are given in

38. FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, at 328.
39. Id.
40. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 28, at 788 (quoting John E. Rosasco
Creameries, Inc. v. Cohen, 11 N.E.2d 908, 909 (N.Y. 1937)).
.
41. Gibbs v. Consol. Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396, 411-12 (1889) (the distinction
between these two concepts "has long since been exploded"). See generally ARTHUR
L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 1169, (1952).
42. See McMullen v. Hoffinan, 174 U.S. 639,670 (1899). The McMullen Court
stated:·
.
The more plainly parties understand that when they enter into contracts of this
nature they place themselves outside the protection of the law, so far as that
protection consists in aiding them to enforce such contracts, the less inclined
will they be to enter into them. In that way the public secures the benefit of
a rigid adherence to the law.
Id.; see also Sirlcin v. Fourteenth St. Store, 108 N.Y.S. 830, 834 (N.Y. App. Div. 1908)
("I think nothing will be more effective in stopping the growth and spread of this
corrupting and now criminal custom [of commercial bribery] than a decision that the
courts will refuse their aid to a guilty vendor or vendee ...."). See generally Juliet
P. Kostritsky, Illegal Contracts and Efficient Deterrence:A Study in Modern Contract
Theory, 74 IOWA L. REV. 115 (1988) (arguing that the illegality doctrine is based on
courts' application of an efficient deterrence approach).
43. Manning v. Noa, 76 N.W.2d 75, 77(Mich. 1956) ("Our doors are open to both
the virtuous and the villainous. We do not, however, lend our aid to the furtherance of
an unlawful project, nor do we decide, as between two scoundrels, who cheated whom
the more.").
44. Kostritsky, supra note 42, at 119.
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other common-law jurisdictions.45

4.

Effect of Contractual Illegality

Generally speaking, courts refuse to lend the judicial process to aid
either party to an illegal bargain. Courts often state that illegal contracts
are void ab initio, (void from their inception) but it seems more accurate
to conclude that courts simply leave· the parties to an illegal bargain
where they find them,46 refusing to allow judicial machinery to be used
to provide remedies to one who has participated in· an illegal transaction,

47

'

'

There are, of course, exceptional situations where the courts will lend
a hand in cases involving illegal contracts, including (a) where plaintiff
is in the category of persons meant to be protected by the violated
statute,48 (b) where plaintiff is less at fault than defendant,49 and (c)
where a "severable" contract allows the court to enforce the legal

45. See e.g., Euro-diam Ltd. v. Bathurst, [1988] 2 W.L.R. 51 7 (Eng. C.A.);
Bowmakers Ltd. v. Barnet Instruments Ltd., [1945] 1 K.B. 65 (Eng.); Beresford v. Royal
Ins. Co. Ltd., [1938] A.C. 586 (Eng.). See generally Y. L. Tan, Stolen Diamonds and
Ex Turpi Causa, 104 LAW Q. REV. 523 (E.M.B. Reynolds ed., 1988).
46. This, of course, often means that one wrongdoer unjustly profits at the expense
of another. For example, if A has lost an illegal bet to B and paid on that bet, a court
will not assist A in retrieving her money. This result stems not from any solicitude for
supra note 17, at 326-27.
B, but simply from a reluctance to aid A. FARNSWORTH
· 47. GRISMORE & MURRAY, supra note 29, at 509. · Grismore &.Murray believe
that the essence of the courts' approach is embodied in the following statement from
Lord Mansfield:
The principle of public policy is this; ei dolo malo non oritur actio. No Court
will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or·
an illegal act. If, from the plaintiff's own stating or otherwise, the cause of
action appears to arise ex turpi causa or the transgression of a positive law of
this country, there the-Court says he has no right to be assisted. It is upon that
ground the Court goes; not for the sake of the defendant, but because they will
not lend their aid to such a plaintiff. So if the plaintiff and defendant were to
change sides, and the defendant was to bring his action against the plaintiff,
the latter would then have the advantage of it; for where both are equally in
· fault, potior est conditio defendentis.
·
Holman v. Johnson, [1775] 1 Cowp. 342, 343, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B. 1775).
48. E.g., Kneeland v. Emerton, 183 N.E. 155 (Mass. 1932) (Deciding that the
purchaser of illegal bonds which defendant failed to register under blue-sky law was not
denied remedy of enforcement of the bonds).·
·
49. E.g., Stewart v. Wright, 147 F. 321 (C.C. Mo. 1906), cert. denied, 203 U.S.
590 (1906) (granting amateur gambler hoodwinked by infamous Buckfoot Gang relief).
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portions of a contract that are independent of the illicit provisions. 50
C.

Ex Turpi Causa: Transplanted to the Tort Context

1.

Overview

Although there is little or no historical evidence that the ex turpi causa
non oritur actio defense was originally intended for application beyond
the contractual context, it has been asserted, with varying degrees of
success, as a defense in tort cases in the United States and, more
frequently, ·in other western common-law jurisdictions. This is so
despite the warnings of many that a contract doctrine should not lightly
be transplanted to the field of tort law. 51
In the United Kingdom, Lord Diplock noted in 1964:
[E]x turpi causa non oritur actio is concerned not specifically with the
lawfulness of contracts but generally with the enforcement of rights by the
courts, whether or not such rights arise under contract. All that the rule means
is that the courts will not enforce a right which would otherwise be enforceable
if the right arises out of an act committed by the person asserting the right (or
by someone who is regarded in law as his successor) which is regarded by the
court as sufficiently anti-social to justify the court's refusing to enforce that
right. 52

In transplanting the ex turpi causa defense from contract law into the
body of tort law, courts have given the same basic justifications for the
doctrine53 and have provided for many of the same limitations. 54

50. E.g., Panasonic Co. v. Zinn, 903 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1990) (deciding that an
illegal provision of contract that was not an essential feature of the agreement could be
severed and the valid portion of the contract enforced).
51. E.g., G.H.L. Fridman, The Wrongdoing Plaintiff, 18 MCGILL L.J. 275, 295
(1972) ("Slavish emulation of the contract principles in an altogether different situation".
could lead to a confusion of the real issue before a court faced with the tort problem.").
52. Hardy v. Motor Insurers' Bureau, [1964] 2 ALL E.R. 742, 750 (emphasis
added).
53. See infra notes 256-325 and accompanying text.
54. For example, in tort law the ex turpi causa defense does not bar recovery by
a wrongful plaintiff who was a member of the class protected by a criminal statute.
E.g., Galvin v. Jennings, 289 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1961) (state alcoholic beverage regulation
intended to protect minors and drunks, so plaintiff was permitted to recover for personal
injuries resulting from illegal sale by defendant); Hudson v. Craft, 33 Cal. 2d 654, 201
P.2d 1 (1949) (state ,law intended to protect amateur boxers, so combatants allowed to
recover for injuries resulting from illegal boxing match).
Also, as in contract cases, courts in tort cases often provide compensatory relief to a
plaintiff who was significantly less at fault (not in pari delicto ) than the defendant.
E.g., De Vall v. Strunk, 96 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) (plaintiff female seduced
into sexual intercourse by defendant's false promise to marry entitled to recover on
battery claim for sexually transmitted disease); Panther v. McKnight, 125 Okla. 134,256
P. 916 (1926) (plaintiff who relied on defendant's false assurance that they were legally
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Courts in the common law system do not hold wrongdoing plaintiffs
to be caput lupinum. 55 Forfeiture and taint of blood are no longer
general consequences of criminal activity, 56 yet few courts would aid
a burglar who tripped on a defective stair in his suit against the
homeowner who failed to post a warning. Before examining the current
state of the ex turpi causa defense in tort suits brought in western
common-law jurisdictions, it might be helpful to examine some factual
scenarios to illustrate how a revitalization of the ex turpi causa defense
in the tort arena would reduce the amount of tort litigation (and ultimate
liability of tort defendants) in the United States:
* Consider McCummings v. New York City Transit Authority,51 in
which a mugger who was shot by transit police as he sought to escape
apprehension was awarded a $4.3 million judgment against the City
of New York. In England and other countries, many courts would
apply the ex turpi causa defense to deny recovery in such cases. 58
* Consider Ashmore v. Cleanweld Prods., Inc., 59 in which plaintiff
was injured while making an illegal pipe bomb that exploded
premanturely. The court held that his lawsuit against the manufacturer
of one of the components of the pipe bomb could proceed despite the
illegal nature of his activities.60 A vigorous application of the ex
turpi causa defense would likely lead to an outright dismissal of such

married also entitled to recover for transmission of venereal disease).
55. "Caput lupinum" means a "wolfs head" or outlaw. BALLENTINE'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 20, at 174. See Henwood v. Municipal Tramways Trust, [1938]
60 C.L.R. 438, 446 (Latham, C.J.) ("[T]here is no general principle of English law that
a person who is engaged in some unlawful act is disabled from complaining of injury
done to him by other persons, either deliberately or accidentally. He does not become
caput lupinum."); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("The door of a court is not barred because the plaintiff has committed a
crime. The confinned criminal is as much entitled to redress as his most virtuous fellow
citizen; no record of crime, however long, makes one an outlaw,"); Rodney v. Rapid
Transit Co., 267 N.Y.S. 86, 87 (Sup. Ct. 1933) (allowing recovery for false imprisonment by illegal alien and noting "even the meanest outcast is entitled to protection
against unlawful restraint of his person").
56. M.P. Furmston, The Analysis of Illegal Contracts, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 267,
274 (1965).
57. 613 N.E.2d 559 (N.Y.}, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 548 (1993).
58. E.g., Murphy v. Culhane, [1977] Q.B. 94, 98 (Eng. C.A.) (dicta).
59. 672 P.2d 1230 (Or. 1983).
60. Id. at 1231.
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a suit based on plaintiff's illegal acts. 61
* Consider Gonzalez v. Garcia, 62 in which plaintiff passenger and
defendant driver went on a drinking expedition. Plaintiff knew that
defendant was extremely drunk, yet voluntarily rode in the car with
him and was injured when an accident occurred. Plaintiff recovered
a judgment against defendant, and it was held that the trial court
properly refused to instruct the jury regarding the assumption of risk
defense. In other countries, the ex turpi causa defense has been held
to completely·bar recovery in similar cases. 63
* Consider Long v. Adams,64 in which plaintiff contracted herpes
from defendant during sexual intercourse. Despite the fact that the
parties were not married and the intercourse was therefore illicit,
plaintiff was allowed to recover on a battery theory. · Recognition of
the ex turpi causa defense might well totally bar recovery in such
circumstances because of plaintiff's immoral and possibly illegal
acts. 65
* Consider Chomatopoulos v. Roma DeNotte Social Club, 66 in which
plaintiff was stabbed eight times while intervening in a fight that
occurred at an illegal gambling establishment. Plaintiff sued the
operator of the establishment for negligence and was held entitled to
recover. In similar cases in other countries, the ex turpi causa defense
has' been used to hold that no duty of care arises to protect a voluntary
·
frequenter of such illicit establishments.67
* Consider Laird v. Illinois Cen. R.R. Co.,68 in which a FELA69
plaintiff was allowed to recover fifty percent of his damages caused
by a concurrence of his employer's negligence and his own violation
of a safety regulation meant for his own protection. In other countries
the ex turpi ·causa defense has sometimes been invoked to totally bar

61. E.g., Barker v. Kallash, 468 N.E.2d 39 (N.Y. 1984) (dismissing suit by plaintiff
injured while making illegal pipe bomb).
62. 75 Cal. App. 3d 874, 142 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1977).
63. E.g., Miller v. Decker, [1955] 4 D.L.R. 92 (B.C.C.A.) (Smith, J.A.) (denying
recovery on ex turpi causa grounds to drunken passenger who sued drunken driver).
64. 333 S.E.2d 852 (Ga. 1985).
65. E.g., Hegarty v. Shine, 14 Cox Crim. Cas. 145 (Ir. C.A. 1858) (denying
recovery on ex turpi causa grounds to woman who was infected with venereal disease
while having illicit intercourse with defendant).
66. 515 A.2d 296 (N.J. County Ct. 1985).
67. E.g., Danluk v. Birkner, [1946] 3 D.L.R. 172 (Ont. C.A.) (plaintiff injured
when he stepped out of door with no stairway during police raid on defendant's
gambling establishment not owed duty by operator of gambling establishment). ·
68. 566 N.E.2d 944 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
69. Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976).
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recovery in such cases. 70
* Consider Klanseck v. Anderson Sales & Serv., Inc., 11 in which
plaintiff was injured while driving his brand new motorcycle. Plaintiff
had failed to obtain a statutorily mandated license to drive motorcycles. This failure was held to constitute evidence of comparative
negligence on plaintiff's part; he recovered only forty percent.of his
damages from defendant seller. Before the ex turpi causa defense .fell
into virtual disuse in this country, it had been used to completely bar
recovery to a wrongdoer such as the plaintiff in this case. 2
* Consider. Llorence v. State Dep't of Transp., 13 in which plaintiff
was allowed to recover for injuries sustained in a traffic. accident
though his speeding was a fifty percent cause of the accident.
Stringently applied, the ex turpi causa defense might well bar any
recovery whatsoever for injuries sustained in an accident occurring
while plaintiff was violating the legal speed limit.74
. Other examples could be given, but the point should be clear: If U.S.
turpitu
causa defense as it once existed in the United
courts revived the ex
States and as it currently exists in some other western common law
nations, the face of tort litigation in the United States could be
profoundly changed. Not only could mugger Bernard McCummings be
denied recovery, but a wide range of less severe illegal or immoral
conduct could also disqualify plaintiffs from recovery of tort damages.
Resurrection of this defense in the United States by borrowing theoretical approaches developed abroad could substantially reduce the number
of successful tort suits.
Would this be a salutary development? This is the essential question
explored in this Article.
Editorialists addressing the Bernard
McCummings case surely would support revival of the doctrine, 75 but
a truly satisfactory answer to the question requires an examination of the

70. E.g., Hillen v. I.C.I. (Alkali), Ltd., [1934] 1 K.B. 455 (Eng. C.A.) (stevedores
who breached safety regulation not allowed to recover for injuries sustained when hatch
coverings collapsed).
71. 393 N.W.2d 356 (Mich. 1986).
72. E.g., Hanson v. Culton, 269 Mass. 471, 169 N.E. 272 (Mass. 1929) (out-ofstate plaintiff who had not registered his car in Massachusetts was barred from
recovering from negligent defendant).
73. 558 So. 2d 320 (La. Ct. App. 1990), appeal denied, 565 So. 2d 442 (La. 1990).
74. E.g., Tuttle v. City of Lawrence, 119 Mass. 276 (1876); Heland v. City of
Lowell, 85 Mass. (3 Allen) 407 (1862).
··
75. See supra note 59.
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ex turpi causa defense in its various forms and applications. The
following part illustrates how courts in selected western common-law
jurisdictions have struggled to develop a principled application of the ex
turpi causa defense in tort cases.
III.

APPLICATION OF THE EX TURPI CAUSA DEFENSE TO TORT CASES
IN WESTERN COMMON-LAW JURISDICTIONS

A. Australia
No jurisdiction has a more developed jurisprudence in this area than
Australia. Over time, Australian courts have explicated three separate
approaches to applying the ex turpi causa doctrine in tort cases. The
first has been applied in cases involving a wrongdoing plaintiff; the
second two have been applied primarily in cases where injuries were
· sustained during joint criminal ventures involving both plaintiff and
defendant.

1.

Legislative Intent

The facts in Henwood v. Municipal Tramways Trust76 were simple
enough. Decedent was riding defendant's tram when he became
nauseated. He leaned out over a rail on the offside of the train and
vomited. While so engaged, decedent's head struck in succession two
steel standards which were in the middle of the street, just seventeen
inches from the side of the train. The key issue was whether decedent's
parents were barred from a negligence recovery against defendant by
decedent's violation of section 74 of the Municipal Tramways Trust Act
of 1906 which provided: "No passenger shall project or lean his head or
other portion of his body or lii:nbs out of any window in any
tram... 77
Judges McTieman and Dixon reviewed American cases,78 determining that "the directness of the connection between the illegality and the
injury seems to have emerged as the discrimen more generally adopted"
in allowing or disallowing recovery. 79 They, however, rejected this
causation approach in favor of one keyed to legislative intent:

76: . 60 C.L.R. 438 (1938) (Aust!.).
77. Id. at 439. In the United States, the case likely would have turned not on the
ex turpi causa issue, but upon an assumption of risk defense. The tram car carried eight
conspicuous notices: "Danger. Do not lean over the rail."
78. Among the U.S. cases discussed were Bosworth v. Swansey, 51 Mass. (10
Met.) 363 (1845) and Lyons v. Desotelle, 124 Mass. 387 (1878). Id. at 459.
79. Id. For a discussion of this proximate cause approach see infra part 111.E.1.
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We do not think that, in the absence of English authority requiring us to do so,
we ought to adopt as part of the law of torts a general principle that, if the
damage suffered by the plaintiff has been directly brought about by an act of
his which is unlawful, he can never complain of a wrongful or negligent act or
omission on the part of the defendant from which the damage otherwise flows
as a reasonable and probable consequence. It appears to us that in every case
the question must be whether it is part of the purpose of the law against which
the plaintiff has offended to disentitle a person doing the prohibited act from
complaining of the other party N neglect or default, without which his own act
would not have resulted in injury.
[T]he general principle remains that a private right of action is not created
by a penal statutory provision unless the statute so intends. In the same way,
we think that, unless the statute so intends, no penal provision should receive
an operation which deprives a person offending against it of a private right of
action which in the absence of such a statutory provision would accrue to
him. 80

In Henwood, Judges Dixon and McTieman concluded that depriving
a person such as decedent (or his heirs) of a cause of action because of
the violation was "[p]robably the last thing intended by the framers." 81

2.

Public Policy

A second Australian approach to application of the ex turpi causa
defense in tort cases was enunciated in Godbolt v. Fittock, 82 which
involved a simple wreck of a truck driven· by defendant in which
plaintiff was a passenger. The complicating factor was that the parties'
journey involved the theft and contemplated sale of cattle. When the
accident occurred at 2:20 a.m., the plaintiff and defendant had already
stolen six cattle from three farms and were on their way to market.
Judge Sugerman's opinion denied recovery on the basis of the ex turpi
causa defense, rejecting what he perceived as the American causation
approach. Sugerman enunciated instead a rationale based on public
policy considerations:
The directness of the connection between the criminal purpose and the journey
in whose course the injury occurred, rather than a causal association of the
injury with the specifically criminal character of the joint venture, is, in my
opinion, the true criterion in these cases of mutual criminality. The latter causal
association is lacking in the present case. But the former is clearly present, the

80.
81.
82.

Id. at 460-61 (emphasis added).
Id. at 461.
1963 N.S.W. St. R. 617 (Austl.).
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accident having occurred in the course of one continuous journey which
included in uninterrupted sequence the stealing of the calves and their
transportation to market. The question is not one of causation as between the
specifically criminal ingredient in the circumstances and the injury but one
ofpublic policy, operating in this disabling sense .... by way of avoiding the
encouragement to crime which would follow if the law lent its aid to the
resolution of disputes of the present kind between its practitioners and bent its
powers to ensuring that one should receive compensation from another for
injuries sustained by negligent acts and omissions in the course of activities
directly connected with the execution of a joint criminal purpose. 83

Unlike Henwood, Godbolt involved a joint criminal undertaking
between plaintiff and defendant. This factor might well justify a
different approach to the ex turpi causa defense, although why it is less
suitable for application of the legislative intent approach is not clear and
was not addressed by the court. Nor did the judges state whether they
would apply the public policy approach to a case not involving joint
wrongdoers. The judges also did not explain which public policy
factors, other than "avoiding the encouragement to crime," were to be
considered in applying the defense.84
This approach, stressing that the courts should not be available to aid
wrongdoers when to do so would violate .vague concepts of public
policy, has gained acceptance in England, Canada, and in some U.S.
jurisdictions, as we shall see presently. 85

3.

The Duty Rule (Parts One and Two)
I

The High Court of Australia rendered a very important ex turpi causa
decision in 1969 in Smith v. Jenkins, 86 wherein plaintiff was injured in
a wreck while occupying a car driven·by defendant. Plaintiff, defendant,
and two companions had acquired the keys to the car by exerting some
force upon the car's rightful owner.in a public lavatory.
Thus, like Godbolt, and unlike Henwood, Smith involved a joint
criminal undertaking between plaintiff and defendant. The court reached
the same result as in Godbolt, and for the same public policy reasons,
but through an entirely different route. The most influential opinion in

83. Id. at 624 (emphasis added).
84. Although I have characterized the case as applying a public policy approach,
it might also be framed as applying a direct connection (as opposed to a causal
connection) test As the quotation above indicates, Judge Sugennan required as a
prerequisite to application of the ex turpi causa defense not that the injury be caused by
the criminal nature of the joint venture, but simply that there be some direct connection
between the criminal purpose of the venture and the injury. Id.
85. See infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text (Canada), notes 109-20 and
accompanying text (England), and notes 169-72 and accompanying text (United States).
86. 119 C.L.R. 397 (1969) (Austl.).
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the case was penned by Judge Windeyer. Rejecting the ex turpi causa
defense as applicable solely to contract cases, 7 Judge Windeyer
reached the same result as if he had applied the defense by holding that
defendant owed no duty to plaintiff in light of the illicit joint enterprise. 88 He stated: "If a special relationship be in some cases a
prerequisite of a duty of care, it seems to me that in other cases a special
relationship [such as that shared by co-conspirators in a criminal venture]
can exclude a duty of care."89
·
·
Judge Owen agreed, stating: "[T]he law does not recognize the
relationship between two criminals who are jointly engaged in carrying
out a criminal venture as being one which_ gives rise to a dutyof care
owed by the one to the other in the execution of the crime." 0 Judge
Kitto also agreed, resting his reasoning on the "legal inseverability, for
the purposes of responsibility, of the acts which several persons
knowingly contribute to the joint commission of a wrong."91
The judges in Smith specifically held that they were not applying the
ex turpi causa defense in order to disqualify plaintiff from recovering.
Yet, plaintiff was not allowed to recover because no duty could be owed
by defendant. Why? Because plaintiff was involved in the same type
of activity that would have led to invocation of the ex turpi causa
defense in Godbolt. And for what reasons did the court hold that one
criminal in a joint enterprise owes .no duty to the other criminal? The
same reasons that other courts have used to invoke the ex turpi causa
defense:
If two or more persons participate in the commission of a crime, each takes the ·
risk of the negligence of the other or others in the actual performance of.the
criminal act. That formulation can be regarded as founded on the negation of
duty, or on some extension of the rule volenti non fit injuria, or simply on the
refusal of the courts to aid wrongdoers. How it be analysed and explained
matters not. 92

Thus, while their Honours specifically refused to extend the ex turpi
causa doctrine to a tort case involving joint wrongdoers, their result,

87.
88.
criminal
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 413-14.
Obviously, Smith, like Goldbolt and unlike Henwood, involved a joint
enterprise between plaintiff and defendant.
Smith, 119 C.L.R. at 418.
Id. at 425.
Id. at 404.
Id. at 422 (Windeyer, J.) (emphasis added).
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reasoning, and rationale were virtually identical to an application of that
doctrine. Realistically, the judges in Smith were holding that plaintiff's
illegal acts nullified the existence of a duty on the part of defendant
which would have existed absent plaintiff's illegal conduct. Indeed,
using the ex turpi causa defense, the Court of Appeal in New South
Wales reached that very result using very similar reasoning in a similar
case at about the same time that Smith was decided. 93 And subsequent
courts have concluded that there is no substantive difference between the
Godbolt and the Smith approaches. 94 In short, the duty approach is
merely a somewhat disguised application of the ex turpi causa defense.95 It shall be treated as such in this Article.
The approach of Smith constitutes "Part One" of the "duty rule." An
important amendment to the duty approach (constituting "Part Two")
occurred in Jackson v. Harrison, 96 a case which purported to truly
differentiate the duty approach from the public policy approach. 97 In
Jackson, plaintiff was injured while riding in a car driven by defendant,
whom plaintiff knew did not possess a valid driver's license. Although
plaintiff and defendant were jointly participating in an offense under
Australia's Motor Vehicles Act, the court managed to distinguish the
case from Smith, despite a strong dissent. 98
93. Bondarenko v. Sommers, 87 N.S.W.W.N. (pt. 2) 295 (1968) (plaintiff was
injured by defendant in a drag race involving a car they had both stolen).
94. E.g., Tallow v. Tailfeathers, 44 D.L.R.3d 55, 66 (Alta. 1973) (Clement, J.A.)
("I think there is no difference in substance between this expression [by Judge Sugerman
in Godbolt] and the conclusion reached by Judge Kitto in Smith v. Jenkins ....").
95. W.J. Ford, Tort and Illegality: The Ex Turpi Causa Defence in Negligence Law
(Part One), 11 MELB. U. L. REV. 32, 40 (1977) ("By subsuming the unlawfulness into
the question of duty a court is able to avoid defining the nature and limits of the
illegality defence, rather less conspicuously than in a decision explicitly based upon the
maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio."); see also Jane Swanton, Plaintiff a Wrongdoer:
Joint Complicity in an Illegal Enterprise as a. Defence to Negligence, 9 SYDNEY L.
REV. 304, 310 (1981) (viewing Smith as an ex turpi causa case).
96. 138 C.L.R. 438 (1978) (Austl.).
97. Jackson seems to be an attempt to narrow slightly the scope of the ex turpi
causa defense in Australia after it was given a broad reach in Smith. Swanton, supra
note 95, at 325.
98. In dissent, Chief Justice Barwick noted:
It seems to me that where there is a joint venture to do an act punishable by
fine or imprisonment, no narrow or pedantic view should be taken of the
nature and scope of the arrangement between the parties when applying the
principle of Smith v. Jenkins and that the consequence to one of the participants of any act done in furtherance of the arrangement or in obtaining the
benefit of having carried it out should not give rise to a cause of action. The
relationship of those participants should not be regarded as giving rise to
relevant rights or duties. The public policy which the denial of a cause of
action in such circumstances is designed to serve is not satisfied if the
miscreant is not denied rights against his co-participant in the commission of
the offence in respect of acts related to that commission.
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The majority in Jackson clearly amended the Smith rule that no duty
exists between joint criminal venturers. The new approach denies a duty
exists in cases of clear joint criminal enterprise of such a nature that no
standard of care could be determined (such as in a :flight from a pursuing
police car), but recognizes the existence of a duty in a case where a
standard of care could be determined (such as where both passenger and
driver know that the driver does not have a license). Judge Mason
stated:
If a joint participant in an illegal enterprise is to be denied relief against a coparticipant for injury sustained in that enterprise, the denial of relief should be
related not to the illegal character ofthe activity but rather to the character and
incidents of the enterprise and to the hazards which are necessarily inherent in
its execution. A more secure foundation for denying relief, though more limited
in its application---and for that reason fairer in its operation---is to say that the
plaintiff must fail when the character of the enterprise in which the parties are
engaged is such that it is impossible for the court to determine the standard of
care which is appropriate to be observed. The detonation of an explosive
device is a case of this kind. But the driving of a motor vehicle by an
unlicensed and disqualified driver, so long as it does not entail an agreement to
drive the car recklessly on the highway (see Bondarenko v. Sommers (1968) 69
S.R. (N.S.W.) 269), stands in a somewhat different position. In this case the
evidence indicates that the participants contemplated that the vehicle would be
driven carefully---an accident or untoward event might, as in fact it did, lead
to discovery of their breach of the law. It is not suggested that either party
lacked the experience or ability to drive carefully--that they were unlicensed
was due to their having been disqualified as a result of earlier traffic offences
.... A plaintiff will fail when the joint illegal enterprise in which he and the
defendant are engaged is such that the court cannot determine the particular
standard of care to be observed.· It matters not whether this in itself provides
a complete answer to the plaintiff's claim or whether it leads in theory to the
conclusion that the defendant owes no duty of care to the .plaintiff because no
standard of care can be determined in the particular case. 9

The High Court in Australia recently married the duty and standard of
care approaches in Gala v. Preston; 100 a suit arising out of injuries
sustained in a joy-riding incident. The High Court encapsulated the
rationale for the ex turpi causa defense as follows: "In the special and
exceptional circumstances that prevailed, the participants could not have
had any reasonable,basis for expecting that a driver of the vehicle would
drive it according to ordinary standards of competence and care." 101

138 C.L.R. at 445.
99. Id. at 455-56 (emphasis added).
100. 172 C.L.R. 243 (1991) (Austl.).
101. Id. at 254.
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It now appears that the Henwood legislative intent approach to the ex
turpi causa defense will be used in Australia where a plaintiff has
violated a safety regulation meant to protect him or her, but the Smith
duty rule, as amended in Jackson, will be applied where plaintiff and
defendant were joint venturers in crime. 102

B.

England

For years the ex turpi causa defense had little presence in English tort
cases. 103 Since at least the 1981 case of Ashton v. Turner, 104 however, the illegality defense has bloomed in the tort context in England. 105
Ashton adopted the "no duty'' approach pioneered in Australia. 106
Several recent English107 and Scottish108 cases have followed this
approach.
However, another popular approach-a public policy approach keyed
to the "public conscience"--has recently appeared as well. The most
102. See ida at 243 (passenger in stolen car who participated in theft and excessive
drinking owed no duty by negligent joint venturer/driver); Matthews v. McCullock
[1973] 3 N.S.W.L.R. 331, 337 (plaintiff, who was disqualified from holding a license
to ride a motorcycle, was not barred from recovering in negligence from defendant driver
who rear-ended plaintiff at a stop light).
103. Until the 1980s, there was little reason to dispute Lord Asquith's observation
in National Coal Bd. v. England, 1954 App. Cas. 403, 428 (appeal taken from Eng.), that
cases where a tort action had been defeated by the ex turpi causa defense were
"exceedingly rare."
104. [1981] 1 Q.B., 137 (denying recovery to plaintiff passenger in negligence suit
against defendant driver where injury occurred during escape from the scene of a crime
jointly committed by plaintiff and defendant).
105. In giving life to ex turpi causa as a tort defense in England, Judge Ewbank,
in Ashton, cited three earlier cases which can only with difficulty be read as supporting
the existence ofthe defense in tort cases: National Coal Bd. v. England, 1954 App. Cas.
403 (appeal taken from Eng.); Hardy v. Motor Insurers Bureau, [1964] 2 Q.B. 745;
Murphy v. Culhane, [1977] I Q.B. 94. See generally Charles Debattista, Ex Turpi
Causa Returns to the English Law of Torts: Taking Advantage of a Wrong Way Out,
ANGLO-AM. L. REV., Apr.-June 1984, at 15.
Another case to which Ewbank could have referred, but did not, is Johnson v. Croggan
& Co., [1954] 1 W.L.R. 195 (Q.B.), in which, without much explanation, an employee
who violated a safety regulation in choosing to use an inadequate ladder which collapsed
and injured him, was held barred from recovery on ex turpi causa grounds. But see
Cakebread v. Hopping Bros. (Whetstone) Ltd., [1947] 1 K.B. 641 (Eng. C.A.) (rejecting
ex turpi causa defense on similar facts).
106. Ashton, [1981] 1 Q.B. at 146.
107. E.g., Sullivan v. Sullivan, 79 W.N. 615 (1962) (plaintiff passenger's suit
against defendant driver would be dismissed for lack of duty owed, among other
grounds, if evidence shows at trial that the parties were at the time of the accident
engaged in a joint burglary and were transporting gelignite and detonators).
108. E.g., .Weir v. Wyper, 1992 S.L.T. 579, 1992 S.C.L.R. 483 (Outer House);
McLean v. Harper, 1992 S.L.T. 1007 (Outer House) (Notes); Ashcroft's Curator Bonis
v. Stewart, 1988 S.L.T. 163 (Outer House); Sloan v. Triplett, 1985 S.L.T. 294 (Outer
House); Lindsay v. Poole, 1984 S.L.T. 269 (Outer House).
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prominent recent case in England is Pitts v. Hunt, 109 which involved
a familiar scenario. Plaintiff passenger and decedent driver (whose
estate was first defendant) were both drunk and aboard decedent's
motorcycle (which plaintiff knew he was not licensed to drive). They
were weaving recklessly down the road shouting ''yippee" and similar
remarks when they were clipped by a car driven by the second
defendant.
The court of appeal held the plaintiff's recovery to be barred by the
ex turpi causa doctrine, but the judges' reasoning did little to clarify the
law of England in this area. Lord Justices Dillon and Balcombe110
seemed to prefer the "duty" approach of Jackson, even though there was
poor factual basis for applying that test. 111 Lord Justice Beldam
appeared to accept the "conscience test" 112 earlier explicated in
England in such cases as Saunders v. Edwards, 113 Kirkham v. Chief
Constable of Manchester, 114 and Thackwell v. Barclays Bank. 115
The "conscience test" asks two questions: (a) Has there been illegality
of which the court should take notice? and (b) Given all the facts, would
it be an affront to the public conscience if by affording plaintiff relief
the court indirectly assisted or encouraged the plaintiff in his criminal
act? 116

109. [1990] 3 W.L.R. 542 (Eng. C.A.).
110. Id. at 558 (Balcombe, L.J.), 567 (Dillon, L.J.).
111. It is arguably difficult to formulate a standard of care applicable when a
safecracker is mixing a dynamite charge or a-getaway car is speeding away from a bank
with the police in hot pursuit. But this case simply involved driving a motorcycle;
formulation of a standard of care should not have been at all difficult. Kevin Williams,
Defences for Drunken Drivers: Public Policy on the Roads and in the Air, 54 Moo. L.
REV. 745, 750 (1991).
112. Pitts, [1990] 3 W.L.R. at 554.
113. [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1116, [1987] 2 All E.R. 651 (Eng. C.A.) (plaintiff, who in
purchasing leasehold obtained defendant's agreement to falsely apportion value of
chattels and value of flat in order to minimize stamp duty, was not barred on public conscience grounds from recovering for deceit from defendants who fraudulently
misrepresented that the leasehold included an adjoining terrace); see also Shelley v.
Paddock, [1980] 1 Q.B. 348 (Eng. C.A.) (similar result on similar facts).
114. [1990] 2 W.L.R. 987 (Eng. C.A. 1989) (decedent's act of suicide held not to
bar his family's negligence suit against jailers on ex turpi causa grounds because suicide
was no longer a crime and no longer shocked the public conscience).
115. [1986] 1 All E.R. 676,687 (Q.B.) (Hutchison, J.) (plaintiff who was knowingly
involved in a forged check scheme could not recover from bank for negligently cashing
the check).
·
116. In Saunders v. Edwards, Lord Justice-Nicholls adopted this formulation, but
stated that he would add to the end of the second element the words "or encouraging
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The existence of two separate approaches in ex turpi causa tort cases
in England leaves substantial room for confusion. 11 However, often
the two rationales lead to similar results. 118 As noted by Lord Hunter
in the Scottish case, Winnik v. Dick, 119 which barred a suit by a
passenger against the driver of a car when both had been drinking
together all day:
It was submitted that the pursuer's claim was defeated by application of the
brocard ex turpi ·causa non oritur actio, either because in law one joint
participant would not in such circumstances owe a duty of care to the other
joint participant or because on grounds of public policy, the court would not
countenance nor adjudicate on a claim by one such joint participant against
another. I see no reason why a Scottish court should not, on the basis of one
or other or both of these principles, arrive in appropriate circumstances at a
result the same as that reached in several cases in other jurisdictions [(i.e.,
dismissal of the suit)] to which we were referred. 120

C.

Canada

Canadian cases have wandered down several paths in an attempt to
determine the proper role of. the ex turpi causa defense. 121 Perhaps
their very indecisiveness and confusion helped the Supreme Court of
Canada decide, in 1993, to reject the defense almost completely in tort
cases. Before we address that landmark decision, however, let us
quickly discuss the history of this defense in Canada, a defense that was
enjoying a revival until the ax fell in 1993.

others in similar criminal acts." Saunders, [1987] 1 W.L.R. at 1132.
117. The inherent vagueness of the variety of tests available means that "in
troublesome cases there may well be disagreements concerning (a) the proper application
of the [ex turpi causa] doctrine; (b) the quality of turpitude required; (c) the degree of
connection necessary between it and the plaintiff's damage; and (d) the purposes to be
served by denying the plaintiff a remedy." Williams, supra note 111, at 749.
118. For example, in Pitts, Lord Justice Beldam refused to allow plaintiff to
recover, reasoning that the public conscience was so offended by those who would drink
and drive that no court should lend its assistance to a plaintiff injured while jointly
engaged in such activity. Pitts v. Hunt, [1990] 3 W.L.R. 542 (Eng. C.A.). Reaching the
same result, Justices Balcombe and Dillon refused recovery because, following Jackson,
they were unable to determine a standard of care owed by defendant driver to plaintiff
passenger in such a joint drunken endeavor. Id. at 559 (Balcombe, L.J.), 569 (Dillon,
L.J.).
119. 1983 Sess. Cas. 48 (Inner House).
120. Id. at 189 (emphasis added) (citing cases such as Smith v. Jenkins, 119 C.L.R.
397 (1969) (Aust!.), and Ashton v. Turner, [1981] 1 Q.B. 137).
121. Indeed, some Canadian courts have dismissed cases on the basis of the doctrine
without any attempt to develop a theoretical foundation for doing so. E.g., Johnson v.
Royal Can. Legion Grandview Branch No. 179, [1988] 5 W.W.R. 267,271 (B.C.C.A.)
(plaintiff's claim for injuries sustained in a fight dismissed on ex turpi causa grounds
because plaintiff's act of fighting in a public place violated statute).
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1.

Public Policy

Several earlier Canadian cases had used a public policy approach in
invoking the ex turpi causa defense to defeat tort claims. A leading
Canadian public policy case, Tallow v. Tai/feathers, 122 was decided by
the Alberta Supreme Court. After drinking all night and stealing a car,
plaintiffs were seriously injured when defendant lost control of the car.
Thus, like Australia's Godbolt and Smith, the case involved a joint
criminal enterprise.
The Tallow court adopted Godbolt '.s' public policy approach to
determine when ex turpi causa should bar recovery by tort plaintiffs.
Judge Clement concluded that there were two prerequisites to successful
invocation of the defense by defendants: (a) the plaintiff's act had to be
one that could be characterized as having "such a quality of turpitude
that it must be regarded as anti-social," and (b) the plaintiff's claim had
to "arise out of the commission of that act" (requiring a direct, but not
a causal, connection). 123
Cases from several other Canadian provinces had also adopted a public
policy approach. 124
2.

Duty

Other Canadian decisions had adopted a "duty" approach, reminiscent
of Australia's Smith and Jackson decisions. 125 indeed, some courts

122. 44 D.L.R.3d 55 (Alta. 1973).
123. Id. at 61.
124. E.g., Caleval v. Miller, 26 Sask. R. 209 (Q.B. 1983) (plaintiff injured while
assaulting victim in car when victim attempted to drive away barred· from recovery in
order to avoid offending the ''public conscience"); Mack v. Enns, 30 B.C.L.R. 337, 345
(1984) (plaintiff gang member who kicked car of rival gang in attempt to provoke a fight
was barred from recovery against driver of second rival gang car who accidentally ran
over plaintiff in the melee; purpose of the defense stated to be "to defend the integrity
of the legal system" by avoiding results ''manifestly unacceptable to fair-minded, or
right-thinking, people"); Danluk v. Birkner, [1946] 3 D.L.R. 172, 178 (Ont. C.A.) (in a
case also based in part on duty concept, court denied recovery to gambler who stepped
out of second-story door with no attached staircase while escaping a police raid; public
policy prevents such a plaintiff from invoking assistance of courts).
125. Phillips v. Vespini, No. 287, 1988 Ont. C.A. LEXIS 158 (plaintiff passenger
could not recover from defendant driver for injuries arising out of accident occurring
during pursuit by police; court followed Smith by denying that it was applying ex turpi
causa defense, yet reached identical result as if doctrine had been applied); Joubert v.
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had gone so far as to hold that the ex turpi causa defense in Canada was
available only in cases of joint criminal enterprise. 126

3.

Direct Connection

Several more recent Canadian cases involving joint criminal enterprises barred recovery on ex turpi causa grounds based on a "direct
connection" rather than a "causal connection" approach. 127 On the
other hand, many courts rejected the defense where there was not at least
some general causal link between the illegality and the plaintiff's
injury. 128 These cases are difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile.
Even in the heyday of the ex turpi causa defense in Canada there were
courts holding that the defense had been effectively eviscerated by
legislation eliminating the all-or-nothing contributory negligence

Toronto Gen. Trusts Corp., [1955] 3 D.L.R. 685 (Man. C.A.) (intoxicated passenger
could not recover for injuries sustained due to carelessness of intoxicated driver where
the two were jointly engaged in the criminal venture of drunken driving); Tomlinson v.
Harrison, 24 D.L.R.3d 26 (Ont. High Ct. 1971) (same); Rondos v. Wawrin, 68 D.L.R.2d
658 (Man. C.A. 1968) (same); Miller v. Decker, [1955] 4 D.L.R. 92 (B.C.C.A.) (same);
Danluk v. Birkner, [1946] 3 D.L.R. 172, 177 (Ont. C.A.) (in a case that also contained
some elements of the public policy approach, ex turpi causa defense was held to bar
recovery by plaintiff who sustained injuries when he ran out a second-story door with
no attached staircase during a police raid of an illegal gambling establishment; plaintiff
was neither invitee nor a licensee and was therefore owed no duty by defendant). But
see Foster v. Morton, 4 D.L.R.2d 269 (N.S. 1956) (recovery allowed by decedent
passenger's estate against defendant drunken driver).
126. E.g., Betts v. Sanderson Estate, 53 D.L.R.4th 675 (1988) (Can.) (plaintiff's
driving while intoxicated alongside intoxicated defendant did not amount to joint
criminal enterprise which would bar all recovery by plaintiff under ex turpi causa
defense); Funk v. Clapp, 35 B.C.L.R.2d 222 (C.A. 1986) (family of prisoner who
committed suicide in cell not barred by immorality of the act of suicide from pursuing
negligence claim against jailers); Teece v. Honeybourn, 54 D.L.R.3d 549, 5 W.W.R. 592
(B.C. 1974) (plaintiff car thief attempting to resist arrest not barred from recovery
against police officer who carelessly shot plaintiff).
127. E.g., Tomlinson v. Harrison, 24 D.L.R.3d 26 (Ont. High Ct. 1971) (denying
plaintiff passenger recovery from defendant driver for injuries sustained in accident
occurring during police chase after plaintiff and defendant got drunk and stole the car);
Rondos v. Wawrin, 68 D.L.R.2d 658, 64 W.W.R. 690 (Man. C.A. 1968) (denying
recovery to plaintiff who knew he was riding in a car stolen by defendant driver for
injuries sustained in accident occurring during police chase); see also Mongovius v.
Marchand, 44 C.C.L.T. 18 (B.C. 1988) (dismissing drunken passenger's suit against
drunken driver on ex turpi causa grounds because of the "demonstrable causal link
between the plaintiffs participation in the illegality and the injuries").
128. E.g., Pugliese v. Taxiarchis, 1989 Ont. C.J. LEXIS 96 (Ont.) (noting that
illegal drug pickups and sales had largely ended when defendant driver caused accident
injuring plaintiff passenger); Bond v. Loutit, 2 W.W.R. 154 (Man. Q.B. 1979) (holding
that illegal taking of vehicle had nothing to do with the negligent way in which
defendant later drove it, injuring plaintiff).
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defense. 129 This fact, coupled with the inconsistent reasoning and
results of Canadian ex turpi causa cases-only some of which could be
explained by province-to-province variations-created a most unsatisfactory situation. 130 Lower courts called for the Canadian Supreme Court
to bring clarity to the issue. 131 The Supreme Court's ultimate conclusion surprised many.

4.

Canadian Supreme Court Decisions

The Canadian Supreme Court first addressed the illegality defense in
tort cases in Canada Cement LaFarge Ltd. v. British Columbia
Lightweight Aggregate Ltd., 132 which involved allegations of a business
conspiracy by defendants to drive competitors, including plaintiff, out of
business. Defendants raised an ex turpi causa defense because plaintiff
had some level of voluntary participation in defendants' scheme by
seeking to become the sole supplier to defendants' combine of lightweight aggregate for the production of concrete. The court discussed
several cases, but made no definitive pronouncements, concluding:
"Whatever the state of the law [regarding ex turpi causa] may be at the
present time," plaintiff must lose because there was no causal relationship between the illegal acts of defendants and plaintiff's injury. 133
The language in Canada Cement was, perhaps, a vague hint that the
Canadian Supreme Court was not receptive to the ex turpi causa defense
in tort cases. A clearer signal came in the 1992 case, Norberg v.
"Wynrib, 134 in which a male physician prescribed a painkiller to an
addicted female patient in exchange for sexual favors. The patient sued
the doctor for damages on several theories, including assault and battery,
negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty. The physician raised an ex

129. E.g., Lewis v. Sayers, 13 D.L.R.3d 543, 550 (Ont. Dist. Ct) (defense implicitly
abolished by legislation eliminating contributory negligence and replacing it with a
comparison of plaintiff's "fault" as well as ''negligence"); Funk v. Clapp, 35 B.C.L.R.2d
222, 233 (C.A. 1986) (same).
130. Indeed, one author noted that "[t]he Canadian experience with the defence of
ex turpi causa non oritur actio has not been happy." l G.H.L. FRIDMAN, THE LAW OF
TORTS IN CANADA 352 (1989)
131. E.g., Betts v. Sanderson Estate, 53 D.L.R.4th 675, 682 (1988) (Can.).
132. 145 C.L.R.3d 385 (Can. 1983).
133. Id. at 404. The court did not discuss what level of causation (direct or
proximate) was needed to activate the defense. · ·
134. 92 D.L.R. 4th 449 (Can. 1992).
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turpi causa defense, noting that plaintiff had entered a plea of guilty·to
the criminal offense of "double doctoring" (obtaining narcotic prescription drugs from a doctor without disclosing particulars of prescriptions
from other doctors in violation of the Narcotic Control Act). Again, no
definitive pronouncement was issued regarding the ex turpi causa
defense. However, Judge LaForest concluded that the defense should
not succeed because there was "no causative link" between the injury
and plaintiff's crime. Even if plaintiff had been relying on defendant
alone for her drugs, she would have suffered the same harm. 135 Also,
Judge Sopinka concluded that the key to the ex turpi causa defense was
the public policy of preventing the administration of justice from being
tainted. 136 Because society's views of what is fair-minded or rightthinking regarding the claims of law-breakers has changed over the
years, Sopinka was convinced that "the administration of justice will
suffer no disrepute in the eyes of the public by reason of this court's
lending its assistance to the [plaintiff] in this case." 137
The death knell for the ex turpi causa defense in most Canadian tort
cases was finally sounded by the Canadian Supreme Court in its 1993
decision in Hill v. Hebert. 138 Defendant owned a "souped-up muscle
car." He and plaintiff had been drinking. The car stalled on a rough
gravel road with a sharp drop-off on one side. Defendant concluded that
the only way to start the car was a "rolling start," because he could not
find the keys that had shaken out of the ignition. Despite plaintiff's
arguably intoxicated state, defendant, at plaintiff's request, allowed
plaintiff to drive when they started the car rolling. Plaintiff lost control
of the car, causing serious injuries to himself. Plaintiff sued defendant
in negligence. Defendant raised the ex turpi causa defense.
The trial court apportioned liability at seventy-five percent for
defendant and twenty-five percent for plaintiff, allowing partial recovery.
The court of appeal reversed, holding that the ex turpi causa defense
barred any recovery whatsoever. 139 The Canadian Supreme Court

135. Id. at 469.
136. Id. at 483. ·
137. Id.
138. [1993) 2 S.C.R. 159.
139. 53 B.C.L.R.2d 201 (C.A. 1991). Writing for the majority, Judge Gibbs held
that ex turpi causa is not limited to cases of joint criminal enterprise, but is available
any time a plaintiff's claim is so tainted with criminality or immorality that public policy
prevents the courts from aiding plaintiff. Id. at 210-11. Dissenting, Judge Southin
followed the opinion of Judge Windeyer in Smith, holding that ex turpi causa has no
place in tort law, but reaching precisely the same result as if it did by holding that
defendant owed no duty to plaintiff. Id. at 215-16. ·
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restored the trial court's judgment in favor of plaintiff. 140
In an extended opinion, Judge Cory rejected the basic rationales that
have been proffered in support of the ex turpi causa defense in tort
cases. He concluded that the defense undermined the policies that
eliminated contributory negligence as an absolute defense, and that "the
defence of ex turpi causa should not be applied in tort cases." 141
Judge McLachlin, with· whom Judges Iacobucci, LaForest, and
L'Heureux-Dube concurred, also harshly criticized the ex turpi causa
defense in tort cases, reserving its application for an extremely narrow
set of factual situations. 142 These limited situations will be explored
later in this Article. 143
After Hill, there is very little room for the ex turpi causa defense in
tort cases in Canada.

D.

New Zealand

New Zealand's jurisprudence contains relatively few cases involving
ex turpi causa in the tort area, but recent decisions have shown an
implicit hostility to the defense. 144
In Fletcher v. National Mutual Life Nominees, Ltd., 145 essentially an
accountants' liability case, litigation arose out of the collapse of a group
of companies known as the AIC Group. AIC Securities was a money
140. [1993] 2 S.C.R. at 225. · However, the majority did alter the allocation of fault
from 75%,-25% to 50%-50%. In a dissent, Judge Sopinka explained that he would have
denied recovery on ex turpi causa grounds, using a public policy approach. Id. at 192
("The true basis for denying recovery in such circumstances is the court's reluctance to
lend its assistance to persons involved in serious criminal activity when to do so would
reflect adversely on the administration of justice."). However, Judge Sopinka also
expressed support for the "no duty" approach of Smith. Id. at 193. Judge Gonthier
generally agreed with Sopinka. Id. at 195.
141. Id. at 223.
142. Id. at 172-79.
143. See infra notes 356-64 and accompanying text.
144. Earlier cases exhibited the same hostility. See Green v. Costello, 1961
N.Z.L.R. 1010 (Sup. Ct.) (mere fact that the plaintiff is a wrongdoer because he struck
the first blow in a fight is not a general defense to tort action); LeBagge v. Buses Ltd.,
1958 N.Z.L.R. 630 (Sup. Ct.) (plaintiffs violation of regulatory statute by driving his
truck seven straight days without a break of at least 24 hours held to not necessarily
affect amount ofrecovery in suit under Death by Accidents Compensation Act); Canning
v. The King, 1924 N.Z.L.R. 118 (decedent driver's violation of statutory regulation
requiring stopping at railroad crossing treated as contributory negligence rather than as
illegal act).
145. [1990] l N.Z.L.R. 97 (High Ct.).
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market operator required by New Zealand law to operate under a trustee.
National Mutual Life was the trustee and hired Deloitte Haskins & Sells
as auditor for AIC. Following collapse of the group of companies,
depositors sued National Mutual Life and recovered NZ$6. 7 5 million for
negligence and breach of trust. National Mutual Life filed a third party
claim for negligence against Deloitte. The primary issue litigated in the
case was whether Deloitte owed a duty of care to third party National
Mutual Life. However, the High Court in Auckland also addressed
Deloitte's ex turpi causa defense. Essentially, Deloitte argued that
National Mutual Life's own negligence and, more importantly, breach
of :fiduciary duty, barred its recovery from Deloitte. Judge Henry gave
short shrift to the defense:
The maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio, certainly when separated from any
historical basis it may have provided for the defence of contributory negligence,
has no application to the present .factual situation. There is a school of thought
which places its proper field of application as being in the law of contract.
Whether or not that be so, there is no illegality or moral turpitude in the
conduct of National Mutual Life Nominees which would give such a defence
to Deloitte. Public policy could not possibly require that this action should be
dismissed because of lack of diligence in carrying out the duties of a trustee.146

Fletcher thus involved a brief discussion of a public policy approach.
The "public conscience" theory was applied in R v. Collis 147 to reach
an interesting result. Police searched Collis's property and found
cannabis and NZ$103,000 in cash. Collis initially denied ownership of
the money and at trial sought to provide an innocent explanation for his
possession of it. After he was convicted, he claimed that the money was
his after all, earned through illegal drug dealing. He sought return of the
money. He was then charged with selling cannabis, but the charge was
dismissed on a technicality. The. trial court _held that the money
belonged to Collis, and ordered that it be paid to reduce .a tax liability
he owed. The Crown argued that because the money had been illegally
obtained, it should have been paid into the government's Consolidated
Fund given that courts should not help wrongdoers benefit from their
criminal activity.
A spirited dissent by Judge Wylie supported the Crown's position,
based on the "conscience test" approach to the ex turpi causa defense.148 However, Judges Casey and Hardie Boys disagreed .and
ordered the money returned to Collis. An important part of their holding

146.
147.
148.
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[1990] 2 N.Z.L.R. 287 (C.A.).
Id. at 300-07.
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appeared to be simply that' Parliament had by statute ordered forfeiture
of drug money in certain circumstances, and this particular case was not
covered by· the statute; therefore, to refuse to order return of the funds
to Collis would be tantamount to ordering a forfeiture not authorized by
Parliament. 149
Both judges also discussed the "conscience test," emphasizing a
limitation ursgn it as explained by Lord Justice Kerr in Euro-Diam Ltd.
v. Bathurst. 150 Kerr gave a lengthy synopsis of the public conscience
test as he understood it, stating in part that where granting relief to

151

149.
150.
151.

Id. at 293.
[1987] 2 All E.R. 113 (Q.B.).
Kerr stated:
(1) The ex turpi causa defence ultimately rests on a principle of public
policy that the courts will not assist a plaintiff who has been guilty of illegal
(or immoral) conduct of which the courts should take notice. It applies if, in
all the circumstances, it would be an affront to the public conscience to grant
the plaintiff the relief which he seeks because the court would thereby appear
to assist or encourage the plaintiff in his illegal conduct or to encourage others
in similar acts: see para 2(iii) below.
· The problem is not only to apply this principle, but also to respect its limits,
in relation to the facts of particular cases in light of the authorities.
(2) The authorities show that in a number of situations the ex turpi causa
defence will prima facie succeed. The main ones are as follows.
(i) Where the plaintiff seeks to, or is forced .to, found his claim on an illegal
contract .or to plead its illegality in order to support his claim: ... For that
purpose it makes no difference whether the illegality is raised in the plaintiffs
claim or by way of reply to a ground of defense...
(ii) Where the grant of relief to the plaintiff would enable him to benefit
from his criminal conduct. ..
(iii) Where, even though neither (i) nor (ii) is applicable to the plaintiffs
claim, the situation is nevertheless residually covered by the general principle
summarized in (i) above. . . .
,
(3) However, the ex turpi causa defence must be approached pragmatically
and with caution, depending on the circumstances. . . . This applies in
particular to cases which at first sight appear to fall within para (2)(i) or (ii)
above.
Thus: (i) Situations covered by para 2(i) above must be distinguished from
others where the plaintiffs claim is not founded on any illegal act, but where
some reprehensible conduct on his part is disclosed in the course of the
proceedings, whether by the plaintiff himself or otherwise.... But where both
parties are equally privy to the illegality the plaintiffs claim will fail, whether
raised in contract or tort, for potiorest condicio defendantis [the position of the
defendant is the stronger] ....And an action on a contract the terms of which
are falsely recorded in documents intended to conceal the true agreement
between the parties may be defeated by the ex· turpi causa defence....
(ii) In situations covered by para 2(i) and (ii) above the ex turpi causa
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plaintiff would enable him to benefit from his criminal conduct the
defense will still fail "if his claim is for the delivery up of his goods, or
for damages for their wrongful conversion, and if he is able to assert a
proprietary or possessory title to them, even if this is derived from an
illegal contract." 152 Justice Casey stressed that he preferred a very
narrow application of the "conscience test." 153 Justice Hardie Boys
concluded that Kerr's limitation on the defense "allays in large measure
the misgivings I _have had about the subjectiveness of a 'conscience
·
test' ."154
Thus, ex turpi causa has a relatively small presence in New Zealand
jurisprudence. 155

E.

The United States

The doctrine of ex turpi causa has a long and checkered history in
American tort law, although, as noted earlier, it has virtually disappeared
in recent years.
Two strains of American tort cases apply the ex turpi causa doctrine.
The first is a public policy strain keyed to the notion that courts should
not lend assistance to those whose injuries are related to their own illegal
actions. 156 These. cases stress the moral component of the law.
Indeed, a tone. of strong moral outrage :permeates many of the cases
recognizing the ex turpi causa defense. 15 The second strain relates to

defence will also fail if the plaintiffs claim is for the delivery up of his goods,
or for damages for their wrongful conversion, and if he is able to assert a
proprietary or possessor title to them even if this is derived from an illegal
contract.
Id. at 28-29.
152. Collis, [1990] 2 N.Z.L.R. at 293 (Casey, J.).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 299.
155. But see Tamworth Indus. Ltd. v. Attorney-General, [1991] 3 N.Z.L.R. 616
(following R v. Collis in refusing to use ex turpi causa to bar return to plaintiff of
unexplained cash seized by police).
156. This is, of course, an important part of the rationale for refusing to enforce
illegal contracts. It also accounts for a second line of cases wherein U.S. courts, unlike
their New Zealand counterparts just discussed, refuse to allow plaintiffs to profit from
their wrongdoing in cases where plaintiffs seek to recover money or other property
seized by police. E.g., Carr v. Hoy, 2 N.Y.2d 185 (1957) (plaintiff who pleaded guilty
to outraging public decency following scheme that charged persons $10 each for
privilege of attending a farm outing and there photographing female models, some of
whom posed nude, could not recover ticket moneys seized by sheriff).
157. For example, in Lencioni v. Long, 361 P.2d 455 (Mont. 1961), plaintiff
bartender was sprayed in the eye with tear gas as he looked through an uncovered
peephole to tum away drunken patrons from a house of prostitution. Recovery from
plaintiffs employer was denied on ex turpi causa grounds, the court complaining that
"the salient facts are rampant with a reeking libidinous atmosphere that should never
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the causal link between the plaintiff's illegal acts and the injuries
sustained.
1.

Proximate Causation

The causation approach will be discussed first. The principle case
with respect to this approach is Bosworth v. Swansey, 158 which pronounced what is known as the "Massachusetts rule." The plaintiff in
Bosworth was injured because of a defect in a road for which defendant
was responsible. The injury occurred on a Sunday, however, as plaintiff
traveled in violation of a Massachusetts statute prohibiting Sunday travel
for secular purposes. The court denied recovery on grounds of the ex
turpi causa defense. Because the injury occurred as plaintiff traveled
illegally, plaintiff was barred from recovery. In a "but for" sense, the
plaintiff's illegal action caused his own injury. However, in no manner
could one argue that proximate causation was present. 159 Nonetheless,
Bosworth and similar cases were strongly defended on grounds that the
plaintiff's own actions were the "immediate, active cause of the damage"
sustained. 160
The Massachusetts rule was quite popular in the mid-to-late 1800s.
Plaintiffs were denied recovery not only because they illicitly traveled
on Sundays, but also because they violated traffic regulations, 161 other

permeate a claim of alleged negligence." Id.•
158. 63 Mass. (10 Met.) 363 (1845); see also Lyons v. Desotelle, 124 Mass. 387
(1878) (holding that unlawful traveling on Sunday necessarily contributes to an accident
and therefore bars recovery); Hinckley v. Inhabitants of Penobscot, 42 Me. 89 (1856)
(same).
159. Eventually, most courts rejected the Bosworth result for two reasons: (1) lack
of proximate cause, and (2) insufficient gravity of the criminal offense to justify denial
of recovery.
160. Davis, supra note 12, at 513. Davis's reasoning seems curious today. He
essentially concluded that among all the conditions that lead to an injury, the active one
occurring most immediately preceding the accident is the cause of the accident. For
example, according to Davis, if defendant builds a defective bridge and carelessly
maintains it, this creates a mere passive condition. The actual cause of the accident is
plaintiff's riding across the bridge on his way from home to work in violation of a
Sunday traveling ordinance, regardless of the fact that the same accident would have
occurred on Monday morning (when plaintiff was traveling the same route completely
legally) if it had not occurred on Sunday. Id. at 509.
·
161. E.g., Heland v. City of Lowell, 85 Mass. (3 Allen) 407 (1862) (plaintiff
exceeding speed limit barred from recovery because of illegal nature of act); Tuttle v.
Lawrence, 119 Mass. 276 (1876) (same).
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safety. regulations, 162 or public morals, 163 even if those violations
were not causally related to their injuries. Through this rule and related
strategies, 164 courts in Massachusetts and other jurisdictions created a
milieu extremely hostile to personal injury litigation.
Bosworth's overly broad view of causation was eventually rejected,
however, because it erroneously assumed "that a mere concurrence of the
illegal act with the accident in point of time is to be treated as aa
concurring cause of the injury, which it is not, but rather a condition or
incident merely." 165 Virtually all American jurisdictions had rejected
the Massachusetts rule by the early 1900s, substituting a requirement that
the illegality not just coincide with the timing of the injuries but
proximately cause the injuries. 166 Proximate causation was viewed as

162. E.g., Read v. Boston & Albany R.R. Co., 4 N.E. 227 (Mass. 1885) (plaintiff
locomotive engineer barred from recovering for injuries caused by defective track
because he was running an unauthorized Sunday train).
163. E.g., Curtis v. Murphy, 22 N.W. 825 (Wis. 1885) (plaintiff not allowed to
recover from hotel whose clerk stole plaintiff's money because plaintiff checked into
hotel with prostitute).
164. For a time, Massachusetts courts also threw out similar cases by labeling
plaintiffs as trespassers disentitled to the law's protection. E.g., Widronak v. Lord, 168
N.E. 799 (Mass. 1929) (passenger in car being driven the wrong way down a one-way
street Was an outlaw and trespasser not owed any duty by negligent defendant); Hanson
v. Culton, 169 N.E. 272 (Mass. 1929) (plaintiff from Rhode Island who had not
registered his car in Massachusetts was a trespasser who could not recover from
negligent defendant who caused auto accident). See generally Irving S. Altshuler, Note,
Automobiles--Use and Operation in Violation of Statute-Effect on Civil Rights, 10
B.U. L. REV. 211 (1930).
.
165. Broschart v. Tuttle, 21 A. 925, 928 (Conn. 1890) (allowing recovery by a
speeding horseman whose violatjon of the speed limit did not cause the accident
complained of).
166. E.g., Currelli v. Jackson, 58 A. 162 (Conn. 1904) (failure of employee to
obtain town clerk's written permission to use dynamite did not bar suit against employer
for injuries sustained due to employer's alleged negligence in requiring employee to use
frozen dynamite); Gilman v. Central Vermont Ry., 107 A. 122 (Vt. 1919) (fact that
plaintiff was driving umegistered vehicle did not bar recovery from railroad for
negligence because violations of criminal statutes "do not preclude a recovery unless
there is a proximate, causal connection between the violation of the statute and the injury
complained of." Id. at 124); Hoadley v. International Paper Co., 47 A. 169 (Vt. 1899)
(fact that plaintiff was working on Sunday in violation of statute did not prohibit
recovery from negligent employer where that fact was not proximate cause of injury);
Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Messina, 72 So. 779 (Miss. 1916) (fact that plaintiff was illegally
riding without paying fare by permission of the engineer did not bar negligence action
against railroad where such free transportation was an incidental condition of, and not
a contributing cause to, plaintiff's injury); Johnson v. Boston & M.R.R., 143 A. 516
(N.H. 1928) (fact that plaintiff operated car without license did not bar negligence
recovery unless it was causally related to injury); Sutton v. Town of Wauwatosa, 29 Wis.
21 (1871) (plaintiff driving cattle to market on Sunday in violation of statute allowed to
recover from maintainer of defective bridge); Baker v. City of Portland, 4 A. 274 (Me.
1870) (plaintiff who violated speeding ordinance not barred from recovery where speed
at time of accident did not proximately cause accident); Baldwin v. Barney, 12 R.I. 392
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a much fairer approach. 167
Invocation of the ex turpi causa defense in tort cases is rare in
America today, but the occasional modern American case giving
credence to the defense tends to stress proximate cause as a prerequisite
to the defense. 168
(1879) (illegal Sunday traveler allowed to recover from reckless driver); Connolly v.
Knickerbocker Ice Co., 21 N.E. 101 (N.Y. 1889) (infant plaintiff riding unlawfully on
trolley platform allowed to recover); Platz v. City of Cohoes, 89 N.Y. 220 (1882)
(illegal Sunday traveler allowed to recover); Cohen v. Manuel, 39 A. 1030 (Me. 1898)
(unlicensed peddler of goods not barred_ from recovering from innkeeper for loss of
goods while he stayed at inn); Kansas City v. Orr, 61 P. 397 (Kan. 1900) (fact that
decedent was working on Sunday in violation of statute did not bar wrongful death
action because violation was not proximate cause of the injury).
Most courts also rejected fairly early on the Massachusetts trespass theory alluded to
earlier, supra note 164. See generally Sears v. Bernardo, 115 A. 647 (R.I. 1922)
(disregard of one-way sign is evidence of negligence but does not render violator an
outlaw); Moore v. Hart, 188 S.W. 861, 863 (Ky. 1916) (Massachusetts "outlaw" rule is
a "cruel and almost savage doctrine" and deprives violator "of all consideration dictated
by the plainest principles of humanity"); Rapee v. Beacon Hotel Corp., 56 N.E.2d 548
(N.Y. 1944) (plaintiff who fell down elevator shaft in hotel while registered under a false
name as a married person with woman who was only his fiancee held a trespasser, but
not an outlaw disentitled to recover).
167. See generally Magdalen G. H. Flexner, Comment, Torts: Negligence: Illegal
or Improper Purpose as Affecting Status, 31 CORNELL L.Q. 89 (1945).
168. E.g., Janusis v. Long, 188 N.E. 228 (Mass. 1933) (alien illegally in country not
barred for that reason from recovering in negligence from defendant for injuries arising
out of auto accident); Meador v. Hotel Grover, 9 So. 2d 782 (Miss. 1942) (fact that
plaintiff's decedent was killed by defendant hotel's negligent operation of elevator while
visiting hotel with prostitute did not bar recovery because injury was not suffered as
proximate result of committing illegal act); Curry v. Vesely, 348 P.2d 490 (N.M. 1960)
(plaintiff, who apparently had abandoned earlier decision to participate in gang fight but
was injured in a car wreck on his· way to check on his brother's safety, was allowed to
sue driver of the other car who had participated in the rumble); Havis v. Iacovetto, 250
P.2d 128 (Colo. 1952) (passenger for hire allowed to sue negligent driver even though
accident occurred as plaintiff returned from illegal .gambling expedition to Utah because
gambling was not a contributing cause to the accident); Johnson v. Thompson, 143
S.E.2d 51 (Ga. Ct. App. 1965) (fact that plaintiff patron of drive-in movie theater was
injured as he walked to snack bar to pick up an illegal bingo prize did not bar recovery
absent causal relation between illegal act and injuries sustained); Manning v. Noa, 76
N.W.2d 75 (Mich. 1956) (plaintiff injured when leaving church after playing illegal
bingo game not barred from recovery because injury was not the proximate result of her
committing an illegal act); Bagre v. Daggett Chocolate Co., 13 A.2d 757 (Conn. 1940)
(plaintiff who broke off tooth when biting into a piece of candy made by defendant not
barred from recovery by fact that he won the candy in an illicit bingo game because
there was no causal relation between the illegality and the injury); Martinez v. Rein, 146
So. 787 (La. Ct. App. 1933) (plaintiff's violation of city ordinance by placing scale on
sidewalk-where it was struck by car in accident caused by defendant's negligence-did
not bar recovery because violation was not a contributing cause of accident).
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2.

Public Policy

The second major strain of American tort cases applying the ex turpi
causa doctrine is primarily confined to the jurisdiction of Virginia.
Although similar decisions are occasionally found in other jurisdictions,
Virginia has produced most of the recent court decisions applying a
broad public policy approach to ex turpi causa, reflecting a strong
commitment to the principal that a court should not aid a plaintiff who
has acted illicitly. Thus, a wrongful death action was rejected because
the decedent had committed suicide; 169 a wife who contracted venereal
disease from her husband was denied recovery because the transmission
happened during an illicit act of intercourse occurring before they were
married; 170 and a ·wrongful death action against a negligent abortionist
was barred because decedent knew the abortion was illegal. 171
Virginia courts stress that a plaintiff's illegal act constitutes not merely
contributory negligence or assumption of risk, but totally bars recovery.
The reason-explained in the case of Zysk v. Zysk involving the
transmission of venereal disease--is simply that "courts will not assist
the participant in an illegal act who seeks to profit from the act's
commission." 172

3.

Modern American Rule

Although occasional American cases outside Virginia still apply ex
turpi causa to dismiss tort claims, the doctrine is seldom invoked today.
Prosser and Keeton accurately note that:
[W]ith few exceptions, the courts have long discarded the doctrine that any
violator of a statute is an outlaw with no rights against anyone, and have
recognized that, except in so far as the violator must resort to an illegal contract
or an illegal status as the basis of the defendant's duty to him, one who violates
a criminal statute is not deprived of all protection against the torts of others.
Thus the Sunday driver or the unlicensed operator of an unlicensed car,
although he is a criminal, can recover for his injuries if in other respects he is
exercising proper care.

169. Hill v. Nicodemus, 755 F. Supp. 692 (W.D. Va. 1991), ajf'd, 919 F.2d 987
(4th Cir. 1992).
170. Zysk v. Zysk, 404 S.E.2d 72 (Va. 1990).
171. Miller v. Bennett, 56 S.E.2d 217 (Va. 1949).
172. Zysk, 404 S.E.2d at 722; see also Suddarth v. Slane, 539 F. Supp. 612 (W.D.
Va. 1982) (state trooper fired after adultery charge held not protected by civil rights law,
42 U.S.C. § 1983, because of his participation in the immoral act).
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The accepted rule now is that a breach of statute by the plaintiff is to stand
on the same footing as a violation by the defendant.'

Thus, in America the general rule is that a plaintiff's violation of a
criminal statute may constitute contributory negligence174 or assumption of risk, but it generally does not completely bar a plaintiff's
recovery on ex turpi causa grounds. Except for the occasional Virginia
case applying a public policy approach, or the occasional New York case
applying a public policy view coupled with the more traditional
proximate cause requirement, 175 few U.S. tort claims today are barred
by the ex turpi causa defense.
This is consistent with the R?statement (Second) of Torts, which
provides: "One is not barred from recovery for an interference with his
legally protected interests merely because at the time of the interference
he was committing a tort or a crime ...." 176
173. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 36,
at 232 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON] (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
174. It may even constitute contributory negligence per se if the statute violated was
enacted for the protection of others, including defendant. E.g., Watts v. Montgomery
Traction Co., 57 So. 471, 472 (Ala. 1912).
175. E.g., Barker v. Kallash, 468 N.E.2d 39 (N.Y. 1984), discussed infra notes 23238 and accompanying text.
176. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 889 (1977). The Restatement divides the
potential scenarios for application of the rule into several categories:
First is the case of intentional harms by third persons. The Restatement provides this
illustration: "A strikes B, who, unknown to A, has criminal possession of narcotics with
intent to sell them. A is subject to liability to B."
Second is the case of negligent harms by third persons. The Restatement provides this
illustration: "A negligently collides with and harms B, who is carrying contraband goods.
A is subject to liability to B."
Third is the case of intentional harm to the person by a conspirator. The Restatement
hypothesizes an example of one robber shooting another in a dispute over the spoils of
a robbery. The shooting victim would have a cause of action for the physical injury, but
no claim for the other's refusal to divide the spoils.
Fourth is the case of taking land or chattels from the illegal possession of another.
Generally speaking, it is not a defense for A who stole a bike from B, that B had stolen
it from its true owner. However, the Restatement suggests that a court may, as a matter
of public policy, refrain from aiding B in such a claim until an attempt is made to
contact the true owner and afford her an opportunity to intervene. The Restatement
gives this illustration: "A has illegal possession of drugs that can be kept only for
medicinal purposes. B seizes A's drugs. B is subject to liability to A." This result
would be different if the chattel involved were not capable of legal use.
Fifth is the case of liability of a bailee to a bailor for goods illegally bailed. In such
cases, bailment for an illegal purpose does not necessarily bar recovery by the bailor
against the bailee for negligent harm to the bailed goods. However, if the return of the
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Little notice was taken of the gradual disappearance of the ex turpi
causa defense in American tort cases, because it did not affect the
outcome of most cases. As the defense disappeared, the doctrines of
contributory negligence and assumption of risk still served as complete
defenses to recovery. Therefore, in most cases, abandonment of the
defense neither aided plaintiffs nor harmed defendants.
·
However, contributory negligence has been gradually replaced by
comparative negligence in the vast majority .of American jurisdictions.177 Today, a plaintiff's recovery may be reduced, but generally
is not barred, by a plaintiff's simple carelessness, product misuse, or
even knowing assumption of risk. Today, plaintiffs in personal injury
cases are often recovering some or most of their damages in cases where
their wrongdoing would have constituted a complete bar to recovery
under previous interpretations of the ex turpi causa doctrine. Now that
proportionate liability has replaced the total defenses that previously
existed due to contributory negligence and assumption of risk, the
gradual disappearance of the ex turpi causa defense in the United States
takes on a new significance. It is surprising that the doctrine's revival
in other western common-law jurisdictions has not been noted by
American advocates and judges.
IV.

A CRITIQUE OF COMMON-LAW JURISDICTION APPROACHES TO
THE

EX TURPI CAUSA DEFENSE

An initial step in determining whether the United States should revive
the ex turpi causa defense in tort cases involves an analysis of the
theoretical approaches to application of the defense that have .been
developed over time. A valid doctrine should have a strong theoretical
underpinning and an articulated rationale that allows for clarity and
consistency of application. Have the courts in other nations that have
revived ex turpi causa formulated these necessary elements? This part
will attempt to answer this query.

chattel would aid in the commission of a crime ("as when a retail dealer who has
received narcotics refuses to return them to the wholesaler ... who intends to use them
for illicit purposes"), a court will deny recovery.
Sixth is the case of the trespassing plaintiff. Here the Restatement borrows the duty
concept of cases like Smith v. Jenkins, see supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text,
stating that "a malicious mischief maker who is hurt by a defective condition of the
premises that he is seeking to harm is denied recovery because the owner of the
premises owes no duty of care. with respect to him." Id.
177. See infra notes 336-38 and accompanying text.
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The earlier survey of selected common-law jurisdictions demonstrates
that there are four primary approaches to application of the ex turpi
causa defense in tort actions. 1
.
First, there is the legislative intent doctrine explicated in Australia's
Henwood case. 179
·
Second, Australia also produced the duty rule centered on the notion
that co-venturers in crime owe each other no duty, in part because it
would be impossible for the court to establish a standard of care in such
cases. This -rule arises from Smith, as refined in Jackson. 180
,
Third is the public .policy approach embodied in Australia's Godbolt
case, in Canada's Tallow case, in England's "conscience test," and in
Virginia's Zysk case. 181
Fourth is America's causation approach, which transformed the
Massachusetts rule's concurrent condition requirement into a proximate
causation requirement. 182
A.

The Legislative Intent Test

As noted earlier, two members of the Henwood court concluded that
depriving decedent (who had stuck his head out a window of the tram
in order to vomit) of recovery because he had violated a safety rule was
"[p]robably the last thing intended by the framers ...." 183
This quotation highlights one of the most intractable problems with the
legislative intent approach. Almost inevitably, in passing criminal
legislation the legislature will not have considered the impact the law
should have upon a private cause of action brought by one of its
violators. This will be true whether the law involved is a minor safety
regulation as in Henwood, or a major felony statute, as in McCummings.
Indeed, the problem is amplified by the fact that, as in Henwood, the

178. In establishing this categorization, it is not to be supposed that there is no
overlap or interaction among the theories. The earlier description of these approaches
clearly demonstrates that these categorizations often highlight a difference of emphasis
only.
179. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (Godbolt), notes 122-24 and
accompanying text (Tallow), notes 109-20 and accompanying text ("conscience test"),
and notes 170-72 and accompanying text (Zysk).
182. See supra notes 158-68 and accompanying text.
183. Henwood v. Municipal Tramways Trust, 60 C.L.R. 438 (1938) (Austl.).
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factual circumstances which result in invocation of the ex turpi causa
doctrine often tend toward the bizarre and unforeseen.
Inevitably, the legislative intent approach leaves courts groping in the
dark, attempting to derive a _conclusion as to legislative intent with
absolutely no solid evidence upon which to base that conclusion. It is
one thing for courts to do their best to exercise policy judgments when
such is required. It is less satisfactory for courts to exercise policy
judgments under the guise of applying a legislative intent that cannot be
satisfactorily determined. 184
Naturally, the vagaries of statutory
interpretation under such circumstances have led to inconsistent
conclusions as to the meaning of specific statutes. 185 Ex turpi causa
is a court-developed doctrine; its application is not satisfactorily
determined by resort to imaginary legislative intent. 186
Additionally, many cases do not involve violations of statutes, but
simple violations of morals contrary to public policy as construed by the
courts. Legislative intent cannot possibly be of assistance in such cases.
In short, the legislative intent approach is appropriate only in the
exceedingly rare case where legislative intent clearly establishes that the
legislature in passing a statute meant not only to regulate or criminalize
conduct but also to deprive violators of their right to recover for injuries
inflicted by others. In the remaining cases, the legislative intent
approach is ineffectual if not disingenuous.
The main opinion in Tallow, written by Judge Clement, appropriately
rejected the legislative intent approach of Henwood as "put[ting] an
entirely different footing under the rule" 187 by shifting the focus from
public policy analysis regarding the antisocial character of the plaintiff's

184. This criticism has also been lodged regarding invocation of the illegality
defense in contract law. John Shand, Unblinkering the Unruly Horse: Public Policy in
the Law of Contract, 30 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 144, 149 (1972) ("The reality of the situation
is that the legislator has probably never applied his mind to the problem of whether the
contract or right should be enforceable.").
185. Compare Monk v. Monk, 32 B.C.L.R.2d 240 (1989) (Family Compensation
Act provisions do not render inappropriate the application of ex turpi causa defense
arising from acts of deceased) with Funk v. Clapp, 35 B.C.L.R.2d 222 (C.A. 1986) (ex
turpi causa defense should not use illegal acts of deceased to bar recovery to his family
under Family Compensation Act).
186. Judges Dixon and McTieman framed the key issue in a manner that restricts
the ex turpi causa defense: "It appears to us that in- every case the question must be
whether it is part of the purpose of the law against which the plaintiff has offended to
disentitle a person doing the prohibited act from complaining of the other party's neglect
or default, without which his own act would not have resulted in injury." Henwood, 60
C.L.R. at 460. Because the legislature will almost never have considered the matter,
courts will be unable to conclude that disabling the plaintiff from recovery was part of
the legislative purpose. However, the presumption could just as easily have been framed
oppositely, in a pro-defendant posture.
187. Tallow v. Tailfeathers, 44 D.L.R.3d 55, 64 (Alta. 1973).
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behavior to the technical matter of statutory interpretation. This ignores
the importance of turpitude that is the sine qua non of the doctrine.
Judge Clement further noted that "[t]o parse a section of the Criminal
Code dealing with, say, theft or criminal negligence or driving while
intoxicated, to determine whether it adds to or subtracts from the civil
rights of a wrongdoer would be an unusual occupation." 188 It would
also be a dangerous occupation. Such speculation can serve only to
undermine the certainty of the law. 189

B.
1.

The Duty Approach

Part One: Existence of Duty

As noted earlier, in Smith, an Australian court refused to allow one
criminal co-venturer to recover from another for injuries negligently
inflicted during the course of their criminal escapade, denying that the
latter could owe a duty to the former under such circumstances. This
approach was refined in Jackson, where the court reasoned that a duty
is not owed because it would be impossible in the context of
safecrackers blowing up a safe or bank robbers executing a getaway for
the court to establish a standard of care.
Several drawbacks to the duty approach are apparent. First, it may be
observed that although the Smith duty test gives some guidance in cases
where defendant is charged with negligence, it is not helpful in cases
where plaintiffs are pursuing other theories. Second, as Professor
Weinrib asks, "If the focus of -the defence is the act of illegality on the
part of the plaintiff, of what relevance can it be that the defendant rather
than a third party is an accomplice in the illegality or indeed that there
is any accomplice at a11?" 190 Third, the courts have not clarified what

188. Id. at 65.
189. Ezra R Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317,320
(1914) ("[T]his sort of speculation as to unexpressed legislative intent is a dangerous
business permissible only within narrow limits; and the tendency to overindulge it is
responsible for much of the confusion in the law.").
190. Ernest J. Weinrib, Illegality as a Tort Defence, 26 U. TORONTO L.J. 28, 34
(1976). Professor Ford agrees, arguing that the principle of "legal inseverability" for
purposes of responsibility for the acts of several persons joined together in commission
of a wrong adverted to by Judge Kitto in Smith, "is a principle for the purposes of
criminal, not civil responsibility. It is surely inappropriate to argue matters of civil
liability on the basis of a rule designed for other purposes." Ford, supra note 95, at 39.
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level of cooperation constitutes the sort of joint criminal activity that will
lead to application of the doctrine. Must plaintiff's level of involvement
be identical to defendant's for there to be no duty owed? What if
plaintiff is not as involved as defendant in the crime, but her actions
could be viewed as aiding and abetting? What if her actions do not
constitute aiding and abetting, but nonetheless exhibit some involvement
in the criminal act? No court applying the duty test has answered these
questions. 191
Fourth, while the duty approach plausibly applies where defendant is
a co-conspirator in crime,· it obviously has no application in other
scenarios where the ex turpi causa defense is raised. 192 Apparently,
it would not even be available to defendants in cases such as
McCummings. In fact, the test produces two anomalies: (a) it allows
defendant to profit from his own wrong in order to prevent plaintiff from
profiting from hers, and (b) it puts innocent third parties at greater risk
of liability than wrongdoing criminals. Regarding the first anomaly, a
Canadian judge has noted:
[C]onfining the barring of recovery to cases where the plaintiff and the
defendant were engaged in a joint criminal act produces a paradoxical result.
Assume that the plaintiff is injured by the defendant's negligence while the
plaintiff is carrying out a criminal enterprise. If the defendant is also engaged
in the criminal enterprise, the defendant will escape liability. But if the
defendant is not involved in the criminal enterprise at all, he will be liable. The
net result of a principle intended to prevent a plaintifffrom profiting from his
own wrong would be to permit a defendant to profit from his own wrong. 193

This passage also highlights the second· anomaly-that the ex turpi
causa defense is available to criminals in situations where it would not
protect innocent third parties. For example, the accident in Smith
occurred when the car, driven by plaintiff's cohort in crime, went off the
road and hit a tree. But assume. instead that the accident had been
partially caused by the careless driver of another vehicle. Under the
duty approach enunciated in Smith, the co-conspirator defendant has an
ex turpi causa defense that is not available to the non-criminal driver of
the other car. Because he was not jointly engaged in a criminal venture
with plaintiff, the driver of .the other car is deprived of an absolute

191. See generally Bruce MacDougall, Ex Turpi Causa: Should A Defence Arise
from a Base Cause?, 55 SASK. L. REV. 1, 25 (1991).
192. Indeed, some courts have explicitly limited the defense to cases of joint
criminal activity. E.g., Teece v. Honeybourn, 54 D.L.R.3d 549 (B.C. 1975).
193. Betts v. Sandersons Estate, 31 B.C.L.R.2d 1, 6 (1988) (Lambert, J.) (emphasis
added).
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defense. 194 "Justice hardly seems to be served by a rule which penalizes a defendant for his innocence but not for his guilt.;' 195
Similarly, justice is not served by a. rule which seems to provide at
least a vague incentive for defendant to involve herself in plaintiff's
illegal activity so as to create the conditions for application of the ex
turpi causa defense. 196
Furthermore, the duty approach confuses what should be two distinct
concepts-the plaintiff's duty not to violate the law 197and the
defendant's duty of care (in a negligence case) or duty not to injure (in
an intentional tort case). 198
Additionally, despite protestations to the contrary by the very courts
rendering the decisions, the denial of a duty renders the plaintiff; in
194. Judge Kitto supplied this illustration:
If, to take a strong example, the respondent in the present case had been an
escaped convict travelling in the car in order to elude lawful pursuit but the
appellant had been driving him in all innocence, the appellant would, I should
think, have owed the respondent the same duty of care as he would have owed
an ordinary passenger.
Smith v. Jenkins, 119 C.L.R. 397, 403 (1969) (Austl.).
195. W.J. Ford, Tort and Illegality: The Ex Turpi CausaDefence in Negligence Law
(Part Two), 11 MELB. U. L. REV. 164, 176 (1977).
196. See JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 278 (7th ed. 1987): Fleming
explains:
There is really no reason in logic or policy for a different result where the
plaintiff is involved in a joint illegal enterprise with the defendant: the
plaintiff does not appear more culpable than if he had acted alone, and offering
immunity to the defendant would be apt to encourage rather than deter the
enterprise.
Id.; see also MacDougall, supra note 191, at 28. MacDougall states:
lf thelaw is willing to make the plaintiff an outlaw vis-a-vis a co-participant
in illegality, then why not vis-a-vis anyone else? If, on the other hand, the
innocent defendant is not allowed to take advantage of the deferice, then
should it not be refused to a "guilty" defendant? It is not a purpose of the law
to encourage others to participate in wrongful acts in order to allow them to
escape civil liability.

Id.
197. Professor MacDougall asks: "Why should it matter that they were involved
jointly? If the court wishes to express its disapproval of the plaintiff's activity then only
her activity should be of relevance to the court." MacDougall, supra note 191, at 28.
198. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, JOINT TORTS AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 334
(1951). Williams notes:
The duty not to smuggle is logically distinct from the duty to warn invitees of
traps, just as the duty not to operate a car without a licence is distinct from the
duty not to drive a car negligently; breach of the one should not be a defence
to an action for breach of the other.

Id.
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effect, caput lupinum in violation of so many basic principles of tort
law. 199
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the duty test is so malleable in
the hands of judges that it tends to be extremely result-oriented in
application. After all, even proponents of the duty theory recognize that
''there is no a priori reason in law why a duty cannot subsist between
criminals or wrongdoers."200 Adding a new layer of considerations in
determining whether a duty exists "provides no new insight into the
fundamental question of when the courts should be entitled to deny
recovery in tort to a plaintiff on the ground of the plaintiff's immoral or
illegal conduct,"201 · and further complicates an already uncertain area
of the law. As Prosser has stated:
These are shifting sands, and no fit foundation. There is a-duty if the court
says there is a duty; the law ... is what we make it. Duty is only a word with
. which we state our conclusion that there is or is not to be liability; it necessarily
begs the essential question. 202

Although Prosser was discussing American law, the "duty" concept is
no clearer in Australia or England where this test is popular.203
Indeed, English author P.S. Atiyah finds the same difficulties with the
concept, deeming the "duty" question "an unnecessary abstraction which
adds nothing to the substance of the law ... [being] simply coextensive
with the boundaries of liability once negligence in fact and damage in
fact have been shown."204
This malleability has been manifest in ex turpi causa cases. Professor
MacDougall argues that this "result orientitis" of the duty approach is
nearly unavoidable because courts will be much more reluctant to
impose the harsh conclusion that no duty exists in cases where plaintiff's
personal injuries are severe than in cases where plaintiff's personal
injuries are minor.205 The difficulty with this approach, of course, is
that neither plaintiff nor defendant know before the accident giving rise

199. MacDougall, supra note 191, at 4.
200. Hall v. Hebert, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 159, 180 (Can.) {McLachlin, J.).
201. Id. at 181.
202. William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 15 (1953).
203. The most recent major case decided in England regarding scope of duty is an
accountants' liability case, Caparo v. Dickman, [1990] 2 W.L.R. 358 (H.L.).
Unfortunately, courts in other· common-law nations are having a devil of a time
determining exactly what Caparo meant, leading to substantial confusion. See Robyn
Martin, Professional Liability - What Price Caparo Now?, 9 PROF. NEGL. 119 (1993).
204. PATRICK S. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION, AND THE LAW 47 (1970).
205. MacDougall, supra note 191, at 18 ("It is, I think, correct that the doctrine
ought not to be applied if manifest injustice would result--that must always be true of
principles developed within the common law.") (quoting Judge Taylor in Mack v. Enns,
30 B.C.L.R. 337, 346 (1981)).
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to suit how severe the injuries will be or, consequently, whether the
courts will find a duty to exist.206 Such an unprincipled and unpredictable approach is clearly deficient.

2.

Part Two: Determining Standard of Care

The Smith rule was refined, of course, by Jackson, but the latter's
approach-which provides that no duty exists in situations where one coventurer in crime injures another because it is supposedly impossible for
the courts to establish a standard_ of care-also has its flaws. Assume
that Driver D and Passenger P are jointly engaged in transporting illegal
drugs. Both desire that D will drive carefully so as not to attract undue
police attention. Under Jackson, D owes a duty to P and will be liable
for an accident unless, the moment before the agreement, a police siren
was flipped on and a chase began. The distinction is a thin one.
As noted above, Smith purportedly rejected application of the ex turpi
causa defense, focusing solely on the duty issue.207 However, as also
noted above, this was merely a semantic ruse-the case was indistinguishable in reasoning, rationale, and result from others applying the ex
turpi causa defense. On the one hand, unlike Smith, the Jackson
approach arguably moves the duty theory away from the ex turpi causa
defense in that the degree of moral turpitude of the parties is irrelevant.
The only issue is whether a duty of care can be established. Most courts
and commentators (and accurately so) view the Jackson approach as just
another approach to the ex turpi causa defense,208 but to the extent that
it purports not to be, it loses all theoretical focus. 209
Notwithstanding the reasoning of Jackson and its progeny, it is, in
fact, possible to establish a standard of care for the setting of a dynamite
charge by one of two safecrackers. That standard of care would be very
similar to that owed by one construction worker to another. It is also
possible to set a standard of care for the driver of a getaway car in a
bank robbery. That standard of care would be very similar to that owed

206. MacDougall, supra note 191, at 18-20.
207. See supra notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
208. E.g., Pitts v. Hunt, [1990] 3 W.L.R. 542, 552 (Beldam, L.J.), 558 (Balcombe,
L.J.), 566 (Dillon, L.J.) (Eng.).
209. See Hall v. Hebert, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 159, 183-86 (Can.) (McLachlin, J.)
(explaining why, to the minimal extent ex turpi causa should play a role in tort
litigation, it should be as a defense, not as an element of plaintiffs cause of action).
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by the driver of a car rushing to a hospital in a medical emergency. It
is possible to set a standard of care for the driver of an automobile, even
when he and the passenger have been drinking together all day. It is
certainly possible to establish a duty of care in a case regarding the
performance of a driver, even though, as in Jackson, the driver has no
license.
Although McCummings was not a joint-wrongdoer case, it demonstrates that a standard of care can be determined in such a situation. The
shooting officer was constrained by both a U.S. Supreme Court decision
making it a constitutional violation to shoot an unarmed fleeing suspect
who poses no danger to the officer or to the public,210 and by New
York police guidelines providing that guns should only be used as
defensive weapons and cannot be used to stop an escaping felon "unless
there is probable cause to believe a felon will use deadly force."211
In short, Jackson is dead wrong in concluding that no standard of care
can be established in such cases. The judges are simply saying that in
certain cases they do not wish to establish a standard of care.212 This
will be the case in situations where the parties are jointly involved in
crimes or other acts of moral turpitude-which is precisely the element
that the Jackson court purports to exclude from its analysis.
Because of two deficiencies the Jackson decision results in an
intolerable lack of guidance. First, the decision does not make it clear
whether the courts cannot establish a duty of care (which is never true)
or are simply choosing not to establish a duty of care. Second, if the
latter is the case, the decision gives precious little guidance as to what
types of conduct will cause the court to choose not to establish a duty.
To the extent that the duty approach requires courts to establish
guidelines in order to determine when they will and when they will not
choose to establish standards of care, the duty approach simply collapses
and is replaced by the public policy approach discussed in the next part.
For it is only those public policy factors which can provide the needed
guidelines.

210. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985).
211. See Richard Cohen, A Mugging of Taxpayers, PLAIN DEALER (CLEVELAND),
Dec. 5, 1993, at D3. There was very substantial evidence supporting the jury's finding
that neither of these criteria were met in the McCummings case. Id.
212. See Williams, supra note 111, at 750-51.
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C.

The Public Policy Approach

At least four different common-law countries have developed a public
policy approach to application of the ex turpi causa defense. Each has
its limitations.
1.

Australia: Godbolt

To the extent that Godbolt is viewed as turning on public policy
considerations, two major problems come immediately to mind. First,
there are objections to the specific public policy advanced in this case
(encouragement of crime) and others (insult to the integrity of the
judicial system, punishment of wrongdoers, etc.). Godbolt's view that
crime would be encouraged by allowance of recovery is facially
incredible. No person embarks on a criminal venture hoping that he or
she will be injured in the course of that venture and thereby enabled to
recover from a co-conspirator in a subsequent civil action. 213
Second, there is a valid objection generally to the use of public policy
as the basis for deciding whether to apply the ex turpi causa defense.
In the hands of a result-oriented judge, unlimited numbers of public
policy arguments can be conjured up to justify application or rejection
of the illegality defense. In the Godbolt case itself, Judge Manning's
opinion, though concurring in the result, pointed out some of the perils
of a public policy approach. Judge Manning cited Lord Atkin in Fender
v. St. John-Mildmay,214 for the notion that "from time to time judges
of the highest reputation have uttered warning notes as to the danger of
permitting judicial tribunals to roam unchecked in the field of public
policy,"21 and quoted Judge Cave's statement in In re Mirams, 216
that ''.judges are more to be trusted as interpreters of the law than as
expounders of what is called public policy." 17

213.
V.A.2.
214.
215.
216.
217.

For a more detailed discussion of this deterrence rationale, see infra part

1938 App. Cas. I, IO (appeal taken from Eng.).
Godbolt v. Fittock, 1963 N.S.W. St. R. at 617, 630 (Austl.).
[1891] I Q.B. 594.
Id. at 595. In conclusion, Judge Manning cautioned:
The application of the rules of public policy to circumstances such as this
provide almost as much difficulty as controlling the ''unruly horse" which the
policy itself has been said to resemble. Accordingly I do not feel that it is
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On the other hand, to the extent that Godbolt is viewed as turning on
the directness of a connection between a criminal enterprise and an
injury, regardless of causation, it is subject to criticism on two counts.
It runs completely contrary to modem trends in tort law in that (a) it
absolutely defeats plaintiff's claim rather than allowing for some
apportionment under a comparative fault doctrine,218 and (b) provides
an inadequate tool (to substitute for causation) for use in delimiting the
scope of the ex turpi causa defense's application.219

2.

England: Pitts

English cases often apply the "public conscience" test. How does one
determine which sorts of illegality give rise to an affront to the public
conscience by indirectly assisting or encouraging the plaintiff in his
criminal activity? The facts in Pitts were not fertile soil for application
of the public conscience test. 220 But even had they been, the public
conscience test221 is clearly a variant of the public policy approach of

necessary or desirable to attempt to lay down any rule of general application.
1963 N.S.W. St. R. at 630.
218. There is no doubt that western jurisprudence strongly favors on fairness
grounds the proportional liability of a comparative negligence or comparative
responsibility system over a harsh all-or-nothing contributory negligence defense. Harry
Kalven, Jr., Comments on Maki v. Frelk-Comparative v. Contributory Negligence:
Should the Court or Legislature Decide?, 21 VAND. L. REV. 897, 899 n.14 (1968)
(noting "apparent[] worldwide consensus" in favor of comparative negligence).
219. Weinrib, supra note 190, at 36-38.
220. See Pitts v. Hunt, [1990) 1 Q.B. 24 (Dillon, L.J.). Plaintiff Pitts was not, after
all, asking the court to assist him directly or indirectly to commit a crime or to keep the
proceeds of one. Williams, supra note 11 1,-at 751.
221. The "public conscience" test is also one of two primary approaches used by
English courts when ex turpi causa is raised as a defense in contract cases. See, e.g.,
Euro-diam Ltd. v. Bathurst, [1990) 1 Q.B. 1; Geismar v. Sun Alliance and London Ins.,
[1978) 1 Q.B. 383 (no recovery under property insurance policy for property stolen from
insured who had illegally imported the property without paying proper duty); Beresford
v. Royal Ins. Co. Ltd., [1938) App. Cas. 586 (appeal taken from Eng.) (no recovery
under life insurance policy by personal representative of insured who had committed
suicide). The other approach refuses recovery on ex turpi causa grounds where it is
necessary for plaintiff to prove or plead an illegal contract in order to recover. See
Bowmakers Ltd. v. Barnet Instruments Ltd. [1945) 1 K.B. 65. See generally Tan, supra
note 45, at 523. Naturally, this rule would also bar recovery in tort cases. Saunders v.
Edwards, [1987) 1 W.L.R. 1116, 1132 (C.A.) (Nicholls, L.J.).
In one recent case, the Court of Appeals found for plaintiff using the public conscience
test, and the House of Lords affirmed on grounds that plaintiff did not need to assert the
contract in order to state her claim. See Paul Magrath, Law Report: Illegality No Bar
to Property Claim, INDEPENDENT, July 6, 1993, at 13 (reporting on Tinsley v. Milligan,
in which one of two joint beneficial owners of a house who had agreed to put the
property in the name of the other so as to facilitate fraudulent claim to housing benefits
by former was allowed to impress trust upon property for half its value).
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Godbolt, 222 and suffers many of the same infirmities discussed above,
including vagueness. 223
For example, Lord Justice Beldam barred recovery in Pitts because
"[t]he public conscience is ever increasingly being focused not only on
those who commit the offence [of driving while intoxicated] but, in the
words of recent publicity, those who ask the driver to drink and
drive,"224 but adamantly refused to draw any sort of line to give
guidance as to what sorts of offenses would be serious enough to arouse
the public conscience to bar recovery and those which would not. 225
Absent such guidance, public policy is worse than an unruly horse; it is
an imaginary one.
3.

Canada: Tallow

The public policy approach, subject to the criticisms mentioned above,
has its own particular problems, as constructed in Tallow. The court
described the division of legislative power in Canada placing criminal
law within the federal sphere and then noted the distinction between
offenses malum in se ("evil in itself') and those malum prohibitum
("wrong because it is prohibited").226 Judge Clement then equated
federal offenses with mala in se and provincial offenses with mala
prohibita, concluding that the former involved sufficient turpitude to
justify invocation of the ex turpi causa defense, while the latter did
not. 227 Plaintiff's recovery was barred because of plaintiff's participation with defendant driver in theft and unlawful use of the car.
This rather neat solution has been criticized228 (a) as ignoring the
fact that the equation of morality and criminality has been expressly

222. The public policy approach has also been characterized as turning on the
proximity (not causal connection) of the illegality to the matters of which plaintiff is
complaining. Pitts, 1 Q.B. at 51.
223. For example, Lord Justice Dillon stated in Pitts that he found the public
conscience test "very difficult to apply, since the public conscience may well be affected
by factors of an emotional nature." Id. at 56.
224. Id. at 46.
225. Id.
226. Tallow v. Tailfeathers, 44 D.L.R.3d 55, 65 (Alta. 1973).
227. Id.
228. See Weinrib, supra note 190, at 32-33.
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disclaimed in Canadian constitutional law,229 and (b) because many
federal criminal offenses in Canada are of a strictly regulatory nature. 230 Acts do not become malum in se simply because a federal
legislature has seen fit to outlaw them. Thus, like their Australian and
English brethren, judges in Canada clearly have not found a satisfactory
basis• upon which to distinguish those illegal and immoral acts which
should motivate a court to deny tort recovery by invocation of ex turpi
causa from those which should not.

4.

United States: Zysk

Like common law courts elsewhere, the Virginia courts, the primary
proponents of the public policy approach to ex turpi causa in the United
States, have not clarified the boundaries of their rationale. The
victimless crime of fornication between two consenting adults apparently
is a sufficiently immoral act to require the courts to withhold remedy.231 The crime of speeding, which endangers third parties much
more significantly, presumably is not so immoral. But where is the line
being drawn, and ·why? Is it between felonies and misdemeanors?
Between crimes malum prohibitum and those malum in se? ' Between
acts that are merely immoral and acts that have been criminalized?
Virginia does not explicate.
This problem has been highlighted in New York. New York, perhaps
more than any American jurisdiction other than Virginia, has produced
a fair number of recent decisions applying the ex turpi causa defense in
tort cases. 232 In Barker v. Kallash, 233 for example, a fifteen-year-old
plaintiff was barred from negligence recovery because his injury
occurred while he was making an illegal pipe bomb which exploded.

229. See Proprietary Articles Trade Ass'n v. Attorney Gen. Can., 1931 App. Cas.
310, 324 (Lord Atkin) ("Morality and criminality are far from co-extensive; nor is the
sphere of criminality necessarily part of a more extensive field covered by morality....").
230. For example, Weinrib asks: "Can it be seriously asserted, for instance, that the
act of mixing sulphur dioxide into sausages in the proportion of forty-six one-hundredths
of a part of sulphur dioxide to two thousand parts of meat is intrinsically wrong and
against conscience even in the absence of injury?" Weinrib, supra note 190, at 33.
231. Zysk v. Zysk, 387 S.E.2d 466 (Va. 1990).
232. E.g., Braunstein v. Jason Tarantella, Inc., 450 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1982) (barring
producers of pornographic movie from bringing negligence action against distributors
because plaintiffs would have to rely on their own illegal act to establish their claim);
Hines v. Sullivan, 431 N.Y.S.2d 868 (Fam. Ct. 1980) (denying plaintiff father's attempt
to obtain an order of filiation to enable him to seek custody of child because child was
conceived through act of illegal intercourse between 16-year-old plaintiff and 14-year-old
mother).
233. 468 N.E.2d 39 (N.Y. 1984).

100

[VOL.

32: 53, 199S]

Litigation "Crisis"
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

The case was particularly weak anyway because plaintiff was suing an
eight-year-old who had allegedly sold to third parties the firecrackers
used as the source of gunpowder for the bomb. The court invoked the
ex turpi causa defense, holding that plaintiff should not profit from his
own wrong.234
Interestingly, Judge Jasen's concurring opinion stressed that violation
of a criminal statute should preclude a plaintiff's suit only when (1)
plaintiff's own criminal conduct was a contributing proximate cause, and
(2) ''that conduct can fairly be considered so egregious an offense that
permitting recovery would be inimical to the public interest."235 Thus,
the New York approach seems to conflate the majority proximate cause
test with Virginia's public policy approach.
The key question in the public policy approach is this: How
"egregious" must the plaintiff's conduct be to disqualify plaintiff from
recovery? Like Virginia, New York has trouble drawing satisfactory
lines. In Barker, plaintiff argued that he was only fifteen years old and
that this was just a case of several youngsters playing with fireworks
shortly before the Fourth of July. 236 Thus, plaintiff argued, his
conduct was not so egregious that it should bar recovery. The court
ruled that making a bomb was serious business that should not- be
minimized.237 In attempting to establish a general rule, the court drew
a distinction between statutes that merely regulate a certain activity and
statutes that prohibit that activity: Violation of the former would not bar
plaintiff's recovery; violation of the latter would.238
Using this standard as a guideline poses several problems. First, this
standard suffers from many of the deficiencies cited earlier regarding the
legislative intent standard of the Henwood case in Australia. 239 Most
importantly the legislature rarely makes known its intent to permit or
deny civil recovery when it enacts criminal legislation. Second, it is not
always clear when the legislature intends merely to regulate an activity
234. Id. at 41 (citing Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889) and Carr v. Hoy,
139 N.E.2d 531 (N.Y. 1957)).
235. Id. at 44.
.
236. 'Id. at 42. Plaintiff also argued that barring his recovery under these
circumstances was inconsistent with the legislature's earlier abolition of contributory
negligence as a total bar to recovery. Id. at 43. The dissenting opinion agreed. Id. at
48-49 (Simons, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 40-41.
238. Id. at 41.
239. See supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.

101

or to prohibit it. Legislatures often attempt to "regulate out of existence" activities that they find odious.240 Third, this standard is
irrelevant for those cases in which ex turpi causa is raised as a defense
where plaintiff's conduct is allegedly immoral, but is not necessarily in
violation of any particular statute. There are many such categories of
cases. The strongest moralistic tones arise from cases involving illicit
sexual intercourse which may or may not violate specific criminal
enactments, such as Hegarty v. Shine. 241
Added together, these factors essentially mean that in most cases the
judges will decide on an ad hoc, subjective basis whether they think the
particular conduct in a case is sufficiently egregious to merit application
of the ex turpi causa defense. As the dissenting judge noted in Barker:
"A plaintiff's right to maintain an action ... should not rest on a
Judge's subjective view of whether the conduct is serious or egregious:
Judges will differ in making such an evaluation. Indeed the Judges of
this court disagreed on the 'seriousness' of the plaintiff's conduct
•••• " 242
Such a state of affairs has led to seriously inconsistent
judgments in New York243 and elsewhere. 244 .
Thus, each permutation of the public policy approach has its
limitations. Each one illustrates what an "unruly horse" the doctrine of
public policy truly is. The arbitrariness in application of the principle
must be a concern. As Ronald Dworkin has noted:
A principle like "No man may profit from his own wrong" ... states a reason
that argues in one direction, but does not necessitate a particular decision . . . .
There may be principles or policies arguing in the other direction--a policy
securing title, for example, or a principle limiting punishment to what the
legislature has stipulated. 245

.
240. See Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan, Guns Don't Kill People. Bullets Do., N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 12, 1993, at EIS (suggesting that ammunition be subjected to a tax so high
as to effectively tax it out of existence).
241. 14 Cox Crim. Cas. 145 (Ir. C.A 1878) (denying recovery for transmission of
a loathsome disease because plaintiff female had committed "immoral acts").
242. 468 N.E.2d at 47 (Simons, J., dissenting).
243. Consider, for example, Alice D. v. William M., 450 N.Y.S.2d 350 (Civ. Ct.
1982), where plaintiff violated a New York statute prohibiting (not regulating) adultery,
yet was allowed to recover from defendant co-adulterer the costs of her abortion.
Though the statute contained a clear prohibition, the court held that it was rarely
enforced and to give it effect in this case would create an injustice. Id. at 355.
244. See John Irvine, Annotation to Mongovius v. Marchand, 44 C.C.L.T. 18, 20
(B.C. 1988). Irvine explains:
It seems that the ex turpi case is running a somewhat maverick course
through the law of torts at present, with the unhappy result that like cases may
yield unlike results, depending on whether this defence is pleaded and if so,
whether it recommends itself to the Judge. Its scope is unnervingly vague.
Id.
245. Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 26 (1967).
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Perhaps more importantly, none of the approaches satisfactorily
answers what has been called the ''well-nigh insoluble question as to
which offences would attract the defence and which would not."246 No
court has developed a satisfactory method of combining public policy
factors to develop any sort of clear guideline for deciding which types
of wrongdoing can or cannot be subject to the ex turpi causa doctrine,247 as a reading of the aforementioned cases clearly illustrates.
When a judge pronounces that worker's violation of a safety regulation
designed for his own protection must receive the same treatment as a
violation of a felony provision of the criminal code,248 things are
seriously amiss.
No court has determined how to draw the line between the situations
of Bernard McCummings and Rodney King. Every U.S. citizen,
seemingly, is outraged at the courts for allowing Bernard McCumm:ings
to recover from the New York Transit Authority. On the other hand,
most U.S. citizens would be outraged if Rodney King were not allowed
to recover from the Los Angeles Police Department.249 Nothing in ex
turpi causa jurisprudence gives helpful guidance to distinguish between
these two cases. That the latter was videotaped seems the most likely
explanation for the difference in public reaction.
This deficiency is terribly significant because the public policy
approach, in essence, still functionally addresses the question of which
plaintiffs are guilty of conduct so odious that they should be denied any

a

246. Debattista, supra note 105, at 16; see also Tom Hervey, Note, Caveat
Criminalis, 97 LAW Q. REV. 537, 540 (1981). Hervey asks:
But where will the line be drawn? Surely not between statutory crimes and
common law crimes or arrestable and non-arrestable offences. Should the
Criminal Injuries Board classification of "crime of violence" be adopted, with
or without an extension to attempts to avoid apprehension for other offences?
Should the difficult distinction between ma/a in se and mala prohibita be
called into play? Or should we merely trust the courts to know the right kind
of crime when they see it?.
Id.
247. MacDougall, supra note 191, at 21.
248. Progress & Properties Ltd. v. Craft, 135 C.L.R. 651, 659 (1976) (Austl.)
(Barwick, C.J., dissenting).
249. The McCummings defendants asked the U.S. Supreme Court to make an
exception to the rule that it is unconstitutional to shoot unarmed fleeing suspects. That
exception would allow use of deadly force against one who had committed an act of
"serious physical violence." See Justice Gets a Good Mugging, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5,
1993, at M4. By denying certiorari, the Court declined to draw such a distinction.
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redress in court for injuries that would otherwise be compensable. If
they are not termed caput lupinum, such plaintiffs are nonetheless treated
as such. A very clear and strongly defensible standard should be
available to draw such lines, yet none exists. To the extent that the
legislature has not chosen to deprive a criminal wrongdoer of civil
remedies (and, as we have seen, legislatures almost never actively
choose to do so), courts should not be eager to substitute their own
judicial activism.

D.

Proximate Cause

On a theoretical plane, the proximate cause approach has its own
deficiencies. Even assuming the existence of proximate causation, how
do we draw the line between which illicit acts will be viewed as
necessary to invoke the defense and which will simply constitute
comparative fault? The proximate cause test itself provides no answer
and does not attempt to. It relies, as we saw in Barker, upon one of the
variations of the public policy test, all of which are inadequate to the
task.
Furthermore, the very usage of the term "proximate cause" reminds us
of the parallels between treating plaintiff's illegal acts as comparative
negligence or assumption of risk (which in modem law will not
generally completely bar recovery) and treating those acts as giving rise
to the ex turpi causa defense (which will totally bar recovery). 250 The
test provides no justification for undermining the policies of comparative
fault.
Furthermore, the proximate causation approach lacks clarity in
application. 251 In Smith, Judge Windeyer criticized the approach.252
Judge Windeyer stated:
[T]his formulation by which the critical question is whether the unlawful act has
a causal connexion with the harm suffered and ''proximately contributed" to it
is not to my mind satisfactory. The question gets bogged down in phrases
about causal relations, ''proximate cause", "causa causans", "causa sine qua
non", "novus actus". (It is perhaps worth interpolating that the word "causa"
has here a meaning which, obviously, is quite different from "causa" in the
phrase "turpis causa".)253

250.
251.
252.
253.

See generally Weinrib, supra note 190, at 36.
See generally Ford, supra note 95, at 42-44.
119 C.L.R. 397, 420 (1969) (Austl.).

Id.;_see also FRIDMAN, supra note 130, at 288 ("It would seem that the utility

of any doctrine of causation, however formulated for the purpose of resolving this
problem, is very much in doubt.").
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The accuracy of Windeyer's criticism is borne out by a survey of the
case results, which yields inconsistent decisions on similar fact
·
pattems.254
A useful doctrine must be based on a clearly justified theoretical
foundation and must be embodied in a set of clear rules capable of
producing consistent results. But the discussion in this part clearly
demonstrates that there. is no satisfactory approach yet developed to
applying the doctrine of turpi causa in tort cases. The defense has
been allowed for more than 100 years, yet the law in the area remains
intractably murky.255 The fact that no satisfactory philosophical
rationale or practical elements for application of the defense yet exist
strongly mitigates in favor of the view that this defense niust be used
sparingly, if at all.

ex

V.

GENERAL EVALUATION OF THE EX TuRPI CAUSA DEFENSE

· As noted in the preceding part, each specific approach to applying the
ex turpi causa defense to tort cases that has been developed by the
courts is seriously flawed. Those containing broader applications of the
defense seem to have more problems than those with more constricted
applications, but all are problematic at best.
This part steps back from the specific flaws of the various theoretical
approaches to applying the doctrine in order to examine its fundamental
rationale on a more general plane. First, this part will examine the
various rationales supporting the doctrine in order to determine whether
they are truly advanced when the. ex turpi causa defense is applied to

254. MacDougall, supra note 191, at 29.
255. See STEPHEN M. D. TODD, THE LAW OF TORTS IN NEW ZEALAND 845 (1991)
(ex turpi causa is a defense "ofuncertain scope"); KLAR, supra note 10, at 333 ("[W]hy
ex turpi causa is applied [in Canada] is not generally agreed upon ... [so] the question
of how and when it is to be applied suffers from the same confusion."); HEUSTON &
BUCKLEY, supra note 10, at 325 (ex turpi causa is an "obscure, yet intriguing" defense
in England); C.D. BAKER, TORT 568 (4th ed. 1986) ("This is a rather obscure comer of
the law."); Neville H. Crago, The Defence of Illegality in Negligence Actions, 4 MELB.
U. L. REV. 534, 534 (1964) (the role of the ex turpi causa defense "has long perplexed
courts both in Commonwealth countries and in the United States of America");
MacDougall, supra note 191, at 37 (''There. can be said to be no uniform, coherent
learning developed by the courts on ex turpi causa."); Williams, supra note 111, at 749
("[T]he case law enshrines a wide variety of approaches, as well as some contradiction
·
and confusion ....").
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tort cases. Second, this part will examine various disadvantages and
drawbacks created when the defense is applied to tort cases

A.

Rationale for the Ex Turpi Causa Defense

The courts have pronounced four major rationales supporting their
invocation of the ex turpi causa defense in tort cases. First, denial of
recovery prevents plaintiffs from profiting from their own wrongs.
Second, denying recovery deters crime. Third, the civil law is a proper
avenue for punishing crime. Fourth, the illegality defense preserves
judicial integrity. These rationales will be evaluated in turn.

1.

Denial of Recovery Prevents Plaintiffs From Profiting from Their
Own Wrongs

The law often ,allows people to profit, quite legally, from their
wrongs. 256 Nonetheless, it is clear that the courts are not, and should
not be, eager to allow plaintiffs to profit from. criminal wrongdoing.
Thus, for example, the law does not allow A to murder B for purposes
of speeding up an inheritance A is to gain under the provisions of B's
will257 or a recovery A is to gain as beneficiary of B's life insurance
policy.258 "Son-of-Sam" laws are another example of this innate
impulse.259
256. As Dworkin points out:
We say that our law respects the principle that no man may profit from his
own wrong, but we do not mean that the law never permits a man to profit
from wrongs he commits. In fact, people often profit, perfectly legally, from
their legal wrongs. The most notorious case is adverse possession-if I
trespass on your land long enough, som(). day I will gain a right to cross your
land whenever I please. There are many less dramatic examples. If a man
leaves one job, breaking a contract, to take a much higher paying job, he may
have to pay damages to his first employer, but he is usually entitled to keep
his new salary. If a man jumps bail and crosses state lines to make a brilliant
investment in another state, he may be sent back to jail, but he will keep his
profits.
Dworkin, supra note 245, at 25-26.
257. E.g., Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889) (deciding that a plaintiff who
speeded up inheritance by murdering grandfather was not entitled to take under will);
Lundy v. Lundy, 24 S.C.R. 650 (1894) (Can.) (similar).
258. E.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Wenckus, 244 A.2d 424 (Me. 1968)
(holdinigthat a wife who murdered her husband was not entitled to recover as primary
beneficiary of life insurance contract). See generally William M. McGovern, Jr.,
Homicide and Succession to Property, 68 MICH. L. REV. 65 (1969).
259. See, e.g., Garrett Epps, Wising Up: "Son of Sam" Laws and the Speech and
Press Clauses, 70 N.C. L. REV. 493, 522 (1992) (''The impulse behind these [Son of
Sam] laws-the desire of the community that hateful criminals not profit from selling
their stories-is a very real one."); Jon A. Soderberg, Comment, Son of Sam Laws: A
Victim of the First Amendment?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 629, 630 (1992) ("[P]ublic
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This principle is correct and does, in fact, give rise to certain proper
applications of the ex turpi causa tort defense. First, tort damage
recoveries should not include lost wages or other income derived from
illegal activities. For example, if a person who makes a living as an
arsonist is injured in a car wreck, whether or not on the way to the site
of a contemplated arson, and claims as damages the income he lost by
being hospitalized and therefore unable to set fires for profit, recovery
of such wages should be denied. Similarly, Bernard McCummings
should not be allowed to recover for lost income derived from mugging.
To allow such recoveries would allow plaintiffs to profit from wrongdoing. The courts are in general agreement on this point. 260
Second, consider Gamble v. Randolph.261 Plaintiff was in an auto
accident while operating his car in violation of New York's ''no fault"
law which required each motorist to have personal injury insurance.
Because plaintiff was not an "insured motorist" under the law, he
claimed that he should have been allowed.to sue defendant for·his nonserious injuries--a remedy not available to an insured motorist. The
court properly dismissed plaintiff's suit, thereby preventing plaintiff from
putting himself in a better position than those who complied with the
law.262
Third, ex turpi causa could properly prevent plaintiffs who act
illegally from recovering punitive damages. For example, in the famous

dismay over notorious criminals commercially exploiting their criminal behavior by
selling their crime stories has prompted Congress and many state legislatures to enact
so-called 'Son of Sam' laws.").
Note that while the Supreme Court struck down the only version of a "Son of Sam"
law it has evaluated, in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991), it did so on First Amendment grounds while holding
that the state does have an ''undisputed compelling interest" in preventing criminals from
profiting from their crimes. Id. at 510. Thus, the Supreme Court implicitly made a
point this Article seeks to emphasize----there are many situations where other values will
require courts to overcome their reluctance to allow "wrongdoers" to "profit."
260. E.g., McNichols v. J. R. Simplot Co., 262 P.2d 1012 (Idaho 1953) (refusing
recovery of damages for profits lost by plaintiff caused by defendant's nuisance where
plaintiffs business was illegal); Desmet v. Sublett, 225 P.2d 141 (N.M. 1950) (awarding
plaintiff possession of truck in replevin action but not damages for time he was deprived
of its possession because he was planning on profiting from unlicensed hauling); Harper
v. Grasser, 150 P.·1175 (Wash. 1915) (holding that defendant had superior right to fish
under license, but was not entitled to damages on counterclaim because he planned to
fish using illegal drag seine).
261. 398 N.Y.S.2d 109 (Civ. Ct. 1977).
262. Id. at 110.
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"spring-gun" case of Katko v. Briney,263 plaintiff, while trespassing in
an abandoned house, was injured by a booby-trap left there by defendant. When plaintiff opened the door, his action pulled a string which
discharged a shotgun pointed at the door. The court allowed recovery
of compensatory damages. and also allowed the jury to tack on $10,000
in punitive damages. The punitive damages were a form of "profit" to
plaintiff, and allowing their recovery improperly rewarded plaintiff.264
Beyond these limited exceptions, however, the ex turpi causa defense
does not properly serve the enunciated principle.265 For example, the
compensatory damages awarded plaintiff in Katko were proper. In most
of the ex turpi causa cases discussed earlier in this Article, plaintiffs
were not ·attempting. to profit from their illegal activity. They were
merely attempting to obtain compensation for injuries they sustained
because of the tortious actions of defendants. If this distinction (between
compensating a plaintiff for injuries on the one hand, and rewarding a
plaintiff's illegality on the other) is recognized and observed, rarely will
invocation of the ex turpi causa defense truly advance the pronounced
public policy of refusing to allow plaintiffs to profit from their own
wrongs. 266
Many jurisdictions recognize this important distinction in the contract
law setting. Thus, plaintiffs who attempt to realize a profit by enforcing
an illegal contract will almost always fail while, if they are able to recast
their claim as one for restitution as a means of avoiding a loss, they will

263. 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971)
264. If it is felt that punitive damages are necessary in such cases to punish and
deter the defendant, some provision should be made for paying them into the public
treasury rather than to plaintiff There is precedent for such action. See, e.g., ILL. .ANN.
STAT. ch. 735, act 5, § 2-1207 (Smith-Hurd 1992) (granting judge discretion to allocate
a portion of a punitive damage award to state Department of Rehabilitation).
265. As Judge Lambert noted in Betts v. Sanderson Estate:
If it were applied strictly in the law of tort it would prevent an award of
punitive or aggravated damages, but would extend no further. An award of
purely compensatory damages cannot be considered to be permitting a
wrongdoer to profit from his or her crime. So an extension of the principle
into the purely compensatory aspects of the law of tort represents not just an
extended application of the principle, but a modification of the principle itself.
That modification has only a very tenuous hold on the law of tort, if it has any
place there at all.
Betts v. Sanderson Estate, 31 B.C.L.R.2d l, 8 (1988).
266. See Dale Gibson, Comment, Torts-I/legality of Plaintiff's Conduct as a
Defence, 47 CANADIAN B. REV. 89, 96 (1969) ("The ex turpi causa defence is
appropriate ... only where the plaintiff is trying to profit by his illegality, not where he
is simply claiming compensation for a wrong done to him while engaged in illegal
conduct.").
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often succeed.267 Similarly, if an illegal contract is fully executed, a
plaintiff may sometimes recover from defendant moneys received by
defendant if plaintiff can plead the cause without resort to the contract. 268
Tort law should also recognize this distinction, especially because
most such cases involve physical injuries in which the plaintiff is simply
trying to be made whole in his or her physical person. 269 Consider, for
example, the plaintiff in Zysk. She was merely attempting to recover
compensation for. a grievous physical injury done to her-infliction of
a sexually transmitted disease. No "profit" in any reasonable sense of
that word was involved. Only the court's recondite reasoning could lead
to the same result_ as the infamous and oft-condemned decision in
Hegarty. 270
We naturally have less sympathy for the "millionaire mugger,"
Bernard McCummings. But the $4.3 million verdict he received, though
a lot of money, is not out of line with other verdicts aimed at compen-

267. See, e.g., JAEGER & WILLISTON, supra note 29, at 46-47 ("[E]ven an equal
participant in the illegality, if public policy demands it, is often allowed relief by way
of restitution or rescission, though not on the contract." (citation omitted)); John W.
Wade, Benefits Obtained Under Illegal Transactions-Reasons For and Against
Allowing Restitution, 25 TEX. L. REV. 31, 33 (1946) (noting that "courts have sometimes
allowed recovery" in restitution for benefits obtained under illegal contracts); George A.
Strong, The Enforceability of Illegal Contracts, 12 HASTINGS L.J. 347, 375 (1961)
("Specific restoration or payment of the reasonable value of consideration given are not
regarded as enforcement. ... ").
Such cases are part of a body of several exceptions that have developed to the general
rule at common law which ignores the distinction between attempting to enforce an
illegal contract and merely seeking restitutional recovery. See Narragansett Indian Tribe
v. Ribo, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 48 (D.R.I. 1988) (stating general rule). This general rule has
been heavily criticized. See John D. McCamus, Restitutionary Recovery of Benefits

Conferred Under Contracts in Conflict with Statutory Policrthe New Golden Rule,
25 OSG00DE HALL L.J. 787, 796 (1987). McCamus states:
[E]ven where policy considerations suggest that unperformed aspects of the
[illega!J agreement should be held unenforceable and/or that it is appropriate
to deprive the parties of any of the profits they may have secured from the
agreement, it may still be sound policy to allow recovery of the value of
benefits conferred thus far in a restitutionary claim where refusal to do so
would yield unnecessarily harsh or otherwise inappropriate results in the
circumstances of the particular case.

Id.
268.
269.
270.
venereal

E.g., McMullen v. Huffman, 174 U.S. 639,655 (1899).
Weinrib, supra note 190, at 41.
14 Cox Crim. Cas. 145 (Ir. C.A. 1878) (denying recovery for transmission of
disease to woman who engaged in illicit sexual intercourse).
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sating persons who were similarly injured by the wrongful acts of
others.271
Consider also the situation where the lawsuit is brought by the
wrongdoer's survivors. If the wrongdoer was killed by the negligence,
for example, of a co-conspirator or a third party, one cannot say that
allowing recovery by his or her survivors profits the wrongdoer in any
way.212
In short, where a plaintiff truly will not profit from wrongdoing if
granted recovery by a court, there is no logical reason for a court to
withhold recovery on the ground of illegality. In such a context, the
court's refusal to aid a wrongdoer "sounds more like an epithet than a
reason. "273
2.

Denial of Recovery Deters Crime

It is unrealistic to believe that allowing recovery to a civil plaintiff in
the illegality context would encourage crime or that denial of recovery
would discourage it, yet this is a commonly cited rationale for invocation
of the ex turpi causa defense. For example, American cases have denied
recovery to women who were butchered .in negligently performed illicit
abortions on grounds that permitting recovery would encourage married

271. For example, in the same issue of the National Law Journal that contained
criticism of the McCummings verdict, two comparable verdicts handed down by New
York City juries were reported: a $6.3 million verdict for two New York City Transit
Authority workers who suffered lung damage from fumes issued by cleaning fluid they
were using, and a $4.5 million verdict for a man who suffered epileptic seizures after
a piece of plaster and brick fell on his head while he was sitting on a toilet in his
apartment. See Margaret C. Fisk, Verdict/Settlement Watch, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 20, 1993,
at 7.
Critics of the McCummings judgment can take some satisfaction in the fact that a 14year-old girl who claims that McCummings is her father is seeking $1,000,000 in child
support from him, and another lawyer who once represented him is seeking $700,000.
Anthony Scaduto, Award Stands in Subway Mugging, NEWSDAY, Nov. 30, 1993, at 16.
272. This point has been made regarding the illegality defense in the area of
contract law. Shand, supra note 184, at 160 ("In what way could it be said that the
deceased [who had committed suicide] would derive benefit from his crime if the right
[of his beneficiaries to recover under an insurance pplicy] was upheld?").
Fortunately, some courts adopting the ex turpi causa defense in tort cases recognize
this distinction and refuse to apply it in this setting. For example, one court explained:
The defence of ex turpi causa would also fail in the present case becausethe
act has been committed by the deceased, and not by [his widow] the plaintiff.
The doctrine is intended to prevent a wrongdoer from benefitting from his own
illegal or immoral act. In the present case, it is not the deceased or his estate
which could benefit from the action brought pursuant to the Family Compensation Act, but rather his widow and children. They have committed no immoral
or illegal act. . . .
Funk v. Clapp, 35 B.C.L.R2d 222, 232 (1988) (Seaton, J.A.).
273. Primeau v. Granfield, 180 F. 847, 852 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910).
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women to have aborti01;1.s for the profit that might accrue from malpractice recoveries274 and would encourage unmarried women to become
seductresses.275
Such reasoning seems as unrealistic276 as it is cruel. Do. women
truly choose to go to bed with men thinking: "I hope I'll become
pregnant so that I can have a back-alley abortion and recover big bucks
if the abortionist butchers me?" Do individuals really decide to rob
banks in the hope that they will be injured in a high speed chase so that
they can recover damages from the insurance company of the getaway
driver?277 Did Bernard McCummings mug a poor old man in the New
York subway system hoping that he would have his spinal cord severed
by a transit authority cop's bullet and thereby become a "mugger
millionaire"? Such thinking borders on the delusional.
Just as allowing recovery in such cases does not encourage crime,
denying recovery in such cases does not realistically discourage crime.
For example, no criminal refrains from stealing a car due to the fear that
if while riding in it he is injured in a collision he will be unable to
recover a monetary judgment from a co-conspirator or negligent third
party. As Judge Starke noted in Jenkins v. Smith,278 criminals, "like
honest citizens, when undertaking a journey in an automobile, confidently expect that they will arrive at their destination safe and sound."279
It has even been suggested that application of the ex turpi causa
defense might encourage crime by eliminating the restraining influence

274. E.g., Sayadoffv. Warda, 125 Cal. App. 2d 626,631,271 P.2d 140, 143 (1954).
275. E.g., Barton v. Bee Line, Inc., 265 N.Y.S. 284, 285 (1933). In an equally
ridiculous line of reasoning applied in a contract case, a court held that a plaintiff, as
executor, could not recover money the testator lost at cards due to defendants'· fraudulent
acts. The executor argued that he should be allowed to recover on behalf of the innocent
heirs, even though the testator himself, if still alive; would not be allowed to recover.
The court concluded that it could see "no authority for the distinction, and that it would
be an encouragement to gaming if a man might kill himself, and thereby give his
executor a remedy." Babcock v. Thomson, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 446, 449 (1826).
276. · Hervey, supra note 246, at 539 ("[T]he idea that a potential criminal would be
deterred from his crime by the prospect of difficulty in a future civil action seems wildly
unrealistic.").
277. John G. Fleming, Notes of Cases: Insurance for the Criminal, 34 MOD. L.
REV. 176, 178 (1971) ("[I]t is really bizarre to credit liability insurance with the
psychological potential for stimulating crime or other intentional injury.").
278. [1969] V.R. 267, rev'd, 119 C.L.R. 397 (1969) (Austl.).
279. Id. at 275.
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that potential civil liability might have for the reckless criminal.280
This argument is not particularly convincing. However, it does lead us
toward the critical questions.
In the case ofjoint wrongdoers, where the injury arises directly out
of the criminal wrongdoing, the key question is which approach would
better deter criminal activity: (a) barring plaintiff's recovery, thereby
encouraging plaintiff to obey the law, or (b) allowing plaintiff's
recovery, thereby encouraging defendant to obey the law? This,
unfortunately, will turn out to be a very fact-specific determination
hampering our ability to draw general conclusions. Consider the
following scenarios, but keep in mind that by the time the ex turpi causa
defense is applied, the criminal law with its attendant punishments has
already failed as a deterrent,281 so there is little reason to believe that
ex turpi causa will succeed.
The personal and economic pressures that would lead a woman to seek
an illegal back-alley abortion in the face of legal, religious, and societal
condemnation would probably not be significantly affected by a policy
barring recovery from a negligent performer of such abortions.
Logically, a performer of such abortions often has a profit motive and
would more likely be deterred by a threat of liability than a pregnant
woman would be by the threat that damages would be withheld.
Consider·the transmission of herpes case. What factors motivate two
romantically involved but unmarried persons to have sexual intercourse?
It is unlikely that, as they lie in the backseat of the '57 Chevy, monetary
factors are at the top of their list of considerations regarding what to do
next. It is unlikely that either the presence or absence of the ex turpi
causa doctrine has much influence, especially because the parties are
unlikely to know about it. If they do not know about it, it cannot affect
their. judgment. If they do know about it, the transmittee certainly
cannot be induced to engage in the illicit intercourse by a doctrine
allowing recovery, because recovery is limited to compensatory damages.
The transmitter, on the other hand, if he or she has some· reason to know
280. Crago, supra note 255, at 548.
281. Given that the evidence indicates that neither the death penalty nor mandatory
life sentences appears to deter crime, it seems fanciful to believe that denial of an afterthe-fact civil remedy will do so. See, e.g., David J. Gottlieb, The Death Penalty in the
Legislature: Some Thoughts About Money, Myth, and Morality, 37 KAN. L. REV. 443,
455 ( 1989) ("In sum, the empirical evidence supports the view that the death penalty was
not a marginal deterrent even when executions took place with some frequency, and it
is certainly not a marginal deterrent as presently employed."); Edward Felsenthal, Life
Terms Aren't Viewed as Big Deterrent, WALL Sr. J., Nov. 11, 1993, at B2 (reporting
that evidence indicates that mandatory life sentences for habitual criminals are not
reducing the crime rate, and quoting Peter Arnella, U.C.L.A. law professor, who says
"[t]he deterrent value of the criminal law has always been grossly exaggerated").
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of the infection but has carelessly failed to confirm the situation,282 is
facing a significant economic loss which might deter careless or
intentional disease-spreading conduct.
Most cases that we can imagine make it clear that (a) the absence of
the ex turpi causa defense does not encourage plaintiffs to break the law
because the most plaintiffs can expect, if allowed to recover, is mere
compensation for injuries sustained,283 and (b) in certain situations the
_threat of liability to defendants created by the absence of an· ex turpi
causa defense might encourage defendants to obey the law. Admittedly,
this borders on rank speculation.284
Consider the case where only plaintiff violated the law. The Henwood
case is a good example. If the threat of serious bodily injury to plaintiff
that arose from sticking his head out a tram window in order to vomit
was not sufficient to induce him to comply with the tram rules, it is
unlikely that the existence of an ex turpi causa defense (of which
plaintiff is likely unaware) would induce him to do so. The tram
company, on the other hand, often makes studied comparisons of risks
of liability versus investment in safety devices, warning signs, etc. If
preventing such accidents is our main goal (and in this case it seems to

282. Of course; if in a given case the plaintiff claims negligence and the defendant
made no conscious decision regarding a course of action (for example, plaintiff claims
to have been infected by defendant with herpes, alleging not that defendant had any
inkling that he had herpes but only that given his high number of sexual partners· in
recent years he was negligent in not having himself tested), it is unlikely that an ex turpi
causa doctrine could have any impact one way or the other.
.
283. It is arguable, or at least conceivable, that allowing an ex turpi causa defense
will encourage criminal or reckless activity by the defendant. As Kevin Williams has
argued: "It is even possible that a driver might be positively encouraged [to break the
law] if he understood that as against his complicit passenger he would, somewhat
paradoxically, be relieved entirely of responsibility for the civil law consequence of his
reckless driving." Williams, supra note 111, at 751.
284. Because so many cases involve traffic accidents arising out of joint criminal
ventures, the fabulous movie "Thelma and Louise" comes to mind Assume that instead
of being happily committed to accelerating into the Grand Canyon at movie's end,
Thelma was heard loudly protesting. That would effectively eliminate any volenti
defense, but because of the extended nature of the criminal venture, an ex turpi causa
defense, as applied in many common-law jurisdictions, would still shield Louise's estate
from any lawsuit by Thelma's estate. Would availability of the ex turpi causa defense
make it more likely or less likely that Louise would drive into the Grand Canyon over
Thelma's vehement protests? It seems that it would be less likely, indicating that
recognition of the ex turpi causa defense in this joint criminal context would encourage,
not discourage, crime and negligence. The speculative nature of this conclusion is
obvious, however.
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be a main goal both of the safety ordinance and of the applicable tort
law), it seems that rejecting the ex turpi causa defense and allowing
recovery is the path most likely to succeed.285 This is especially so
because given the relative positions of plaintiff and defendant, defendant
is often more likely to have knowledge of the rule and therefore is more
likely to be affected by it.
Consider the Bosworth Sunday traveler case. Assuming that it is safe
to do so, plaintiff travels over defendant's negligently maintained bridge
heading from home to work on a Sunday in violation of a statute
requiring that any Sunday travel be to or from church. If plaintiff does
not fall through the bridge on Sunday, he or she will likely do so on
Monday. Therefore, the existence of an ex turpi causa defense (even if
plaintiff knows about it) is not likely to have any deterrent impact.
Defendant is more likely to know of the state of the law and therefore
be deterred by the absence of an ex turpi causa defense, although the
deterrent impact is likely to be minimal because there are six chances
out of seven that the defense will not be available.
What about the speeding plaintiff case? Plaintiff is exceeding the
speed limit when she smacks into defendant who just ran a red light.
Plaintiff might be induced to pay more careful attention to the speed
limit if she knows of the existence of an ex turpi causa defense.
Defendant might be induced to pay more careful attention to stop signs
if he knows that by carelessly causing an accident he will be liable, at
least partially, to all persons he hits, not just those who were not
exceeding the speed limit.. To the extent that either party is simply not
thinking, suffering the type of momentary mental lapses that are
inevitable in human behavior, the existence or nonexistence of an ex
turpi causa defense would seem to have no impact in terms of encouraging legal and/or careful behavior.
All in all, the questions surrounding the deterrent impact of the ex
turpi causa defense in tort cases cannot be answered with certainty. The
issue is sufficiently clouded that no reasonable claim that ex turpi causa
will deter criminal action by plaintiffs can be credibly made. Nor can
a strong claim be made that elimination of ex turpi causa will deter
criminal or even negligent action by defendants. Indeed, given the
description of the law given above, it is easy to agree with Professor
MacDougall that "[t]he application of ex turpi causa is currently so
unpredictable that it can have little deterrent effect on a person who is

285. Generally speaking, it is more feasible to use the law to affect the economic
decisions of corporate defendants such as the tram company than it is to attempt to
encourage more careful {or more lawful) behavior by consumers, drivers, or employees.
See generally Prentice & Roszkowski, supra note 6, at 274-300.

114

[VOL. 32: 53, 1995]

Litigation "Crisis"
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

willing to gamble on an illegal enterprise."286 Therefore, this major
justification for the existence of an ex turpi causa defense fails. It has
even less validity in the body of tort law than in the body of contract
law, where it has already been greatly criticized. 287 Therefore, attention must tum away from the deterrence function to other considerations
shaping tort law (such as the compensation function) which should
accordingly be given more weight. 288

3.

Tort Law Should Be Used to Punish Crime

Certainly tort law should not be at loggerheads with criminal law.
Therefore, the ex turpi causa defense is properly applied where it
prevents neutralization of criminal sanctions.
For example, in Mettes v. Quinn,289 the court properly refused to
allow plaintiff to sue her former attorney while claiming, in essence, that
defendant's negligent advice had allowed a fraud perpetrated by plaintiff
to be discovered, depriving her of the benefit of the fraud. 290 To have
allowed recovery would have completely offset the criminal sanctions
attached to the fraud.
In a famous English case, Colburn v. Patmore, 291 plaintiff publisher,
who had been convicted and fined for publishing a criminal libel, sued
the editor who had published the material without plaintiff's knowledge.
Plaintiff sought to force the editor to pay plaintiff the amount of the
criminal fine plaintiff had been forced to pay because of the editor's
acts. However, to allow recovery in such a case would stultify the effect
of the criminal law, and recovery was· properly denied.
A more recent case making the same ·point is Braunstein v. Jason
Tarantella, Inc., 292 in which producers of an obscene film, "Fulfilling
Young Cups," sued distributors of the film, inter alia, for negligence in

286. MacDougall, supra note 191, at 37.
287. Shand, supra note 184, at 154 ("[Deterrence of criminal activity] is the
function of the criminal law ... [but] it is no part of the law of contract, any more than
of the law of tort."); Harold C. Havinghurst, Book Review, 61 YALE L.J. 1138, 1145
(1952) (suggesting that refusal to enforce illegal contracts rarely has a substantial impact
in deterring illegal conduct).
288. See discussion infra notes 326-31 and accompanying text.
289. 411 N.E.2d 549 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
290. Id. at 551.
291. 149 Eng. Rep. 999 (Ex. 1834).
292. 450 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1982).
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choosing to show the film in a New York county which subjected the
producers to criminal prosecution, and for fraud in misrepresenting the
number of places where such a film could be legally shown. The court
properly denied recovery, because a judgment of damages "would, in
essence, permit the producer to recover the fine it paid. upon its
conviction,"293 again offsetting the duly imposed criminal sanction.
Unfortunately, the ex turpi causa defense in tort cases is more often
used not to preserve valid criminal sanctions, but to add civil punishments to those criminal sanctions provided by the legislature. This
"double punishment" improperly places valid civil tort policy considerations in a subservient position to criminal law policies that are only
tangentially relevant. Professor Weinrib has argued that:
[T]he refusal to allow a civil remedy entails the enshrining of the criminal law
policies as dominant and indeed exclusive. This in itself may not be desirable.
In the situation presented in Tallow v. Tailfeathers, for instance, the activity
involved ... is regulated by a vast nexus of legal arrangements. The task is
shared by [Canadian] federal criminal law, provincial penal legislation,
administrative prerequisites such as licensing, tort law, the contract of
insurance, and legislative modifications that extend the scope of insurance as
a device for distributing losses. This panoply of legal mechanisms serves an
appropriately wide variety of social aims. It is designed to prevent the evil of
physical injury, to visit a sanction on a perpetrator or potential perpetrator of
the evil, and to mitigate the effects of the evil when it materializes by
compensating the victim. By denying recovery in the Tallow situation a court
gives a wide berth to the policies of prevention and punishment at the expense
of stultifying the policy of compensation. 294

Another major objection is that using denial of civil recovery as a
sanction against wrongdoing plaintiffs amounts to a form of double
jeopardy by adding a punishment for the offense that was not contemplated by the legislature. This additional sanction is imposed without the
procedural safeguards attendant to the process of criminal sentencing.29s
The additional sanction has the further disadvantageous feature of
being unduly fortuitous, not falling on all wrongdoers equally. For

293.
294.
295.

Id. at 866.
Weinrib, supra note 190, at 43-44.
One of these important safeguards relates to burden of pr!)of. In America,
naturally, the burden of proof in criminal cases is generally the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard, whereas in civil cases it is the lower "preponderance of the evidence"
standard. In Betts v. Sanderson Estate, 53 D.L.R.4th 675 (1988) (Can.), Judge Lambert
observed that a key factual issue in the case--who was driving the car at the time of the
accident- could never have been established beyond a reasonable doubt because one
of the main participants in the incident was killed and the other suffered amnesia. Yet,
were ex turpi causa applied, plaintiff (on her counterclaim) might be punished by denial
of her civil recovery on the basis of speculative evidence that could never have led to
criminal punishment. Id. at 685-86.
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example, in Tallow, a case involving a wrecked car and a group of joyriding boys, one wrongdoer was killed. Others suffered various injuries
of differing severity. All committed the same offense, were guilty of the
same moral turpitude, and- would have been subjected to the same range
of criminal penalties, but because recovery in civil suit was denied on
ex turpi causa grounds, they sustained vastly differing penalties.296
Those injured the most severely were punished the most by being barred
from compensation via a civil suit.
Severity is another consideration. The "double punishment" criticism
has long been made against the illegality defense in the realm of contract
law.297 The objection is much stronger in the area of tort law where
the loss that the court refuses to compensate is likely to involve severe
personal injury rather than mere economic dislocation. ·The criminal
penalty for an offense might be a few months of imprisonment, or
perhaps just a small monetary fine. This might be the maximum penalty
imposed by the legislature. But life in a wheelchair, completely
uncompensated by monetary damages from the negligent driver, could
be an additional, completely disproportionate sentence added by a court
applying the ex turpi causa defense. 298 The plaintiff in Pitts, for
example, was effectively fined £40,000 for the offense of aiding and
abetting his friend's reckless driving of a motorcycle. 299 Bernard
McCummings, if recovery was denied on ex turpi causa grounds, would
suffer a functional $4.3 million civil fine (and life in a wheelchair) in.
addition to the thirty-two months in jail that he served as a consequence
of his unarmed mugging of another. Upon what principled basis is this
harsh additional sanction imposed.?300
296. Weinrib, supra note 190, at 45.
297. E.g., St. John Shipping Corp. v. Joseph Rank, Ltd., (1957] 1 Q.B. 267, 292
(Devlin, J.). The court stated:
The Act of 1932 imposes a penalty which is itself designed to deprive the
offender of the benefits of his crime. It would be a serious thing if the
operation could be performed twice-once by the criminal law and then again
by the civil. It would be curious, too, if in a case in which the magistrates had
thought fit to impose only a nominal fine, their decision could, in effect, be
overridden in a civil action.
Id.
298. Weinrib, supra note 190, at 45.
299. For a similar offense, the plaintiff in Ashton v. Turner, (1981] 1 Q.B. 137, was
effectively fined L 70,000 in addition to the criminal punishment already imposed.
300. F.A. TRINDADE & PETER CANE, THE LAW OF TORTS IN AUSTRALIA 487 (1985)
("[W]hile deterrence of breach by means ... of a fine may be desirable, the unpredict-
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The punishment obviously bears no necessary relation to the degree
of plaintiff's moral turpitude in the particular case, which may be
slight.301 Worse still, in the cases of joint wrongdoing the defendant
is equally at fault, yet is rewarded by the law with immunity from
liability for his or her negligence (or perhaps intentional tort). 302
Furthermore, if a person is killed in an accident while engaged in a
criminal enterprise, and the ex turpi causa defense is used to deny
recovery to his or her heirs, this defense casts a burden on the survivors
which amounts to vicarious liability for criminal acts. 303 This is
completely contrary to most of our basic notions of criminal responsibility.304
There is obviously a long history of interrelationship of criminal and
tort law. 305 The two bodies of law have common roots and did not
diverge until fairly late in the game. 306 And while there is certainly an
important role for the concepts of punishment and deterrence in tort law,
the modem trend is to deemphasize tort law's criminal and punitive
function in deference to its civil and compensatory purposes.307 As
noted earlier, the punitive function of tort law should not be made
paramount at the expense of the compensatory function. Any broad use
of the ex turpi causa defense commits this sin. 308
able and usually much more serioµs sanction of the denial of a civil remedy may seem
an unnecessary and unduly harsh penalty.").
301. See St. John Shipping Corp., 1 Q.B. at 288-89 ("It may be questionable also
whether public policy is well served by driving from the seat of judgment everyone who
has been guilty of a minor transgression.").
302. As noted above, similar criticisms have been made in the area of contract law,
where the defendant is often allowed to keep the fruits of an illegal contract at plaintiffs
expense, even though defendant was equally at fault. It has been noted that judicial
refusal to assist either party to an illegal contract, in light of the ''remarkable growth of
regulation in the modem era" has led to "absurd results" that confer "windfall benefits"
on lucky defendants "for which no sensible justification can be offered." McCamus,
supra note 267, at 788-89; see also Wade, supra note 267, at 36.
Fortunately, some courts have acted on this criticism. E.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 192
Cal. App. 3d 551, 237 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1987) (deciding that the rule that illegal contracts
will not be enforced should not be applied where the transaction has been completed, no
moral turpitude was involved, and to apply the illegality rule would permit defendant to
be unjustly enriched).
303. Some courts have recognized this distinction and have acted to preserve the
rights of widows and orphans accordingly. E.g., Bigcharles v. Merkel, [1973] 1 W.W.R.
324 (B.C.).
304. Crago, supra note 255, at 547-48.
305. See generally Gary, supra note 12, at 1622 ("[T]he protection of society
through the punishment and deterrence of antisocial behavior is an accepted function of
the tort law.").
306. See generally WEX S. MALONE, ESSAYS ON TORTS 1-10 (I 986); GEORGE C.
CHRISTIE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 1-7 (1983).
307. Gary, supra note 12, at 1621.
308. See discussion of the compensatory function of tort law infra part V.B.1.a.
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The criminal justice system is, one hopes, a well-conceived approach
to the problems of deterrence and criminal sanction. That system
supposedly metes out punishment in proportion to moral dereliction by
the defendant and the societal interest to be protected. To allow the ex
turpi causa defense to add punishments willy-nilly, unconnected to either
plaintiff's moral failings 309 or to society's vital interests, would
undermine rather than advance the interests of the criminal justice
system, 310 and cause other dislocations as well. 311
4.

The Illegality Defense Preserves Judicial Integrity

The final major argument lodged in favor of broad application of the
ex turpi causa defense in tort cases is that the integrity of the judicial
process is defiled if the courts must entertain testimony by criminals and
perhaps grant judgments to them. 312
No doubt courts should not be accomplices to criminals, assisting them
in their criminal designs. As noted above, courts should not enable
criminals to profit from their crimes. Such actions would truly sully the
courts' reputation. However, this defiling of a court's image does not
arise if the court does not allow a plaintiff to profit from crime, but only
compensates him or her for injuries wrongfully sustained at the hands of
others. Assuming a suit by one criminal conspirator against another for
negligent injuries sustained in the course of a getaway, one may ask: Is
the court's image as. a bastion of justice more damaged by awarding
plaintiff damages truly caused by defendant's acts than by awarding
defendant (who is guilty of the same· criminal conduct and additional

309. Weinrib calls this an "indiscriminate lashing out at the offender." Weinrib,
supra note 190, at 46.
310. Even in contract cases, "[a] court may conclude that the [criminal] sanction
explicitly provided by the legislature is adequate to further the statute's underlying
policy, without the additional sanction of unenforceability." FARNSWORTH, supra note
17, at 348 (citing Town Planning & Eng'r Assocs. v. Amesbury Specialty Co., 342
N.E.2d 706, 711 (Mass. 1976) (Kaplan, J.) ("Our cases warn against the sentimental
fallacy of piling on sanctions unthinkingly once an illegality is found.")).
311. For example, if discouraging crime were given as much prominence in other
areas of the law as it is in tort law by the ex turpi causa defense, we might hold all
property liability policies void because, it has been argued, insurance against loss from
theft promotes these crimes because it weakens the incentive of insureds to take adequate
security measures. See generally M.P. Furmston, The Analysis of Illegal Contracts, 16
TORONTO L.J. 267, 272 (1965).
312. Crago, supra note 255, at 551.
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negligent conduct) immunity from the injuries caused by the latter's
misdeeds? There is no reason to think so. 313
Some courts invoke the ex turpi causa defense stressing the impropriety of a court's entertaining evidence about criminal misdeeds. The
integrity of the judicial system is scarcely breached when a court is
forced to hear such testimony. In America this occurs all the time, often
on the television evening news or perhaps a court channel on cable TY.
No judge sits on the bench very long before running into a Bernard
McCummings. As Judge Owen noted in Smith:
[l]t has been suggested, as a reason for the denial of a remedy in some
exceptional cases to a participant in crime, that the courts might properly refuse
to entertain an action, where evidence would be required of a kind which would
endanger the dignity of judicial proceedings and tend to bring the courts into
public disrepute. But courts are required constantly to hear evidence of
criminal conduct no matter how vile and degrading it may be. The reception
of evidence of that kind need not be regarded as an affront to the dignity of the
court. . . . I do not think that the essential reason for a rule by which the courts
refuse to recognize a right of action in some cases of criminality is a shrinking
by the court from the seamy facts of life or a scrupulous regard for its dignity
or reputation. 314

Courts often have to hear vile and degrading evidence regarding a
defendant :S, misconduct. They will, on occasion, hear evidence
regarding vile and degrading conduct by the plaintiff that bore no direct
relationship to the plaintiff's injuries or to the wrong committed. In
neither of these situations will the court feel bound to exclude the
evidence because of its. shocking nature. Therefore, it cannot be too
great a shock to a court's system to hear similar evidence regarding a
plaintiff's misconduct that may bear on the plaintiff's tort-caused
injuries.315 The court simply must keep in mind that the fundamental
313. TRINDADE & CANE, supra note 300, at 212 ("[I]t does no credit to the law that
an intentional tortfeasor is able to rely upon the illegal nature of the transaction with the
victim to escape liability for his own intentional and tortious conduct.").
314. Smith v. Jenkins, 119 C.L.R. 397, 431-32 (1970) (Austl.).
315. This same argument has been persuasively made in the context of court
reluctance to enforce illegal contracts:
Any turpitude involved in a suit arising from an illegal contract is no worse
than that disclosed in the sordid cases which the criminal courts entertain daily
without feelings of wounded dignity or pollution and without covering their
eyes in holy horror at the display of human iniquity. Civil courts, too-even
those sitting as "courts of conscience" in equity-do not reject a plaintiff
whose suit requires a demonstration of the defendant's fraudulent, immoral or
unlawful acts; but on the contrary they weigh such acts with great care in
determining the appropriate relief, and without speaking of contamination or
public scandal. . . . The truth is that in its usual statement this argument has
an unrealistic, other-world flavor, as if it came from the medieval monks who
isolated themselves from the world, rather than from judges accustomed to
dealing with the daily affairs of men good and bad.
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question being asked is whether the loss sustained by plaintiff should,
under all the circumstances, be shifted to defendant. 316 Judicial
fastidiousness is no reason to deny compensation if the other prerequisites to legal recovery are present. 317
No doubt, if they had their druthers, attorneys would always represent
only the purest of the pure and judges would hand out damage awards
only to church-going mothers of four, injured on their way to an evening
class in Bible study. But we must realize that the legal profession has
had some of its finest moments in representing the dregs of society.
Clarence Darrow, famed "Attorney for the Damned," whose clients were
often far from saints, shines brightly as a model for aspiring attorneys.318 And,. one could easily argue, our Supreme Court's decisions
that most embody the advancement of western civilization have involved
protecting the rights of the Clarence Earl Gideons,319 Dollree
Mapps,320 Danny Escobedos,321 and Ernesto Mirandas322 of the
world. 323

Wade, supra note 267, at 43-44.
316. Thayer, supra note 189, at 340.
317. Shand, supra note 184, at 152 ("Our system of justice is not a beautiful garden
ornament but is (or should be) a piece of machinery for social engineering which may
occasionally require its operators to put on overalls and get their hands dirty.").
318. See ARTHUR WEINBERG & LILA WEINBERG, CLARENCE DARROW: .A
SENTIMENTAL REBEL 10 (1980) (quoting letter from William Kunstler stating that
Darrow "established the ideal of the fighting brave lawyer who will go to the limits of
his endurance, skill and courage for a client"); KEVIN TIERNEY, DARROW: A BIOGRAPHY
439 (1979) ("[Darrow] carved his own niche in history, a voice for the inarticulate, the
oppressed, the poor.... [H]is robust independence left an example for later generations
to admire.").
319. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (protecting an accused's right to
counsel).
320. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (protecting an accused's right to protection
from unreasonable searches and seizures).
321. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (protecting an accused's privilege
against self-incrimination).
322. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (creating the now infamous "Miranda
Rights").
323. See ARCHIBALD Cox, THE WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS
AN INSTRUMENT OF REFORM 88 (1968) ("If Winston Churchill was right in saying that
'the quality of a nation's civilization can be largely measured by the methods it uses in
the enforcement of its criminal law,' then the activism of the Warren Court has enabled
our civilization to give a vastly better account of itself."); Walter V. Schaefer,
Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV; 1, 26 (1956) ("The quality
of a nation's civilization can be largely measured by the methods it uses in the
enforcement of its criminal law.").

121

Simply put, the moral characteristics of the parties before a court have
little or no relevance to that court's capacity to do justice or injustice.324 And awarding compensation to a wrongdoing victim of
another's torts does not signal judicial approval of the wrongdoing any
more than does a court's decision to overturn a criminal conviction on
technical statutory or constitutional grounds. It merely signals that in
our system of justice there are often other values to be served.325

B.

Reasons for Virtually Eliminating the Ex Turpi Causa Defense in
Tort Cases.

The previous part's discussion shows that there is no persuasive reason
for courts to recognize a broad-based ex turpi causa defense in tort
cases. Such a defense does not prevent plaintiffs from profiting from
their wrongs; it prevents them from being compensated for wrongs done
to them. Nor can it be shown that the defense deters crime, serves as a
proper complement to the criminal law, or preserves judicial integrity.
As noted in the earlier discussion, however, there is a very limited role
for the ex turpi causa defense in tort litigation. The purpose of this part
is two-fold. First, it explains the primary positive arguments for the
virtual elimination of the ex turpi causa defense in tort cases. Second,
it explains and justifies the argument for a real, but very limited, role in
tort law for the ex turpi causa defense.

324. See Shand, supra note 184, at 152. Shand states:
It is not the function of the judge to be shocked, far less to seek out public
outrage where none may exist or where it may be prejudiced or ill-informed.
Indeed, it is in those very situations which are [the] most shocking that public
policy may demand positive intervention and where a denial of relief may
simply perpetuate the undesirable manifestations of an illegal contract.
Id.

325. In the McCummings case, those other values include a public desire to restrain
police officers from the use of undue force. Police brutality is still a majot problem in
this nation, as the Rodney King videotape graphically demonstrates. See Leslie Gevirtz,
Police Brutality Costs Millions of Dollars, Shatters Lives, REUTERS, Oct. 31, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexus Library, News File.
The Supreme Court spelled out the constitutional values also at stake when it ruled in
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. l (1985), that a Tennessee statute authorizing the use of
deadly force against an unarmed, nondangerous fleeing felony suspect was unconstitutional. The Court explained: ''The suspect's fundamental interest in his own life need not
be elaborated upon. The use of deadly force also frustrates the interest of the individual,
and of society, in judicial determination of guilt and punishment." Id. at 9.
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1.

Positive Arguments Supporting the Near Elimination of the Ex
Turpi Causa Defense in Tort Cases

As noted above, the major arguments raised over the years in support
of a broad ex turpi causa defense in tort cases have little validity.
Furthermore, invocation of this defense severely undermines two
important aspects of tort law-the compensation function and the
fairness value.
a.

The Compensation Function of Tort Law

Perhaps the most important objective of the common law of torts is
the compensation of injured plaintiffs.326 As Professor Wright noted
many years ago:
Arising out of the various and ever-increasing clashes of the activities of
persons living in a common society, carrying on business in competition with
fellow members of that society, owning property which may in any of a
thousand ways affect the persons or property of others-in short, doing all the
things that constitute modem living-there must of necessity be losses, or
injuries of many kinds sustained as a result of the activities of others. The
purpose of the law of torts is to adjust these losses, and to afford compensation
for injuries sustained as the result of the conduct of another. 327

Any invocation of the ex turpi causa defense in tort cases occurring
outside the very limited circumstances outlined later in this part
significantly undermines this compensation goal. Application of the ex
turpi causa defense almost always suoordinates compensation, perhaps
the fundamental purpose of tort law,328 to goals of lessei: importance
such as criminal deterrence, support for criminal law, and the image of
the judicial system.329

326. See ALLEN M. LINDEN, CANADIAN TORT LAW 3 (4th ed. 1988) ("First and
foremost, tort law is a compensator."); ROBERT E. KEETON, VENTURING To Do JUSTICE
147 (1969) (''The primary objective of Anglo-American tort law is fair and just
compensation for losses.").
327. Cecil A. Wright, Introduction to the Law of Torts, 8 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 238, 238
(1944) (emphasis added).
328. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 173, at 5-6 ("[Tort law] is directed toward the
compensation of individuals . . . for losses which they have suffered within the scope
of their legally recognized interests generally....").
329. In his dissenting opinion in Barker v. Kallash, 468 N.E.2d 39 (N.Y. 1984),
Judge Simons criticized application of the ex turpi causa defense as
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Indeed, the compensatory function of tort law is virtually ignored in
all the judicial pronouncements regarding the defense. Courts using the
"public policy'' approach to ex turpi causa, for example, virtually never
mention the public policies supporting compensation of persons injured
by the torts of others. Worse still, courts allowing the ex turpi causa
defense are more likely to leave injured plaintiffs uncompensated and
thus with no choice but to resort to welfare or the dole for support.330
This is an aspect of public policy not sufficiently considered in such
cases.331

b.

The Fairness Concept

Given that an essential component of tort law is compensation,
doctrines which totally block compensation based on transgressions
(negligent and/or illegal) by plaintiffs work against the compensation
goal and, just as importantly, are unfair. Perhaps the most irresistible
trend in tort law in recent years has been to sweep away such doctrines.
Thus, both courts· and legislatures have fashioned schemes that apportion
liability based on fault.
Contributory Negligence. Consider the contributory negligence
doctrine, which, like ex turpi causa, reflects the courts' essential
reluctance to assist persons who themselves areat fault. 332 Of course,

a return to the old "admonitory" theory of tort liability, the idea that a
defendant was liable to the plaintiff because of his blameworthiness or fault.
The rationale of that theory, in its pristine form, was that because the conduct
of the defendant may have fallen short of criminal activity the injured party
should be given satisfaction, and the wrongdoer ''punished", by a civil remedy
of damages in tort. Because this admonitory or punitive function was
-paramount, a plaintiff who was also guilty of blameworthy conduct was
similarly punished by being denied relief. Both parties being at fault, the
courts refused to measure their wrong and let the losses lay where they fell.
The rigors of such a rule soon became apparent and the law moved towards
a compensatory theory of tort law which led to the principle of comparative
liability set forth as early as the turn of the century in statutes such as the first
Federal Employees Liability Act, followed by the Jones Act, the Merchant
Marine Act and eventually the comparative negligence statutes enacted in
several States . . ..
Id. at 48 (Simons, J., dissenting).
330. See Jackson v. Harrison, 138 C.L.R. 438, 464-65 (1978) (Austl.) (Murphy, J.).
331. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 111, at 751 ("[W]here defendants (or their
insurers) are able to pay some compensation, the public interest is not advanced by
excusing them and leaving the plaintiff reliant on social security or charitable support.");
Cecil A. Wright, Editorial Note to Danluk v. Birkner, [1946] 3 D.L.R. 172, 173
("Participation in crime should not compel an injured man to seek redress from public
funds rather than from a wrongdoer.").
332. See Francis H. Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21 HARV. L. REV. 233,258
(1908) ("[Contributory negligence] debars from recovery, even from an admittedly
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the contributory negligence doctrine originally prevented any recovery
by a plaintiff whose negligence contributed in any significant fashion to
his or her own injuries. The.unfairness of the doctrine was well known.
As Prosser noted:
The hardship of the doctrine of contributory negligence upon the plaintiff is
readily apparent. It places upon one party the entire burden of a loss for which
two are, by hypothesis, responsible. The negligence of the defendant has
played no less a part in causing the damage; the plaintiff's deviation from the
community standard of conduct may even be relatively slight, and the
defendant's quite extreme. The injured person is in all probability, for the very
reason of his injury, the less able of the two to bear the financial burden of his
loss, and the answer of the law to all this is that the defendant goes scot free
of all liability, and the plaintiff bears it all. Nor is it any answer to say that the
contributory negligence rule promotes caution by making the plaintiff
responsible for his own safety. It is quite .as reasonable to say that it
encourages negligence, by giving the defendant reason to hope that he will
escape the consequences. 3

The contributory negligence doctrine was so harsh in application that
judges were constrained to create exceptions to its operation,334 and
juries often disregarded it in practice. 335 An "increasing social awareness of [the] harsh 'all or nothing' consequences"336 of contributory
negligence caused most western common-law jurisdictions· to adopt some
form of comparative negligence or comparative fault so that a minor
indiscretion by plaintiff no longer requires plaintiff to bear an entire loss

negligent defendant, one whose own social misconduct has been a concurring proximate
cause of his harm.").
333. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 173, at 468-69.
334. Among those judicially created modifications to the contributory negligence
defense were rules that plaintiff was not barred from recovery by his or her own
negligence if: (a) defendant had the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident, (b)
defendant was guilty of wanton and willful misconduct, (c) defendant was subject to
strict liability under the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-H.L. 330 (1868), and (d)
defendant had violated a statute clearly designed to protect plaintiff. See generally
Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 882-84 (W. Va. 1979) (explaining
the various judicial modifications to the theory of contributory negligence).
335. See Donald Wittman, The Price ofNegligence Under Differing Liability Rules,
29 J.L. & ECON. 151, 162 (1986).
336. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 735, 575 P.2d 1162, 1167, 144
Cal. Rptr. 380, 385 (1978); see also Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879,
882 (W. Va. 1979) ("[O]ur system of jurisprudence, while based on concepts of justice
and fair play, contains an anomaly in which the slightest negligence of a plaintiff
precludes any recovery and thereby excuses the defendant from the consequences of all
of his negligence, however great it may be.").
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caused largely by defendant. 337 Thus, comparative negligence or
comparative fault principles clearly improve the fairness of the tort
system.338
Assumption ofRisk. Assumption of risk, known in other common-law
nations as volenti non fit injuria, 339 was formerly a total bar to a
plaintiff's recovery. This was unfair because it absolved a careless (or
intentionally wrongdoing) defendant of any liability whatsoever even
though defendant may have contributed substantially to plaintiff's injury.
Such immunity for defendant was inconsistent with the basic policies of
risk distribution underlying tort law.340
Because of the harshness and unfairness of the original volenti
doctrine, the trend in most western jurisdictions today is to compare
plaintiff misconduct in the form of assumption of risk with defendant's
fault, resulting in only a proportionate reduction in plaintiff's recovery.341 Like comparative fault, and unlike ex turpi causa, the assumption of risk defense's provision for proportionate allocation of loss
produces a fairer result than an absolute bar to recovery.
Contribution. Contribution among tortfeasors is also an area of the
law that illustrates the continuing evolution toward fairer policies
embodied in proportionate allocation of loss. Originally, courts refused

337. These provisions talce several fonns, of course. Several jurisdictions have
adopted "pure" comparative negligence. Most allow plaintiff to achieve a partial
recovery so long as plaintiff's fault is either (a) less than, or (b) not greater than
defendant's. See generally William A. Vainisi, Merging Comparative Fault with Strict
Liability Actions in North Dakota: In Search of a New Day, 61 N.D. L. REV. 7 app. at
27-29 (1985) (defining the varying degrees of comparative negligence and illustrating
the states which use each form, as well as the corresponding case law and statutory
authority); John H. Leskera, Comment, Change from "Pure" Comparative Negligence
to "Modified'.' Comparative Negligence -Will It Alleviate the Insurance Crisis?, 32
ST. LoUIS U. L.J;· 753 app. at 773-76 (1988) (illustrating which states apply pure
comparative negligence, modified comparative negligence, and contributory negligence
as a complete defense, and citing the relevant primary authority in those states).
338. See Jordan H. Leibman & Anne S. Kelly, Accountants' Liability to Third
Parties for Negligent Misrepresentation: The Search for a New Limiting Principle, 30
AM. Bus. L.J. 345, 387 (1992) ("A comparative fault regime would appear to meet tort
law's fairness and deterrence objectives more effectively than one in which contributory
negligence is a complete defense.").
339. Literally, "one is not legally injured ifhe has consented to the act complained
of or was willing that it should occur." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1349 (3d ed.
1969).
340. Victor E. Schwartz, Strict Liability and Comparative Negligence, 42 TENN. L.
REV. 171, 176 (1974) (addressing the products liability area).
341. See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 732, 575 P.2d 1162,
1167, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380,385 (1978); Coney v. J. L.G. Indus., 454_N.E.2d 197,200 (Ill.
1983). See generally Robert L. Walsh, Note, Assumption of Risk Merges with
Comparative Negligence, 31 LoY. L. REV. 401 (1985) (discussing several American
cases taking this point of view).
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to grant contribution to a tortfeasor on the same grounds that they
invoked the ex turpi causa defense. 342 Most particularly, courts
reasoned that by denying contribution. they were preventing a wrongdoer
from profiting from his wrongs and they were protecting the judiciary's
honor by refusing to lend their aid to a wrongdoer. 343 Indeed, some
authorities trace the origins of the common law's no-contribution rule to
the Highwayman :S, Case, which is also a foundation case for the
illegality defense. 344
This reasoning is terribly outmoded. 345 With the exception of
occasional nooks and crannies, a regime allowing contribution has

342. Daniel Waltz, Note, Total Equitable Indemnity Under Comparative
Negligence: Anomaly or Necessity?, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1057, 1061 (1986) (explaining that
the rule against contribution among joint tortfeasors "echoed the Latin maxim ex turpi
causa non oritur actio").
343. See Robert A. Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U.
PA. L. REV. 130, 132 (1932) ("[T]he rule refusing contribution between joint tortfeasors
is rooted in this same unwillingness of courts to aid persons whose conduct has not
measured up to legal standards [as was demonstrated in the famous ex turpi causa case
arising out of a charivari, Gilmore v. Fuller, 65 N.E. 84 (Ill. 1902))."); see also Skinner
v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 374 N.E.2d 437, 442 (Ill. 1977), modified,
374 N.E.2d 444 (Ill.), cert. denied sub nom., Hinckley Plastic, Inc v. Reed-Prentice Div.
Package Mach. Co., 436 U.S. 946 (1978) (rejecting this rationale as no longer
persuasive).
344. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. After noting that the court
fined the solicitors and beheaded both plaintiff and defendant, Prosser commented on the
Highwayman's Case: "In short, contribution was not allowed." WILLIAM L. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 1112 n.23 (1941). See generally, Guy M. Hodges,
Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEX. L. REV. 150 (1947).
However, most authorities trace the common law's old no-contribution rule to
Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799). See, e.g., Theodore W. Reath,
v.
Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged for Negligenc'7-Merryweather
Nixan, 12 HARV. L. REV. 176, 176 (1898) (noting that Merryweather is usually cited as
the leading case for the proposition that "[a]s between conscious, willful, malicious, or
intentional joint wrongdoers, or tort-feasors who are in pari delicto, neither the law or
equity will intervene to adjust the damage by enforcing contribution"); Note, Contribution and Indemnity Among Joint Wrongdoers, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 94 (1932)
("Merryweather v. Nixan is generally accepted as the origin · of the doctrine that
contribution will not be enforced among joint wrongdoers....").
Merryweather itself has been criticized as a misapplication of the principle of ex turpi
causa non oritur actio, further emphasizing the intertwining of the outmoded nocontribution rule with the ex turpi causa defense. See J. Fischer Williams, The Rule in
Merryweather v. Nixan, 17 LAW Q. REV. 293,301 (1901).
345. See generally Francis H. Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity Between
Tortfeasors, 21 CORNELL L. REV. 552, 559 (1957) (rejecting notion that wrongdoers
must always be denied a judicial forum).
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replaced the old no-contribution regime in most western nations. 346
The reason for this evolution in the law has been clear: "The lack of
contribution is quintessentially unfair."347 This was recognized by the
Supreme Court which has concluded that equitable considerations require
that damage liability be assessed according to proportional fault
whenever possible.348 Granting contribution does not allow wrongdoers to profit, but simply allows them to mitigate a loss,349 a lesson that
should be applied when the turpi causa defense is raised in tort cases.
The ex turpi causa defense is inconsistent with the trend toward
proportional liability, and tends to emasculate its fairness goal. 350 In

ex

346. See Richard W. Wright, Allocating Liability Among Multiple Responsible
Causes: A Principled Defense of Joint and Several Liability for Actual Harm and Risk
Exposure, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1141, 1183 (1988) ("In England and almost all other
countries, joint and several liability with contribution has long been the rule.").
347. Jonathan M. Jacobson, Contribution Among Antitrust Defendants: A Necessary
Solution to a Recurring Problem, 32 U. FLA. L. REV. 217, 238 (1980); see also John H.
Langmore & Robert A. Prentice, Contribution Under Section 12 of the Securities Act
of 1933: The Existence and Merits of Such a Right, 40 EMORY L.J. 1015, 1062 (1991)
("[T]here can be no justice in a wrongdoer escaping liability for the wrong caused by
his or her fault."); M. Patricia Adamski, Contribution and Settlement in Multiparty
Actions Under Rule l0b-5, 66 IOWA L. REV. 533, 541 (1981) ("[F]undamental fairness
requires that the financial loss caused by joint wrongdoers be apportioned among
them."); Martin Turck, Contribution Between Tortfeasors in American and German
Law-A Comparative Study, 41 TuL. L. REV. 1, 10 (1966) ("Justice involves the
principle of equality, which is violated if, when several parties are involved in the same
fault, one alone bears the total loss."); Leflar, supra note 343, at 141 (stating that refusal
to grant contribution creates "obvious injustice").
348. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 411 (1975)
("[W]orldwide experience has taught that that goal [of just and equitable allocation of
damages] can be more nearly realized by a standard that allocates liability for damages
according to comparative fault whenever possible."). As Reliable Transfer indicates,
the Supreme Court has, for similar fairness reasons, often advanced regimes of
comparative fault and contribution. E.g., Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc.,
417 U.S. 106, 111 (1974) (adopting contribution in admiralty cases on grounds that "a
'more equal distribution of justice' can best be achieved by ameliorating the commonlaw rule against contribution").
Although many courts are reluctant to allow contribution to intentional wrongdoers,
there is no reason not to do so if they are seeking recovery from others who are equally
at fault. Langmore & Prentice, supra note 347, at 1068 ("[I]t is fair to allow intentional
wrongdoers to seek contribution from other intentional wrongdoers because their claim
for compensation arises not from the wrong done to the plaintiff, but from the righting
of that wrong.").
349. B. Franklin MacPherson, Comment, Contribution and the Distribution ofLoss
Among Tortfeasors, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 203, 213 (1975) ("The right to contribution is
not created by the tort,· but by satisfaction of the judgment, which repairs the harm done
by the tort. Hence, the contribution action is based not on a wrong, but upon its
compensation---an act which cannot be said to soil the hands of the perfonner.").
350. See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 266, at 91 (ex turpi causa defense inconsistent
with trend away from contributory negligence and consent defenses); Thayer, supra
note 189, at 341-42 (reinforcement of absolute effect of contributory negligence
defense's "discrimination against the plaintiff [by ex turpi causa] would come oddly at
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the joint wrongdoer context, like the common-law no-contribution rule,
it leaves the total loss upon just one of two wrongdoers. 351
In short, there has been a generally irresistible tide in western comm.on
and statutory law away from the harsh regimes of contributory negligence, volenti, and no-contribution. 352 Just like the ex turpi causa
defense, all three doctrines were originally based upon the courts'
reluctance to assist wrongdoers. All three doctrines have been greatly
restricted or even eliminated in order to enhance the equity and justice
of western law.
To revive ex turpi causa as an absolute defense is, in the words of
Professor Weinrib, "retrograde."353 It allows judges to reach harsh
results that are inconsistent with both the modem comparative fault and
assumption of risk defenses, thereby undermining the purposes of the
more modem approaches,3 54 many of which are based on legislative
enactment. Indeed, "[O]ne is left with the feeling that contributory
negligence apportionment provides a far safer tool for doing substantial
justice on a case-to-case basis, and produces results more likely to appeal
to 'fair-minded and right thinking people' than this stark and retributive
defence of illegality." 55

2.

The Limited Role of Ex Turpi Causa

Earlier discussions noted a few very limited situations in which t];ie
defense of ex turpi causa is properly applied in tort cases. Essentially,
there are three such situations. First, ex turpi causa should serve as a
a time when the defense itself is crumbling at many points under attacks both legislative
and judicial"); Note, The Plaintiff's Breach of Statutory Duty as a Bar in an Action of
Tort, 39 HARV. L. REV. 1088, 1090 (1926) (ex turpi causa 's "continued advocacy seems
particularly unfortunate at a time when the rigor of the defence of contributory
negligence is being gradually relaxed").
351. Williams, supra note 11 l, at 752 (ex turpi causa allows defendants "to turn
the flank of contributory negligence and side-step the statutory prohibition against

volentt').
352. See Jordan H. Liebman, Comparative Contribution and Intentional Torts: A
Remaining Roadblock to Damages Apportionment, 30 AM. Bus. L.J. 677, 677 (1993)
("The trend to apportion damages among parties in tort litigation has proceeded
inexorably, yet cautiously, in the United States.").
353. Weinrib, supra note 190, at 37.
354. MacDougall, supra note 191, at 38, 41.
355. John Levine, Annotation, in Mongovius v. Marchand, 44 C.C.L.T. 18 (B.C.
1988), quoted in Pierre Legrand Jr., La dynamique de l'impunite: autour de la defense
d'ex turpi causa en common law des de/its civils, 36 McGILL L.J. 609, 629 (1991).
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defense if the legislature has made it clear that a law it has enacted is to
disable violators from civil recovery. 356 Second, plaintiffs should not
profit from their wrongdoing by (a) recovering as damages lost wages
or earnings from illegal enterprises, (b) recovering punitive damages
over and above compensatory damages, 357 or (c) somehow placing
themselves in a position superior to that of law abiders. 358 Third,
plaintiffs should not be allowed to receive compensation in tort for
criminal fines or other punishments the law has imposed upon them, 359
or to recover money or property properly seized by the law enforcement
authorities,360 thereby stultifying the criminal law. 361
The rationale for this very limited role for the ex turpi causa defense
in tort law has been best explained by Judge McLachlin in his thoughtful
opinion in Hall v. Herbert. Although he expressed some sympathy for
the view expressed by Judge Cory that the defense should be totally
eliminated, he stated:
My own view is that courts should be allowed to bar recovery in tort on the
ground of the plaintiff's immoral or illegal conduct only in very limited
circumstances. The basis of this power, as I see it, lies in the duty of the courts
to preserve the integrity of the legal system, and is exercisable only where this
concern is in issue. This concern is in issue where a damage award in a civil
suit would, in effect, allow a person to profit from illegal or wrongful conduct,
or would permit an evasion or rebate of a penalty prescribed by the criminal
law. The idea common to these instances is that the law refuses to give by its
right hand what it takes away by its left hand. 362

356. See supra part IV.A (explaining that this will be a very rare occurrence).
357. Even this rule arguably punishes plaintiff in some cases. Denial of punitive
damages, it has been pointed out, may leave plaintiff undercompensated given that onethird of the compensatory damages will likely go to plaintiffs lawyer. Fleming, supra
note 277, at 179 n.21.
.
358. See supra notes 263-64 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 261-62 and accompanying text; see also Blain v. The Doctor's
Co., 222 Cal. App. 3d 1065, 272 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1990) (denying recovery to a doctor
who lied at deposition in civil case to his ultimate detriment from insurance defense
counsel who allegedly advised him to do so); Feld & Sons v. Pechner, 458 A.2d 545
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (denying recovery to plaintiffs convicted of federal perjury and
other crimes from counsel who allegedly urged them to commit the offenses); Kirkland
v. Mannis, 639 P.2d 671 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (denying recovery to plaintiff perjurer from
attorney who allegedly cooperated in the perjurious tale).
360. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text (discussing a New Zealand case
that erroneously allowed such a recovery).
361. In a roughly analogous situation, some courts have held that savings and loan.
officials accused of wrongdoing should not be allowed to raise in their defense the
contributory negligence of government regulators in failing to detect and report the
wrongdoing. See, e.g., In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 818 F. Supp. 840-41 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
(holding that an auditor defendant was not allowed to raise FDIC's careless regulation,
as part of a comparative negligence defense).
362. Hall v. Herbert, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 159, 169 (emphasis added). After surveying
a number of cases, Judge McLachlin also concluded that the best explanation for their
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This is certainly not a new idea in the law. Many years ago an
American court noted that "[t]he law is not properly chargeable with the
absurdity of implying an obligation to do that which it forbids." 363
Similarly, the law is not properly chargeable with the absurdity of
allowing a plaintiff to profit from acts which it forbids or allowing a
plaintiff to avoid a punishment which the law prescribes.
After examining several examples consistent with the rules described
above, Judge McLachlin submitted that the "fundamental rationale for
the defence of ex turpi causa ... [is] based on the need to maintain
internal consistency in the law, in the interest of promoting the integrity
of the justice system."364
Thus, the instincts of the courts applying the public policy approach
have been correct all along. Civil tort plaintiffs should not actually
profit from wrongdoing. The criminal law should not be neutralized.
Unfortunately, the courts have painted with too broad a brush. In all of
its various manifestations-duty rule, public policy approach, proximate
cause rule, etc.--the ex turpi causa defense has generally been applied
much too broadly. If the doctrine is to do ·more good than harm in the
tort context, it must be strictly limited (indeed, nearly eliminated) as
discussed in this part.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Holmes once said that law is "the witness and external deposit of our
moral life. Its history is the history· of the moral development of the

holdings was not simply a desire to prevent plaintiffs from profiting from their
wrongdoing:
A more satisfactory explanation for these cases, I would venture, is that to
allow recovery in these cases would be to allow recovery for what is illegal.
It would put the courts in the position of saying that the same conduct is both
legal, in the sense of being capable of rectification by the court, and illegal.
It would, in short, introduce an inconsistency in the law. It is particularly
important in this context that we bear in mind that the law must aspire to be
a unified institution, the parts of which--contract,tort, the criminal law-must
be in essential harmony. For the courts to punish conduct with the one hand
while rewarding it with the other, would be to "create an intolerable fissure in
the law's conceptually seamless web." We thus see that the concern, put at
its most fundamental, is with the integrity of the legal system.
Id. at 176 (quoting Weinrib, supra note 190, at 42).
363. Edison Blee. Co. v. City of Pasadena, 178 F. 425,431 (9th Cir. 1910).
364. Hall, 2 S.C.R. at 178 (emphasis added).

131

race."365 Tort law, particularly, has a strong moral component.366
Nothing should be done to undermine Holmes's description or to lend
the judicial system's support to advance wrongdoing. However, "[m]oral
indignation must not be mistaken for public policy."367 For that
reason, the answer to the question posed in the title of this Article is
"no." The obscure equitable doctrine ex turpi causa non oritur actio
should not be used in a misguided attempt to blunt the litigation crisis
in the United States or in other western common-law nations.
Though contract law and tort law each have a strong moral component, moral standards are just one of several public policy considerations
that go into shaping both bodies of law.368 The law-and tort law
especially-does not distribute compensation based on who is a good
person and who is not. 369 The ex turpi causa defense blurs the lines
between our gut hesitation to aid a wrongdoer and the more important
public policies underlying tort law, allowing the former to exert undue
influence. 370 The doctrine leads the courts to focus improperly upon

365. 0. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,459 (1897); see
also A.L. GoODHART, ENGLISH LAW AND THE MORAL LAW 37 (1953) (noting that
"morality has played a particularly important part in the development of the common
law").
366. See SIMON F. LEE, LAW AND MORALS 18 (1986) ("Behind the technical law
of tort ... are competing moral principles...."); Ernest J. Weinrib, Thinking About
Tort Law, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 717, 717 (1992) (explaining the "moral ground" needed
to link a plaintiff and defendant in order to create liability). Professor Weinrib correctly
observes that tort law has an intrinsic moral component that renders simple economic
analysis of tort law inadequate. See Ernest J. Weinrib, The Special Morality of Tort
Law, 34 McGILL L.J. 403, 404 (1989).
_
367. Jenkins v. Smith, [1969] V.R. 267, 276 (Starke, J.). Holmes himself also said
that "[m]oral predilections must not be allowed to influence our minds in settling legal
distinctions." 0. w. HOLMES, JR. THE CO1™ON LAW 148 (1881).
368. See Shand, supra note 184, at 147 ("[T]he moralistic concept ofcontract law,
as opposed to utilitarian or pragmatic justifications for enforcing bargains, is open to
dispute.").
369.
F.C. Cronkite, Effect of the Violation of a Statute by the Plaintiff in a Tort
Action, 7 CAN. B. REV. 67, 83 (1929) ("When a defendant comes into court and argues
that he should not make good the damage he has caused, and gives as his sole reason
that the plaintiff is also a bad man, he is making the oldest retort of the human mind
when charged with evil.").
CHRISTOPHER F. MOONEY, S.J., PUBLIC VIRTUE at xi (1986) ("Morality and
370.
public policy may be related.. . But the two are also clearly distinct, since not every
ethical value promotes the common good.").
An obvious example of the distinction between moral obligation and legal obligation
lies in the "Good Samaritan" doctrine, holding that there is no legal obligation to
emulate the hero of the famous Biblical parable. Luke 10:30-37. See also Robert A.
Prentice, Expanding the Duty to Rescue, 19 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 15 (1985) (arguing,
primarily on public policy grounds, for a limitation on the Good Samaritan doctrine). See
generally FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 1 (2d ed. 1986) ("A sharp
distinction was recognized between the obligations of the common law and those of
ethics or humanitarianism.").
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the punctilios of the plaintiff rather than the public policy factors that
should underlie a reasoned assignment of legal responsibility. 371
The problem is particularly acute in cases where the plaintiff's
illegality involves a simple breach of a regulatory statute,372 and cases
in which there is no illegality at all, but simply a breach of moral
standards. 373 Cases where ex turpi causa allows an immoral defendant
to escape an otherwise applicable legal duty are also especially
troublesome.
Even in the contract area where the illegality doctrine was born and
developed, it has vexed the judiciary,374 and its application has been
the subject of frequent criticism by legal commentators both in the
United States and abroad. 375 Indeed, New Zealand has gone so far as

In criminal law also, the emphasis on morality can inappropriately overwhelm other
public policy factors. In drafting the Model Penal Code, the American Law Institute
noted this fact, stating: "We deem it inappropriate for the government to attempt to
control behavior that has no substantial significance except to the morality of the actor.
Such matters are best left to religious, educational and other social influences." MODEL
PENAL CODE§ 207.1 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955).
371. Weinrib, supra note 190, at 37 ("Thus in Godbolt the fact that the litigants
happened to be engaged in the theft of cattle when the defendant negligently drove his
truck off the road and injured the plaintiff seems more pertinent to an assessment of the
plaintiffs character than to the ascription of responsibility to the defendant for his
careless act.").
372. In a contract case, such a consideration led Lord Devlin to note that the
illegality defense "cares not at all for the element of deliberation or the gravity of the
infraction, and does not adjust the penalty to the profits unjustifiably earned." St. John
Shipping Corp. v. Joseph Rank, Ltd., [1957] 1 Q.B. 267, 281. The same criticism may
be made of most approaches to the illegality defense in tort cases. It seems particularly
important that the injured plaintiff not be rendered a wolfs head (or, perhaps, a Zoe
Baird) for a minor, technical violation of regulatory standards.
373. Hubert W. Smith, Antecedent Grounds ofLiability in the Practice of Surgery,
14 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 233, 271 (1942) ("Why should a breach of morals destroy a
legal right of action when it will not confer one?").
374. Andrew Beck, Illegality and the Courts' Discretion: The New Zealand Illegal
Contracts Act in Action, 13 N.Z. U. L. REV. 389, 389 (1989) ("Illegal contracts have
always provided something of a headache to the judiciary ...."); R.A. Buckley,
Illegality in Contract and Conceptual Reasoning, 12 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 280, 281
(1983) ("[T]his branch of the law [has produced] an unusually high proportion of cases
in which the judicial reasoning seems both questionable and difficult to follow.");
Strong, supra note 267, at 347 ("The illegality of contracts constitutes a vast, confusing
and rather mysterious area of the law.").
375. See generally Brian Coote, Another Look at Bowmakers v. Barnet
Instruments, 35 MOD. L. REV. 38, 38 (1972) ("The common law on illegal contracts is
Draconian ... in all conscience.... "); Shand, supra note 184, at 167 ("The frequently
expressed dissatisfaction of the judges with the consequences of applying the present
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to replace the common-law doctrine with a new statutory scheme. 376
If courts have developed a wariness about the illegality defense even in
contract cases,377 how much greater must the problems be when it is
transplanted to the relatively foreign soil of tort law?378
Whether the context be tort law, contract law, or criminal law, judges
must not be overly fastidious, fearing that they will muss their robes if
they must hear unsavory evidence or consider the claims of unwholesome individuals. Justice, not an elevated sense of judicial propriety,
must be the guiding star.
None of the cases discussed in part II of this Article379--not even
that of Bernard McCummings----should be dismissed on ex turpi causa
grounds. Use of the ex turpi causa defense beyond the limited
parameters outlined in this Article serves no good purpose; rather, it
undermines the compensatory and fairness features of our tort law
system.
Notwithstanding all the foregoing discussion, the McCummings
verdict, mentioned in the introductory quotations, still grates at a visceral
level. This grating may not go away when it is remembered that of all
the scenarios discussed in part II as possibly giving rise to an ex turpi
causa defense, the McCummings case involved, by a wide margin, the
most serious form of plaintiff misconduct. The answer to this visceral
irritation is two simple words: Rodney King. Carelessly applied, as it
often is in other western common-law jurisdictions, the ex turpi causa
defense would likely have barred any suit brought by Rodney King
against the Los Angeles Police Department for injuries sustained during

illegality rules is ample indication of their desire to be freed from them."); ·Hazel Carty,
Illegal Contracts of Employment, Void or Contractually Unenforceable?, NEW L.J.,
Aug. 20, 1981, at 871; K. Gillance & A.N. Khan, Effect of Illegality in Contract of
Employment, SOLIC. J., March 27, 1981, at 212, 213.
376. See generally Brian Coote, Validation Under the Illegal Contracts Act, 15
N.Z. U. L. REV. 80 (1992).
377. Royal Bank of Can. v. Grohman, 18 O.R.2d 636, 651-52 (1977) (Krever, J.)
("[M]odern judicial thinking has developed in a way that has considerably refined the
knee-jerk reflexive reaction to a plea of illegality.").
378. As MacDougall explains:
Ex turpi causa non oritur actio works in contract law because the plaintiff
has consented to what he or she (presumably) knows is an illegal arrangement.
The court cannot be used to enforce what the plaintiff expected to derive from
an illegal arrangement. In tort cases, the situation is different. The plaintiff,
presumably, is punished by the criminal or other law for the wrong he or she
has committed and is deprived of all other profits that he or she might have
expected from the wrongful act. To say that the plaintiff must also bear the
burden of uncontemplated damages for which he or she is not "at fault" is
insupportable.
MacDougall, supra note 191, at 38.
379. See supra notes 57-74 and accompanying text.
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the notorious video-taped beating. Rodney King has not lived his life
as a model citizen, but his alleged criminal acts on the night in question
(and those occurring before and since) do not disentitle him from the
protection of the law. Nor should they neutralize the other public policy
factors that might mitigate in favor of a judgment against the police in
his case. If what appears on the videotape to have happened actually did
happen, the jury's $3.8 million verdict in favor of Mr. King was
certainly justifiable.380 There may be a principled method of distinguishing between the Rodney King and Bernard McCummings cases, but
the ex turpi causa doctrine cannot provide it. 381 Both are excessiveuse-of-force cases and entitlement to recovery should tum on factual
determinations unaffected by the ex turpi causa defense.
Legislatures and courts should not revive the ex turpi causa defense
in tort cases. They should not hastily undermine the compensatory
function of tort law in order to effectuate some perceived need to reduce
the amount of existing tort litigation.

380. King Jury May Be Key to Appeal, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 3, 1994, at
SA.
381. Up to this point, I have not directly defended the McCummings verdict.
However, the verdict is definitely defensible. There was substantial evidence that the
shooting officer, Officer Rodriguez, who had several earlier incidents of questionable use
of his firearm, (a) did not see the mugging take place, (b) shot the unarmed
McCummings as McCummings was running away and posing no threat to Rodriguez or
others, (c) did so in clear violation of guidelines imposed by his employer in accordance
with Supreme Court mandate, and (d) lied about his actions on the witness stand (his
testimony was contradicted by _the testimony of McCummings, of the mugging victim,
of his fellow officers, and by the available physical evidence-unless it is possible for
a person to run down a flight of stairs after having his spinal cord severed in the midchest area). See generally McCummings v. New York City Transit Auth., 580 N.Y.S.2d
931 (1992), ajf'd, 613 N.E.2d 559 (N.Y. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 548 (1993).
The recovery by McCummings from the tortfeasor has the advantage of providing him
with funds needed to compensate his victim who sued him for damages. William
Murphy, Mugging Victim Wins Court Order, NEWSDAY, Dec. 24, 1993, at 24. It will
also pay his attorney's fees from his criminal defense.
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